FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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GERMANY'S COLONIAL DEMANDS

By Hjalmar Schacht

THE American reader will think that the problem of colonial possessions for Germany is no concern of his. For that reason I should like to refer to two points which are of importance from an American standpoint in the solution of this problem. First of all, I do not believe that the world economy can enjoy lasting prosperity without Germany's participation. If Germany were isolated, one might say that the world could survive the loss of a market of some seventy million people, that seventy million consumers, more or less, make very little difference to the world at large. But no such isolation of Germany is possible because the whole of Eastern Europe simply cannot dispense with the German market.

The Eastern European countries are predominantly agrarian. For them the German market is a matter of life and death. At the present time Germany receives some 14 percent of the exports of Poland, 16 percent of those of Czechoslovakia, 17 percent of those of Austria, 30 percent of those of Hungary, 49 percent of those of Bulgaria, 20 percent of those of Rumania, 36 percent of those of Jugoslavia, 45 percent of those of Greece and 64 percent of those of Turkey. Consequently, the disappearance of Germany from the world market would have most unwelcome results for the whole of Eastern Europe. Nor is it of much less importance to the Scandinavian countries. No one must forget this importance of Germany, situated as she is in the heart of Europe, with her highly developed population and her high standard of living. European prosperity cannot be conceived of without German prosperity. And however much America may wish to stand aloof, there is not the slightest doubt that the ebb and flow of European prosperity is important to her.

The second reason why the United States cannot remain in-

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different to the German colonial problem is moral. Even though the United States finally refused to ratify the Versailles Peace Treaty, it nevertheless was President Wilson who, by the proclamation of his Fourteen Points, provided the occasion for peace negotiations. Point Five of the Wilson program concerning colonies was one of the points on which Germany relied when she entered into those negotiations. And this, moreover, after the American Government had received from the Allied Powers the assurance, and had conveyed that assurance to Germany, that the Fourteen Points would constitute the basis of peace. Point Five of the Wilson program reads as follows:

> A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interest of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

Germany was perfectly ready to submit her colonial claims to the test provided for in Point Five, the more so because Colonel House, the President's friend and collaborator, in his well-known Lyons wireless in October 1918, had given the following interpretation of President Wilson's conception: "The stipulation is that in the case of the German colonies the title is to be determined after the conclusion of the war by 'impartial adjustment' based on certain principles. These are of two kinds: 1. 'Equitable' claims. 2. The interests of the populations concerned." Colonel House then referred specifically to Germany, and said: "What are the 'equitable' claims put forth by Germany? That she needs access to tropical raw materials, that she needs a field for the expansion of her population, that under the principles of peace proposed, conquest gives her enemies no title to her colonies." [1]

[1] *Editor's Note.* Although American authorities have recognized the moral obligations imposed by the Fourteen Points, many of them will learn here for the first time that the interpretation of the Fourteen Points sent to President Wilson from Paris by Colonel House in a cable dated October 29, 1918, had in some manner become known to the German Government at that time, *i.e.* two weeks before the Armistice. The implication of Dr. Schacht's statement might be that Colonel House's message (the reference to it as a wireless from Lyons is obscure) was intercepted by the German authorities. The message in question transmitted a memorandum prepared for Colonel House, largely by Walter Lippmann. The sentences quoted above by Dr. Schacht appear in that memorandum. The full text is printed by Charles Seymour in Volume IV (p. 192–200) of "The Intimate Papers of Colonel House," published in 1928. It also is given by David Hunter Miller in "My Diary at the Conference of Paris," Volume II, pages 69–80, privately printed in New York in 1924.

The full text of the section of the memorandum dealing with Article V reads as follows:

"Some fear is expressed in France and England that this involves the reopening of all colonial questions. Obviously it is not so intended. It applies clearly to those colonial claims which have

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Just as it is impossible for the Government of Great Britain to ignore, in the face of history, the solemn assurance it gave at the beginning of the World War that it did not wish to annex the German colonies, so it is equally impossible for the American people to ignore the solemn declarations made by their Chief Executive and his collaborator.

It was not the German Government that brought the war into the colonial territories. It was not the German Government that brought the colored peoples into the World War, an act the consequences of which we now see in the widespread unrest prevailing amongst the colored races. The Congo Act of 1885, in which England, France, Belgium and Germany participated, provided that the signatory Powers in case of war would renounce the use of the Congo Basin as a basis for war-like operations. On August 23, 1914, Germany suggested to her opponents that the colonies should be left out of the war. France and England did not follow this suggestion. They not only violated the Congo Act, but brought the war into the German colonies. Germany's entire colonial military power was only some 7,000 men in all the colonies put together. They had no significance

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been created by the war. That means the German colonies and any other colonies which may come under international consideration as a result of the war.

"The stipulation is that in the case of the German colonies the title is to be determined after the conclusion of the war by 'impartial adjustment' based on certain principles. These are of two kinds: 1. 'Equitable' claims: 2. The interests of the populations concerned.

"What are the 'equitable' claims put forth by Britain and Japan, the two chief heirs of the German colonial empire, that the colonies cannot be returned to Germany? Because she will use them as submarine bases, because she will arm the blacks, because she uses the colonies as bases of intrigue, because she oppresses the natives. What are the 'equitable' claims put forth by Germany? That she needs access to tropical raw materials, that she needs a field for the expansion of her population, that under the principles of peace proposed, conquest gives her enemies no title to her colonies.

"What are the 'interests of the populations'? That they should not be militarized, that exploitation should be conducted on the principle of the open door, and under the strictest regulation as to labor conditions, profits and taxes, that a sanitary régime be maintained, that permanent improvements in the way of roads, etc., be made, that native organization and custom be respected, that the protecting authority be stable and experienced enough to thwart intrigue and corruption, that the protecting power have adequate resources in money and competent administrators to act successfully.

"It would seem as if the principle involved in this proposition is that a colonial power acts not as owner of its colonies, but as trustee for the natives and for the interests of the society of nations, that the terms on which the colonial administration is conducted are a matter of international concern and may legitimately be the subject of international inquiry and that the peace conference may, therefore, write a code of colonial conduct binding upon all colonial powers."

Professor Seymour states ("Intimate Papers," v. V, p. 153) that in reply to the House cable of October 29, President Wilson the next day cabled from Washington that the comment on the Fourteen Points was "a satisfactory interpretation of the principles involved," but that the details of the application mentioned should be regarded as merely illustrative suggestions.

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other than to act as a police force for the maintenance of law and order. The inhabitants of the colonies were never used for German military purposes, whereas France brought over half a million colored soldiers and put them into the field against Germany. I make these preliminary remarks in order to show clearly that for Germany the colonial question is not today, any more than it was before, a question of Imperialism or Militarism. To this day it is still essentially a question of her economic existence.

In the golden age before the World War the problem of colonies and raw materials did not have the importance it has today. This is as true for Germany as for other countries. Before the war, Germany's world investments were in round figures 12,000 million dollars, the profits of which could be used to buy raw materials all over the world. The markets where raw materials were procured were completely free. Very seldom were the development and distribution of raw materials controlled by cartels, and on the rare occasions when raw materials were cornered the situation was only temporary. Long-term commercial treaties assured the freedom of international trade. All the important countries were on the gold standard, and this provided a sure basis for commercial calculations. Emigration and immigration, between the young countries and the old, was open and was looked on with favor.

All these elementary principles of international trade and intercourse have now disappeared. Strict regulations govern immigration into almost all the countries where formerly immigrants were welcome. The gold standard has been abandoned by nearly every country. Commercial treaties are concluded only for brief periods, and in their place have come quotas and restrictions, to say nothing of constant increases in more effective tariffs. German investments abroad have been taken away without compensation, and the markets where raw materials are to be procured are largely subject to the same restrictions that prevail in other fields of commerce. In recent years we have seen the results of this policy. World trade has fallen to almost one-third of its previous maximum. Credit machinery has ceased to function. Confidence in international payments has been extinguished. Every merchant and investor is chary of investments in foreign countries.

In view of the decline in international commercial relations, the more important countries have fallen into the habit of ex-

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ploiting more intensively the economic territories at their disposal. Much is said nowadays to the effect that Germany is striving for autarchy. People entirely forget that this autarchy has long since been achieved by such countries as France and Great Britain, not to mention Russia and the United States. Autarchy can be easily achieved — in fact it naturally exists — in an economic region which is supplied with almost all raw materials, provided it enjoys the same monetary system throughout. The British devaluation would never have had the success which it achieved if Great Britain had not been able to bring the monetary system of the Dominions onto the same basis as her own. France could never have used her colonial empire so successfully if it had not been administered under the same monetary system as the mother country.

I should like to quote some figures to indicate the extent to which autarchy has progressed in the British and French Empires. The share of the British Dominions, colonies and protectorates in the imports of Great Britain rose during the last twelve years from about 31 to about 42 percent; and their share in British exports rose from about 41 to about 49 percent. The imports of France from her colonies increased in the last ten years from about 10 to about 26 percent, and her exports to the colonies increased from about 14 to about 32 percent. So vast is the geographical expanse of the United States of America, so enormous its wealth, that it is much less dependent than other countries on an exchange of goods with the outside world. In its natural wealth lies the explanation of the fact that its 125,000,000 people have only a ten percent share of the world's trade, whereas the 45,000,000 people of Great Britain have more than 14 percent. Of course the circumstances are even more favorable in Russia, which is not so developed and contains almost all kinds of raw materials.

As against these great national economic domains stand the countries with large populations but limited territories. Because of their inadequate land resources they are much more dependent than the others upon the international exchange of goods. These two kinds of countries have lately been classified as the "Haves" and the "Have-nots."

To their astonishment, statesmen have now become conscious of the fact that the British Empire has more than a quarter of the earth's surface at its disposal, and that one-quarter of the world's

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wheat, one-half of the world's wool and rubber, one-quarter of the world's coal, one-third of the world's copper and almost all the world's nickel is produced within the confines of that Empire. It was recently stated in the House of Lords that of an estimated twenty-five different varieties of essential raw materials, the British Empire was amply supplied in its own territory with no less than eighteen, was supplied to a certain extent in two cases, and was deficient only in five.

Germany, on the contrary, as the same speaker in the House of Lords pointed out, was sufficiently supplied by its own production in only four cases, was more or less adequately supplied in two, and was completely without supplies in nineteen. In Italy and Japan conditions are equally unfavorable. The speaker in the House of Lords appropriately added that, "in these circumstances it was not surprising that there was unrest in Germany, Japan and Italy; it was true that Great Britain was probably the most peace loving country in the world; that was because she had got all that she wanted." What is particularly interesting in this statement is the connection established by the speaker between the control of raw materials and the love of peace. He very rightly recognizes that a nation which is cut off from the essential necessities of life must be a source of unrest in the world.

Now, however, events have unfortunately occurred to make Germany's case very different from that of similarly situated countries like Japan and Italy. Despite the League of Nations and its alleged assurances of peace, Japan has meanwhile decided to help herself and has acquired Manchuria; while Italy, by the conquest of Abyssinia, has expanded the territory which she requires for her life. As a result, Japan and Italy are no longer amongst the unsatisfied nations. They have left the Have-nots and have joined the ranks of the Haves, those nations which are satisfied. Germany remains the lone unsatisfied large Power. So long, then, as the problem of colonial raw materials is not solved for Germany, so long will she remain a source of unrest despite all her love of peace. It is that love of peace which still permits her to entertain the hope that she can solve the colonial problem peacefully and that she can take her place in the ranks of the Haves.

In the year 1929, when the extension of ample credit to Germany still concealed her economic situation, and while the international gold standard still flourished, 4,400 million dollars

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out of the 5,630 million dollars which Germany paid for imports went for food stuffs, raw materials and semi-manufactured goods. In the year 1935, the import total had declined to 1,680 million dollars, of which 1,400 million dollars were devoted to food stuffs, raw materials and semi-manufactured goods. The extent to which German production has been throttled is obvious. Of the 1,400 million dollars spent for imports, 600 million were devoted to food stuffs alone, and only 800 million went for raw materials and semi-manufactured goods. Any such quantity of raw materials is far below what Germany normally needs to keep her industries going and maintain the standard of life of her people. The false dawn which foreign credits brought to Germany in 1925–1930 following the institution of the Dawes Plan, made way for cruel reality when this credit inflation ceased and the world economic crisis occurred. It is either silly or cynical, in the face of such facts, for foreign commentators to declare that Germany can buy raw materials in the world market at will. No, Germany cannot do that because she does not possess the means of paying for them in foreign currencies; and she does not possess the means because foreign countries do not consume enough of her wares.

In the circumstances, it can hardly be a matter of surprise that Germany should try to increase her ability to produce raw materials in her own country by forced and artificial means. We know very well that even if we succeed in replacing with artificial native products a number of raw materials normally supplied by the world market we can do this only at high cost. So we ought to reject autarchy on principle, because it will necessarily lead to a lowering of the standard of life of the German people. But we have no choice so long as political conditions do not permit German colonial activity. There will be no peace in Europe until this problem is solved. No great nation willingly allows its standard of life and culture to be lowered and no great nation accepts the risk that it will go hungry.

I should like to make perfectly clear that autarchy, whether natural or produced artificially, cannot possibly be an ideal. It is opposed to the general principles of civilization. Autarchy means isolation from the rest of the world. A reduction in commercial relations reduces the exchange of products of the intellect; the means of exchange in scientific, artistic and cultural fields are destroyed. A national economy based on the autarchic

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principle produces mental autarchy. As minds grow narrower there is an increase in the estrangement which has unfortunately existed between the great Powers for many years owing to political factors. Heretofore mankind has progressed only by means of the exchange of intellectual goods; and only by such an exchange can it resume a healthy development.

A considerable school of opinion holds that all that is needed is to restore the international exchange of goods. Germany's share will thus be increased, and she will again be able to purchase raw materials. These are the people who are always talking of free trade and the lowering of tariff walls. Everybody agrees with them, but no one has yet succeeded in translating their ideals into reality. The reason for this is very simple. It lies in the fact that a nation's economic strength plays an extraordinarily important part in determining its political situation. Today the possession of raw materials has become a political factor, just as the voluntary change of the currency standard has become a political instrument. People think that by withholding or sharing raw materials the political situation of a political opponent or friend can be correspondingly influenced. This theory was sadly exemplified in the famous sanctions agreements of the League of Nations. It was imagined that by means of an economic boycott the political necessities of life could be denied a country, or deliberately limited. We saw the policy in operation against Italy. The Italian example proves that no nation with any claim to honor and worth will willingly submit to such a policy. For any nation to live at the mercy of another is a complete impossibility. The spirit which prompts the idea is not that of a League of Nations; it is not the spirit of peace. It is a spirit which drives nations apart and into war. A great nation that sees itself exposed to such a danger will employ all its powers to avoid it. No friend of peace can ever approve of measures intended to cut off great Powers from the natural treasures of the earth.

A particularly ridiculous charge to which Germany has often to listen in connection with her colonial demands is that colonies in general and her former colonies in particular are valueless, and that it would not do Germany any good if her colonies were returned to her. This immediately prompts the retort: If the colonies are so bad, why do you keep them? It is also misleading to refer to the minor part played by the colonies in Germany's prewar foreign trade. I have already pointed out that before the war

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free trade prevailed on a large scale and that Germany had valuable resources in the form of foreign investments. Consequently, it was not necessary before the war for Germany to develop her colonies with particular energy. It nevertheless is astonishing what Germany did with her colonies before the war without any great effort. They had been in her possession, on the average, for only some twenty-five years, from the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties. But during those twenty-five years Germany did more with her colonies than other countries had done in two hundred and fifty years.

At the outbreak of the World War, that is, after two decades of German administration, the German colonies had ceased to be a burden on the mother country. In fact, the financial balance was so well established that even the colonial railway loans had been paid for by the earnings of the colonies. Only the seven thousand police troops were supported by the mother country. During the fifteen years before the war, the external trade of the German colonies had increased seven-fold. That happened in a time when Germany did not experience a scarcity of raw materials and foreign currency, in a time when world trade had not been interrupted by political and economic mistrust, in a time when the struggles of different currency systems were not being fought out, in a time, therefore, when Germany had no particular need to intensify her trade with her colonies. Today, when there no longer is free trade in the world, when Germany is crushed by foreign debts and harassed by the lack of raw materials and valuta, if her colonies were returned to her she would proceed to develop them with far greater intensity. A large part of the food supplies and raw materials which we now lack could be furnished by them.

Of course there are short-sighted people who declare that if Germany got back her colonies they would compete with the other countries which supply raw materials, to the disadvantage of these latter. This is simply the eternally recurring, short-sighted, unbusinesslike attitude of all those people who are constantly afraid of any new development. It was this attitude which found expression in England in the nineties, when it was said that every Englishman would be the richer if only Germany were crushed.

Even the stupidest person, I believe, would admit today that the English are not richer by one penny because of the World War and the Versailles Treaty. Their trade has dwindled, like that of

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every other country, and their financial burdens have increased exactly like those of other nations. If Germany could expand economically by acquiring her own basis of raw materials, this could only contribute to the stimulation of world trade in general. It would help to increase consumption, promote prosperity, and raise the standard of life, not only of the German people, but of the entire industrial world. At no time in history did the prosperity of world trade reach such a peak as during the years of peace before the war, when the economic competition of all countries was vigorous. For example, trade between Great Britain and Germany was never so active as at the time before the war when these two countries were engaged in fair industrial competition.

In matters of foreign politics, the American people, despite their youth — or perhaps because of it — have for the most part shown a healthy, human, moral attitude. It is true that, for reasons which are gradually being seen in their true light, the American people joined in the war. But they rightly refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty, because it was an immoral treaty. I know very well, and I wish here to confess it openly, that many things that are happening in Germany today are not approved of by a large section of the American people. But may I, just as frankly, ask Americans this question: What would they themselves do, after having lost a war which they fought in the conviction that it was for their existence, if they then were oppressed for twenty long years by an unjust peace imposed by the victors, and on top of that were deprived by their opponents of the necessities of life?

The German people have been the torch-bearers of European culture for thousands of years, have been the model in every field of art, have produced the most creative figures in religion and in science. And this is the nation whose moral standing has been affronted and disparaged by its opponents for two decades! It is inconceivable that such treatment should not produce a profound reaction in the German people. Believe me, my American friends, when I say that this German people is still the same people that gave the world Luther and Goethe. For this reason it must and will live, for this reason it will continue to fight with all its strength for its place in the world.

Americans must not imagine that they can evade the moral responsibility laid on their shoulders by President Wilson. That

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this feeling of responsibility still exists in America is shown by the following statement by Colonel Edward M. House, the same man from whose Lyons wireless I have already quoted, and who recently wrote in *Liberty* as follows: "Every statesman will admit in private conversation that Germany, Italy and Japan need reservoirs into which to pour their man power and from which to draw those necessities and raw materials which nature denied them. But the great possessing nations — Great Britain, France, the United States and Russia — are unwilling to grant to their less fortunate fellows more than the crumbs that fall from their colonial table. Just as social peace cannot prevail without some adjustment of the capitalistic system, so international peace cannot be preserved without drastic territorial readjustments. Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States must receive Italy, Germany, and Japan on terms adjusted to present world conditions and recognize their insistence upon being given their proper part of the colonial resources of the world. Chaos and catastrophe will be upon us unless those that have among the Powers are willing to share in some way with those that have not."

The attitude towards German colonial needs has been modified a bit. In 1929, when I pointed out at the Young Conference that Germany's demand for colonies raised an essential condition for her economic survival, I was laughed at. But now a British minister, Sir Samual Hoare, speaking before the League of Nations in September of last year, has come forward in favor of a redistribution of the means of access to the world's raw material resources. The precise propositions and intentions that may lie behind that general formulation have not yet been revealed.

I therefore wish to name two conditions essential to the solution of Germany's raw material problem. First, Germany must produce her raw materials on territory under her own management. Second, this colonial territory must form part of her own monetary system. Colonial raw materials cannot be developed without considerable investments. Colonial markets are not of the kind that can live by the personal needs of the native population. Shirts and hats for the negroes and ornaments for their wives do not constitute an adequate market. Colonial territories are developed by the building of railways and roads, by automobile traffic, radio and electric power, by huge plantations, etc. From the moment that the German colonies came under the control of the Mandate Powers, Germany was cut off from the

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delivery of goods required for such investments. In 1913, for example, Germany's exports to Tanganyika formed 52.6 percent of that area's imports. In 1935 they formed 10.7 percent. The British Mandate Power as a matter of course places its orders in England and not in Germany or elsewhere. That is the reason why Germany needs colonial territories which she herself administers. Since, however, the development of colonies depends upon long term investments, and these investments cannot be made by the native negro population, the German currency system must prevail in the colonial territories, so that the required investments may be made with German credits. These, then, are Germany's two basic demands in the colonial field: that she have territories under German management and included in the German monetary system.

All the other questions involved — sovereignty, army, police, law, the churches, international collaboration — are open to discussion. They can all be solved by means of international cooperation so long as nothing unworthy is imputed against the honor of Germany. The German colonial problem is not a problem of imperialism. It is not a mere problem of prestige. It is simply and solely a problem of economic existence. Precisely for that reason the future of European peace depends upon it.

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THE ARMIES OF EUROPE

By Liddell Hart

NAPOLEON delivered himself of the saying that "Providence marches with the big battalions." He was often careless about contradicting himself and also about the way his sayings might be misinterpreted. This one was not altogether borne out in his practice, although he certainly relied on weight of numbers more than most of the great Captains. It was inevitable that this should be so owing to his disregard of the possibilities of making his forces qualitatively decisive through superior training or superior weapons. It was fostered by his unlimited resources — until the man power of France was exhausted. Even so, his victories were obtained more by manœuvring power as a result of massing superior numbers at the decisive point than by a mere total superiority.

His words, however, made a deep impression. And they were read in the more obvious sense. A generation later his famous German interpreter, Clausewitz, expressed the conviction that "superiority in numbers becomes every day more decisive." He at any rate had more excuse than the military authorities who, in all countries, have repeated his creed for a century. For when Clausewitz wrote the mechanical age was only dawning; whereas his followers persisted in the same delusion during the time that mechanical weapons were continually multiplying in nature and effect. They forgot how Alexander conquered Asia, how Hannibal defeated the Roman armies in their own land, how Belisarius reconquered the Roman Empire, how Jenghiz Khan swept over Asia and Europe, with forces far smaller than those opposing them. They forgot the still clearer proof of the value of superior armaments which was provided when Strongbow conquered Ireland with a few hundred knights, an astonishing lesson in the power of a technically decisive handful which was repeated by Cortez in Mexico, Pizarro in Peru, and Clive in India.

When the World War came in 1914 the fallacy of the "big battalions" theory was exposed by the mechanical progress which enabled one man sitting behind a machine-gun to account for more than a score, or sometimes a hundred, or sometimes even a thousand, who were advancing upon him with rifle and bayonet. The more the number of the attackers, the more the number of

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the dead — that was all in many cases. The contrast between qualitative and quantitative values was exemplified in another way at Cambrai on November 20, 1917, where the use of only 378 tanks and some 4,000 tankmen to assist a mere six divisions of infantry, produced a greater gain of ground and a greater shock to the enemy at a cost of some 5,000 casualties, than the use of several dozen divisions had achieved at Ypres in a three months' effort at a cost of 400,000 casualties. The contrast also illuminated the qualitative difference between different technical means — for at Ypres the British Higher Command rested their hopes on the use of 3,000 guns, and 120,000 gunners, who fired some 4½ million shells in the preliminary bombardment alone.

Yet, in spite of all the experience which shows that numbers have little real meaning, the governments and generals of Europe still continue on the whole to count their forces in terms of "numerical men." And the public is naturally of the same tendency. Such figures are more easy to grasp than the difficult and intricate assessment of qualitative values. And even if they throw little light on the military problem they do at least help to reveal the taxpayers' burden, for the pay and upkeep of the individual soldier forms by far the biggest proportion of any military budget. Since no survey of the armies of Europe would seem "factual" without these false figures, I will insert a few in my present account. They are as accurate as can be determined under the conditions of censorship and mystification which now prevail in many parts of Europe. And if the sum should be a million or so out, it will not much matter militarily from any practical point of view.

II

The British Army voted by Parliament consists of 152,000 officers and men, and of this total 34,000 are serving abroad. But a further 57,000 stationed in India belong to it, although while serving there they are not paid for by the British public. Thus nearly half the Regular Army is employed on foreign service even in quiet times. The troops at home are organized in five infantry divisions — one less than before the war, owing to the disbandment of the Irish regiments. Behind the Regular Army there is the Territorial Army, composed of civilian soldiers who spend a fortnight annually in camp, besides training in the evenings at their local drill hall. Its establishment is 182,000 but its strength at present is under 140,000.

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The British Army has many points of difference from the armies of the continent. They are large, it is small; they are raised by conscription, it depends on voluntary enlistment; they have short terms of service, it has a long term (seven years is the normal); they are raised from all classes, it is drawn from the poor. In the past the British Army largely depended for filling its ranks on those who were too uneducated and resourceless to find better-paid employment; and while the officers were drawn from the other social extreme, it was a family principle that the army was the vocation of those sons who were not likely to shine in other professions. If there has been some change in this basis, it persists sufficiently to be a handicap in days when the trend of warfare places an increasing premium on intelligence. Moreover, its social tradition tends to make the British Army highly conservative. On the other hand, it to some extent escapes the narrow professionalism of the continental officer corps through the fact that so many of its officers have independent means, and also because it sees service in such a variety of places.

This brings us to the greatest difference between the British and the continental armies. While their primary purpose is the defense of their own country — a euphemism which embraces attack on a neighboring country — that of the British Army is the defense of, and maintenance of order in, the British Empire. These duties have governed its basic organization. In the nineteenth century it became so predominantly a colonial service army as to become quite unfit, both quantitatively and qualitatively, to face the contingency of a European war. Thus in 1868 Mr. Cardwell, then Secretary of State for War, established the principle that there should be a battalion at home for each one maintained abroad. Under the "Cardwell system" the units at home provide drafts for those on foreign service, and the regiment, instead of being a fighting organization as in other armies, consists of linked home and foreign battalions, which never serve together but merely interchange officers and men. This interchange, combined with the fact that normal promotion is confined within the regiment, has tended to make the regiments (which cherish their distinctive titles and badges) a series of clans within the army. If the effect is to foster *esprit de corps*, it also acts as a check on change. The fact that colonial policing calls for infantry rather than the more modern arms which play a dominant part in continental warfare tends to produce the same result.

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Besides finding drafts for the overseas garrisons, the home army has also to serve as a potential expeditionary force, either to act as an imperial fire-brigade in coping with a serious outbreak in the overseas territories, or as a contribution to the collective forces ranged against an aggressive European power. This last rôle, if deeply rooted in British history, was only revived a few years before 1914, when an expeditionary force of six divisions was erected as part of the Haldane reforms. If its size was puny compared with the armies that the continental powers could mobilize, and its equipment barely as good as theirs, it had a definite qualitative advantage through longer training; from its hard experience in the Boer War it had learned the value of marksmanship, and thus in 1914 its volume of aimed rifle-fire took the Germans by surprise and created the impression that it possessed quantities of machine-guns. This fire capacity gave it a weight beyond its numbers, and, combined with the natural "sticking power" of the British soldier, enabled it to renew its traditional record in repelling attacks. But it showed less aptitude for the offensive; and as it grew in numbers it tended to expend them prodigally but unprofitably. In the tank, however, it produced the most important new offensive weapon of the war.

After the war Britain gave up conscription and went back from her wartime army of millions to one even smaller than she had had in 1914. Yet in one respect this postwar army took the lead. Instead of being content to copy continental ideas and practice, it developed a new school of military thought which went back to an older tradition and thence went forward, via its wartime experience with tanks, to a fresh conception of mobile mechanized warfare. The new ideas, although at first regarded as heresy or fantasy, eventually won general acceptance.

But in the translation of theory into terms of actual equipment Great Britain has fallen behind. The political desire to postpone measures of rearmament, the inherent conservatism of the senior military chiefs, the inelastic requirements of the Cardwell system, the retarding power of India — these are some of the factors that have put a brake on material progress. Another brake is to be found in the characteristic British tendency to seek technical perfection instead of going into production as soon as something that will be fairly effective has been found. The result is that the chief foreign armies already have a large quantity of modern

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mechanized troops, while Britain, despite the fact that her army is much smaller, is only beginning the task of reëquipment.

It was not until the end of 1935 that the British War Office embarked on a big scheme of thorough modernization. The cavalry were to be mechanized. Part was to be equipped with light tanks. The larger part was to be given a new kind of light motor vehicle with large wheels and oversize tires that can travel across country; it looks like an adaptation of the Irish jaunting car, the seating being so designed that each man on board can jump out easily and go instantly into action on foot. The intention is to create a mobile Division — taking the place of the old cavalry Division — to consist of two mechanized cavalry brigades and one tank brigade (the British Army has only one). At the same time, 28 battalions of infantry out of 136 are being converted into mechanized machine-gun units. It was originally intended to have one of these battalions in each infantry brigade, but it has now been decided to employ them as divisional and corps troops, while the infantry brigade will be reduced to three "rifle" battalions. These, relieved of their heavier and more complex weapons, will be easier to handle and train. Their manœuvring power is being improved by the motorization of their transport. Although called "rifle" battalions, each will have 52 light machine-guns — one in each section of six men — thus increasing their fire-power.

Actually, owing to the fact that the decision was taken so late, and that even then the execution of it was delayed by fresh changes of mind, the manufacture of all the new equipment required is likely to take some years. Meantime the successive emergencies in Egypt and Palestine during the past year have stripped the home army of equipment and men, leaving the expeditionary force a skeleton. This state of affairs has strengthened the arguments of those who hold that the home army should be designed and used simply as an imperial reserve. They would abandon the idea of its playing a part in continental warfare and leave to the Air Force any intervention called for by British obligations under the League Covenant or the Locarno Treaty.

III

The French Army exemplifies the fallacy of the old standards of gauging strength. If we judge by total numbers it would appear the "strongest" in Europe, apart from the Russian. That idea is reinforced if we take account of trained reserves of men and

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stored reserves of war material. Thus arose the impression that the French Army was, at any rate until recently, a serious potential threat to Germany. Actually, the numbers had small offensive meaning under modern conditions; a large proportion of them were abroad; and most of the war material was old. Although 22 tank battalions are maintained in France, most of them are still equipped with machines left from the last war, slightly renovated. They are slow machines. They are to be employed to help the infantry forward, yet they possess a very limited capacity for crossing obstacles to achieve their purpose.

The French Army comprises 20 infantry divisions, 5 cavalry divisions, and 5 colonial infantry divisions which serve as a "mobile force" ready for dispatch to deal with trouble overseas. The total "strength" is some 640,000; but of these nearly 200,000 are serving in North Africa and other colonies. Conscript service is still nominally for one year. Contingents are now being held for an extra year, however, due to recent German military expansion and to the shrinkage of the annual contingent of young men reaching military age (caused by the fall of the birth-rate during the World War). This shrinkage, together with the need for adequately trained personnel in the mechanized arms, has also led the French to enlist an increased number of long-service professional soldiers as a corps of specialists. A maximum of 117,000 has been legally sanctioned; but the terms of employment are not sufficiently attractive, and so far only some 80,000 have been found.

Until recently the French Army's horizon was bounded by 1918. It apparently intended, if war came again, to resume where it had left off. In French military doctrine and training all else was subordinated to the production of a great volume of fire, by methods that were as studiously deliberate as the rate of movement they promised. The best thing that could be said of the doctrine was that it recognized the importance of material factors, especially the effect of fire, and recanted the fallacious belief of 1914 that the unshielded will of the soldier was proof against bullets and shells. But it seemed to ignore the truth that fire is a means to movement, and that the effect is lost unless it can be followed up quickly. The division was still the profusely armed but complex organ of wartime pattern. The French seemed to have conceived of nothing more than the preservation of a powerful but rigid fighting machine, one likely to break down from its own internal friction if it should ever be called upon to make a

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prolonged advance or retirement. I could not help thinking that the French had renovated their steam-roller by fitting an extra roller, but had forgotten to consider its motive-power.

But in the last year or two there has been a rapid evolution towards a more flexible and mobile type of force and action. One cavalry division has already been completely mechanized; it is mainly equipped with armored fighting vehicles, but also has a proportion of "motor-dragoons" in light cars and on motorcycles. A second cavalry division is now in process of mechanization. In addition some ten infantry divisions have been motorized; their artillery is all tractor-drawn, while their infantry regiments are provided with little armored carriers for mortars, machine-guns, and ammunition, and can themselves be moved by lorry convoy.

The creation of these new-type formations, so different from the rest of the active French forces, and from the bulk army to be assembled in case of general mobilization, is naturally leading French military authorities towards a new picture of warfare. General mobilization is a slow process, so slow, indeed, that if mobilization and concentration were carried out as in 1914 there would be a risk that the army would never reach the field. Air pressure on the congested traffic arteries might cause a premature collapse. Even at best, a week or two must elapse before these forces can come into action. But the new-type formations, helped by their special composition as well as by their railfree mobility, may be ready in a few hours. To keep them waiting while the bulk army was assembling would be to discount the time factor precariously, even supposing the action of the enemy permitted.

In the new picture, then, the first phase of a war is fought out by the mobile forces together with the frontier garrisons. The second phase, that of conflict between the two enemy mass forces, may follow — although some regard the possibility as doubtful.

In France, however, special conditions mean that the new military evolution takes a special turn. French opinion is more than ever concerned with the problem of safeguarding French soil from invasion. In other words, the chief problem is essentially defensive. Thus the new-type formations seem above all to be visualized as a means of strengthening defense, by switching fire more quickly to a threatened spot and by more promptly developing a counter-offensive. This "defensive" view of the value of mechanized forces may strike many as novel. But it is justified on technical grounds. Despite the obvious increase of offensive power

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conferred by the development of mechanized forces, time may show that the reinforcement of the defensive power is indirectly greater still. In the long view, one might even say that this has been the general trend revealed by the growing mechanization of war through the centuries.

The importance which the French attribute to defensive power also finds expression in the frontier fortifications to which they have devoted so much of their money and attention in recent years. Their newly fortified line, for the most part running just inside the Franco-German frontier, has been widely discussed. It consists of a chain of forts and casemates. The forts themselves consist of a mushroom-like cluster of concrete casemates linked by underground galleries; other galleries lead to the living quarters, magazines, and power stations which serve each cluster, all likewise buried deep. The sector first constructed was from Longuyon, opposite Luxembourg, to the Vosges; this covered Metz and the Briey industrial area, although originally a gap was left on either side of the Sarre River between St. Avold and Bitche, where a succession of streams parallel with the frontier helped to form a natural barrier. Subsequently this gap was filled, in part at least, and the chain of fortifications now extends along the Rhine to the Swiss frontier. Defense of the approaches through Belgium and Luxembourg has also been taken in hand.

Though this fortified line is better designed than the vast trench systems which developed in the war, it of course is narrower and cannot offer so much protection. It is intended to gain time rather than to be an insurmountable barrier. Primarily it is a shock-absorber, to cover the mobilization process. Its effectiveness thus depends on the adequacy and readiness of the forces which normally garrison it, and on the promptness with which support can be given. The main danger to it would be a surprise attack which might overwhelm a sector before the emergency was realized. A further danger is that the intervals between the main forts might be penetrated by mechanized forces; the forts would be left to be "mopped up" by a second wave of invaders. It is for this reason that French strategists now are so concerned with the new risks of the *attaque brusquée*. Some visualize the possibility of hostile mechanized forces crossing the old demilitarized zone by a swift bound during a single night and delivering their stroke early next morning. All of them now appear to realize,

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from this point of view at least, the great acceleration of the *tempo* of warfare which modern developments foreshadow.

Meantime the immediate concern of the French is how to adapt their present organization to meet the requirements of changing conditions. One need is to remodel the scheme of mobilization so as to produce an effective force in support of the frontier garrisons in the shortest possible time — a time that we must now count in hours rather than in days. That mobilization scheme must also take account of the new risks threatened by hostile air attack during the main process of mobilization and concentration. Concentration must not spell congestion. Rail and road movements must be more flexible, and the whole process must be more widely distributed. The other need is to carry forward the process of mechanization as a means of saving time in making intervention effective. The fortified region itself is garrisoned by units "hand picked" to suit the requirements of each individual sector; these garrisons can be brought up to strength at short notice with reservists drawn from the neighboring district. But to supply prompt support to each region, and to facilitate manœuvre based on these pivots, mobile formations are necessary. The need is now being met.

IV

Since the advent of the Nazi régime, the German Army has carried out a great expansion not altogether to its qualitative advantage. The Treaty of Versailles limited it to a strength of 100,000 men voluntarily enlisted on a long-service basis; it was forbidden the use of tanks, aircraft and heavy artillery. These compulsory limitations encouraged subtle attempts to develop a force of superior quality and mobility. Surprise became the German keynote. "Every action," declared the postwar German manuals, "should be based on surprise . . . ruses and wiles of every kind ought always to be used to deceive the enemy." General von Seeckt had been the brain of Field-Marshal von Mackensen in the war; he devised the plans which led to the Gorlice break-through against the Russians in 1915, and to later successes. It was General von Seeckt who rebuilt the German Army after the war. He gave it the doctrine of mobility, putting forward the view that a small, quick-moving, quick-hitting army of picked troops could, under modern conditions, discount the numerical superiority of an old-fashioned mass army. That view

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was shared by some of the more original-minded German officers. But the majority merely made a virtue of necessity. Brought up in the creed of mass, they hankered after the size which to them still represented strength and, no less important, prestige. Similarly, despite the experience of the war and their straitened post-war means, they still clung to the old belief in the offensive. Officers like the present Field-Marshal von Blomberg who sought to adapt tactics to modern conditions and who advocated such methods as the "luring defensive" found it difficult to win over the bulk of their comrades.

The idea of the "qualitative" professional army had not really taken firm root when the Hitler revolution gave the German Army a chance to revert to its old love of mass. The very nature of the Nazi movement made such a reversion almost inevitable. Many of the regular officers were undoubtedly apprehensive of the effect of diluting their carefully trained units with undisciplined enthusiasts of the Brown Shirt type, and found still more cause for concern in the claim of the Brown Shirt leaders to share in the officering of the new national army. They welcomed all the support the new régime gave to the growth of the army and the development of martial ideas, but they were not ready to accept a partnership in control. Their policy prevailed, helped by Hitler's need of army support in maintaining what he had created.

Before she left the League, Germany had claimed the right to expand her army of 100,000 men, organized in seven divisions, to an army of 300,000. While the statesmen argued, the process of expansion went on. The aim was to create a force of 21 divisions. The manufacture of tanks, artillery, machine-guns and aircraft was pushed ahead rapidly. The way for conscription was paved by the introduction of six months' labor service, and the training given in the Labor Corps was so directed that it soon came to have a marked military value — more, indeed, than the training given the Brown Shirts.

Then, in March 1935, the Nazi government announced conscription for the army and simultaneously its expansion to 36 divisions, organized in 12 army corps. The news came to neighboring countries as a shock, increased by the importance customarily accorded to mere numbers. Yet, curiously, there was a tendency to underestimate the new total; 450,000 was suggested as the probable figure, whereas it really seemed likely to exceed 550,000. The first contingent of conscripts of the 1914 class (aged 21) was

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called up in October, 1935. An average year was expected to yield about 300,000 young men. Meanwhile, the men between 21 and 35 (the classes 1900–1913), representing Germany's lost classes of trained reserves, have been called up for short periods of training lasting six weeks to two months.

In August this year a fresh step was taken when the period of conscript service was extended from one year to two. This may be partly designed to offset the lean years when the birth-rate was low, represented by the 1915 to 1919 classes; but the effect is likely to be an increase in the total number of men under arms. Moreover, it is known that Germany has formed 3 armored divisions which are additional to the 36 divisions provided for by the Army Law of March 16, 1935; and there are reports of the formation of two more. The fact has a bearing on the declaration made by Hitler in the Reichstag a few days after that law was announced: "The German Government have announced the extent of the expansion of the new German defense forces. In no circumstances will they depart therefrom." It would seem that further increases are not regarded as a departure.

These new-style formations were not shown to the foreign officers and military publicists who were invited to see the German Army at work in the autumn of 1935 or again in 1936. In the infantry divisions which were seen, the transport of the battalions and the field artillery were still horse-drawn, but they were well provided with machine-guns, anti-tank guns and mortars. The division has some 400 machine-guns, light and heavy, and their quota of anti-tank guns (2½ pounders drawn by a light car) is higher than in the French or any other army; they form a divisional unit of 3 companies with a total of about 42 guns. The most interesting new feature of the division is a mechanized reconnaissance group, which comprises a company of armored cars or light tanks, one of anti-tank guns, one of four light mortars, one of machine-guns, and two companies of infantry in lorries. They push ahead of the division's advance, seize tactical points and occupy them with machine-guns, and then press on to some fresh objective. The staple of the division is composed of three infantry regiments, each with three battalions, a mortar company, a machine-gun company, and a cavalry troop. A battalion is formed of three "rifle" companies, each with 9 light machine-guns.

There is an apparent shortage of officers in the German Army, owing partly to a wise desire to maintain the proper standards

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and also, perhaps, to a reluctance to give commissions except to those who have passed through the orthodox professional channels. But the troops have made a strong impression on observers. They move in more dispersed form than the French, but they are no less active and their equipment is far more modern. The Versailles Treaty evidently has had its compensations. The new German 105 mm. field-howitzers and the anti-aircraft guns are highly efficient weapons. But the general composition of these divisions and the manner of handling them show little advance over the ideas which prevailed in the last war. With its increase in size the German Army seems to have rather lost sight of the need for subtlety and surprise which von Seeckt insisted on in the early postwar era.

The new armored divisions are not as yet well known. They are said to consist of three parts, one for probing, one for hitting, and one for holding. The "punch" is delivered by a tank brigade, which is believed to consist of three regiments totalling about 600 tanks. The number of mechanized vehicles in the division as a whole is said to be nearly two thousand. At present the tanks are fast but light, weighing only about six tons, with two machine-guns in a turret capable of all-round fire. The Germans are seeking to develop a larger "medium" tank, but it is doubtful if as yet it has been produced. Against a country with open frontiers or an army inadequately equipped with anti-tank guns, the new armored divisions might prove a formidable factor in the opening phase of a war. But there is cause for doubt whether the German Army as a whole has yet developed either the equipment or the tactics to overcome the opposition of a strong and thoroughly modern defense.

V

The Red Army, by contrast, is undoubtedly the most powerful in its tank forces, while also the most original in methods. New and old ideas are strangely intermingled. The most archaic feature is the prominent rôle given to horsed cavalry — no less than 16 cavalry divisions are maintained — and the way in which they are handled. On manœuvres, great masses of horsemen are plunged into tank-infested areas with little regard to the differing vulnerability of each. In peace the proceeding looks like a circus; in war it would probably create a huge cemetery. This Russian attempt to repeat Balaclava in face of machine-guns is evidence that the Red Army has not succeeded in shedding the mental

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conventions of its Tsarist predecessor so thoroughly as its progress in other directions might suggest.

The reliance on mass is a general symptom. In numbers, the Red Army far exceeds any other. A population which has now grown to 170,000,000 provides an annual contingent of recruits which in recent years has always been well over a million and this year is over two million. The peacetime strength of the army has now been raised to 1,300,000. This number provides 84 infantry divisions apart from other formations. The men taken for the regular army do two years' continuous service, while the remainder do several months' training in the territorial militia. The regular army now represents 73 percent of the total forces, and the territorial militia 27 percent. It is said that the Red Army chiefs could mobilize 6,000,000 men at a fortnight's notice, and that by 1938 the total trained reserves will reach 10,000,000. This apparently does not include the youths below military age who, to the number of several millions, are receiving preliminary training under the auspices of the *Osoaviatkhim* and the Young Communist League. More significant is the statement that upwards of half a million have qualified as skilled parachute-jumpers and many thousands as aëroplane or glider pilots.

The bulk of the Red Army is maintained in the West. The Far Eastern forces nevertheless are said to number nearly 300,000 men. The double-tracking of the Trans-Siberian Railway will facilitate the reënforcement of the Far East command in an emergency. But as Tukhachevsky pointed out in his 1935 report: "If the Germans had to expend some 15 million kilometre-tons in order to concentrate one infantry division in Liége by means of the railway from Berlin, 200 million kilometre-tons are required of us in order to transfer such a division from Moscow to Vladivostok. Thus we must be very cautious in counting on the rapid transfer of considerable masses of troops over so-called internal operation lines." The strain on the railway for supply has been much reduced by accumulating supplies on the spot in order to make the Far Eastern army self-sufficient — so much so that soldiers stationed there are said to find the can-opener almost as indispensable as the rifle. At the same time, agriculture and munition factories are being developed as a more permanent foundation for military effort. This is part of the general scheme by which the industries of Russia are being organized and distributed with an eye to strategy, *i.e.* where they will be safest from hostile

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air attack. The largest source of munitions is now established in the almost inaccessible area near the Ural Mountains. But this only solves half the problem. If the Red Army attempts to concentrate its immense forces to act in any particular theatre there will be an inevitable congestion of the routes of supply in that area. Herein lies a continual danger of breakdown.

The units of this enormous mass are certainly far more impressive in quality than the old Tsarist Army. The discipline is unmistakably good, yet free from the old brutality. The men's bearing on the march combines smartness with elasticity. They give a good impression as regards physique and intelligence. The officers are professionally enthusiastic and much better educated than their predecessors; no army, indeed, takes a keener interest in foreign ideas and all news of military progress. On manœuvres there is much evidence of skilled organization and staff work. The elimination of the corruption which was rampant in the administration of the Tsarist Army should alone go far to reduce the risks of defeat through shortage of equipment and supplies.

The most striking features of the Red Army are its development of tank and air-borne units. Today there are said to be about 6,000 tanks in service; over a thousand have been seen on manœuvres in one area alone. The small number of breakdowns is evidence of their mechanical efficiency as well as of the standard of training prevailing among the crews. The fact that the designs show no marked originality, and are obviously indebted to various foreign models, seems to indicate only that the Russians have had the ability to adopt and adapt the best points of each. They have great numbers of two-men light tanks which can "swim" rivers and are based on the Carden-Lloyd amphibian, first produced in Britain by the Vickers firm. They also have quantities of rather larger machines copied from the 6-ton Vickers. But the machine on which they mainly rely for fulfilling the modern-style cavalry rôle is one developed from the American Christie tank. It is well-armored and weighs about 12 tons. Yet it has a speed of over 30 miles per hour on its tracks, while for long strategic moves these can be taken off, when the tank runs on its bogie wheels. In addition, to deliver the decisive assault the Russians have a "medium" tank of no less than 27 tons. It carries a gun of field-artillery calibre as well as machine-guns, yet travels almost as fast as the Christie-type tank. They even have a small number of "heavy" tanks, which look like moving

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fortresses and must weigh at least 50 tons. But in view of the growing power and variety of anti-tank defense, the Russians prefer to rely on high-speed machines with a good capacity for crossing obstacles, combined with a fair thickness of armor, rather than to increase weight and size at the expense of pace.

While the Russians are now ahead of all other countries in the development of armored mobile forces, their ideas regarding the use of such forces are not so well thought out. Here they give an impression of having assimilated many ideas from abroad without digesting them. At any rate, such is the impression one gains from a study of their published views and from personal discussions. On their manœuvres, too, the higher tactical handling of the armored forces is not equal to the actual handling of the machines by the individual crews. The same remark applies also to the handling of the ordinary infantry forces; their formations too often offer too good a target. An undue disregard of the effects of modern fire is to be noticed even in the methods employed in the low-flying attacks on ground columns which are in much favor; these seem to invite casualties needlessly. The general tendency noted may be in accord with the Russian tradition. But if it is inherent in a doctrine of war which contemplates the use of masses, that is no reason for believing that the masses, despite their increased efficiency, will prove capable of overcoming modern methods of defense. The Russians might have better prospects if they relied simply on their mechanized forces. For this would also minimize the worst risk they run in taking an offensive with such vast numbers — namely, that the military machine will break down under the burden placed on its own communications when the strain is increased by air attacks.

In one way, however, the Russian Army is better equipped than any other to bring about the breakdown of the enemy. I refer to their new parachute forces, much in evidence during the manœuvres of this past autumn. In one area, for example, a force of 1,200 men together with 150 machine-guns and 18 light field-guns was carried 100 miles in air-craft and dropped on an aerodrome behind the enemy's front. Within eight minutes of the release of the parachutes the force had assembled on the ground and driven off the defenders. The spectacular nature of such an operation may be as likely to obscure its real potentialities as to cause an exaggerated estimate of them. It is easy to see what practical difficulties such an expedition might encounter if carried out

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under war conditions; obviously it would run dangers both in its passage through the air, in the descent to the ground, and in maintaining itself when landed. Nevertheless, any instrument of surprise confers a big advantage in war. Audacity pays, especially when it is allied with mobility. Because of its range and its capacity for variability, the "parachute stroke" has possibilities that it would be foolish to underrate. Its indirect strategic influence may be much greater than its actual results. All armies, and nearly all commanders, are acutely susceptible to the threat of a blow in the back. They worry about anything that endangers their communications. Knowledge that the enemy had parachute forces which could be dropped near important bridges or other crucial points in the rear would aggravate this fear. The risk might cause the higher command to strengthen detachments and posts on the lines of communication, with the result that a force many times larger than the parachute forces of the enemy might be subtracted from the main concentration. Added to this would be the psychological strain. Such forces, then, hold a promise of far greater effect than any damage they may actually do.

VI

In view of the essential antithesis between mass and mobility it is a curious phenomenon that both are being simultaneously developed all over the continent regardless of consequences. No country carries quite so far as Italy the conception of the "nation in arms." The male child is put in uniform when he is scarcely out of the cradle and may stay in it until he is put in the grave — since the hard-worked Italian peasant is often not very long-lived, all risks of war aside. At six years of age he is enrolled in the "Figli della Lupa" (Wolf Cubs), in which he is taught to march, to shoot with the rifle and the machine-gun, to wear gas-masks and perform anti-gas drill, and to inure himself to life under canvas. A boy who is bad at drill is treated as if he had failed to pass his scholastic examinations for promotion to a higher form. At eight he enters the ordinary Balilla corps, and continues there until eighteen, when he undergoes a more intensive system of military training. At twenty-one he is called up for his conscript service with the army, which normally lasts eighteen months. After his release he has to carry on his post-military training until the age of fifty-five — and even then he joins the civilian cohorts that are part of the wartime civil mobilization scheme. The Ital-

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ian press was unusually accurate when it applauded this introduction of life-service with the remark that history had no parallel for such nation-wide militarization.

The actual number of men in the Italian Army varies. In the past it has usually been about 400,000, but shortly before the Abyssinian War it was raised to 600,000. In addition the Fascist Militia totals some 400,000 men. The army (exclusive of the colonials) is organized in 13 army corps, yielding a total of 31 infantry divisions. There are also 3 mobile divisions, mainly of motorized troops, with a small proportion of armored vehicles. They have a few hundred Fiat tanks, but these are very small and have limited obstacle-crossing capacity. They are mainly used as armored machine-guns to assist the infantry attack.

The infantry division comprises nine battalions, as is usual on the continent, but until recently three of these were kept in skeleton. It is rather weaker in artillery support and also in automatic fire-power than the French. The Italian Army's progress towards mechanization was for long retarded by lack of money, a reluctance to be dependent on outside fuel supplies, and the fact that its probable theatres of war were mountainous, thus seeming to offer small scope for mechanized mobility. On the other hand, this type of country has had an influence on the training of the infantry, which has aimed to develop agility by a most strenuous course of physical exercise. The hillsides near any military center are dotted with gymnastic apparatus, and it is astonishing to see whole companies of men going through a series of vaulting, jumping and balancing exercises which seem severe enough to test a professional acrobat. Likewise the marching of the Italian infantry, both in pace and distance, seems all the more remarkable when one takes note of the slender scale of rations on which these physical feats are performed. Italy has also begun to exploit a new kind of mobility by following the Russian lead in forming parachute units. In mountain warfare these may have notable effect. A pass or narrow valley can be held by a few men against many; and by dropping parachute units to seize such points in the enemy's rear reinforcements may be prevented from reaching him, his supplies may be interrupted, or his retreat may be cut off.

By a curious contrast, the higher training of the Italian Army until recently had a tendency to restrain rather than exploit the use of its natural assets. Tactical methods were even more deliberate than in the French Army. In part, this was inspired by a

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desire to correct the haphazard ways of the past by a rigorous mental discipline attuned to the new national trend. Even though it thus served a practical purpose, it certainly had the less beneficial effect of cramping tactical mobility. Operation orders were so long and detailed that, after reckoning the time for writing and reading them, they seemed to leave little time for execution.

In form and in outlook, then, it was an old-style army which was shipped out from Italy to Eritrea a year ago. Mechanized vehicles and aircraft were no more than a trimming to the masses of infantry. Yet the trimmings, coupled with the fact that the primitive enemy had a similar obsession with mass, extricated the Italians from the impasse (even peril) into which their own old-fashioned ideas had brought them. In the outcome, the course of the campaign can be epitomized in a phrase — the machine triumphed over the man. The Lion of Judah was crushed between Italy's mechanized fangs. The data of the campaign, when analyzed, reveal that the machine-gun and the gas-projector proved the decisive weapons, aircraft the decisive arm, and mechanization in the broad sense of the word the foundation upon which the Italians built their military superiority. The result is a striking vindication of those who, in the face of doubts and obstructions, have for years foreshadowed the importance of these new factors. For Europe this war is a writing on the wall — the more significant because the wall was in remote mountains. For here was a theatre of war so rugged and so strategically inaccessible that aircraft and landcraft operated under exceptional handicaps.

The Italian command at first increased their own handicap by beginning the invasion of Abyssinia after the style of the invading hosts in 1914. By relying on mass they impeded their own mobility, so that what they gained by their mechanized means of movement was largely offset by the fact that they used them merely to feed and maintain great masses of infantry. The supply of such large forces as were employed demanded a well-developed system of roads. The building of these roads called for a great number of laborers, together with the troops to protect them. The task of feeding and otherwise maintaining all these involved a great increase in the transport demands and in the traffic over the new-built roads. That enormous traffic destroyed the roads almost as fast as they were built. So the difficulties were multiplied by the very means taken to overcome them.

Thus the Abyssinian war began by providing a fresh illustra-

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tion, in a somewhat different form, of the lesson of the last European war — that armies are impeded more than helped by their own growth. Mere quantitative superiority of force carries its own antidote. That experience merely confirmed the neglected warning of the famous eighteenth century master of war, Marshal Saxe, that "multitudes serve only to perplex and embarrass." He saw, like Sherman a century later, that there is a limit, determined by mobility, to what one may call the *economic size* of an army. That is something which requires unusual art to gauge — mass and mobility are hard to reconcile. Unless the mean can be found, force is liable to be stultified by its own forces.

It was fortunate for the Italians that there was no air force to oppose them. That missing factor was their salvation from something worse than congestion and internal disorder. At the end of 1935, after a campaign of three months, the Italian masses were at a standstill with nothing to hit, while the overburdened communications by which they were being fed provided a target for guerrillas. How much worse it would have been if those narrow mountain routes had been bombed from the air! In this state of stagnation, discontent grew. Then the Abyssinian leaders came to the rescue of the Italian command by attempting a series of massed attacks, thus providing a target for machine-guns both on the ground and from overhead. In exploiting the Abyssinians' recoil, the Italians turned their infantry masses into road-makers and relied for their own thrust forward on relatively small motorized spear-heads, the while mustard gas was sprayed to shield their own communications against enemy interference and also to demoralize the troops and populated areas behind the enemy's front. The advance of these mobile columns was covered by a long-range and flexible barrage of air bombers, while their supplies were in part brought up by air transport.

The Abyssinian campaign gave the general staffs of the world cause for thought. It has shown the fallacy of their argument that machines are not a substitute for men — by which they mean the weight of the many, not the quality of the essential few. It has shown, more clearly even than the World War, that mass has become a dangerous encumbrance when the attempt is made to concentrate it on the fighting front. Under modern conditions, and especially in view of the growing menace of air attack, the larger a country's army, the weaker that country may prove in war. Technical quality counts, not drilled quantity.

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THE CHANGING BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

By Hu Shih

BROADLY speaking, there are only two views of the Far Eastern situation. There is the view of those who regard it as completely beyond any peaceful remedy. They are the defeatists. But there are still a few optimists who hold the view that recent changes in the balance of power in the Pacific may yet provide far-sighted and constructive statesmanship with an opportunity of devising some kind of peaceful adjustment. I shall try to state in the following pages the reasons for my being one of these optimistic few.

Many believe that there is no longer any balance of power in the Far East, that there is only the supremacy of one nation — Japan. They believe that the semblance of international equilibrium and order which obtained during the period of the Washington Treaties (1921–31) was ruthlessly and irrevocably destroyed by the acts of Japan beginning in September 1931. They believe that where one Power is in a position of such absolute preponderance, and where that Power happens to be intoxicated with the successes it has met with in carrying through an apparently irresistible program of militaristic expansion, there cannot be any remedy or modification of the situation without an international war.

From such a major premise only defeatist conclusions can be drawn: either the Powers of Europe and America must acknowledge their helplessness in this situation, and each of them plan to withdraw the commercial and financial interests of its nationals from the Far East in order to avoid a possible conflict; or they must appease the predominant Power by sacrificing all principles of international justice and the sanctity of treaty obligations in order to retain a minimum share in the spoils; or each must go on with its military and naval preparations in anticipation of an inevitable clash in the not-too-distant future.

Such seemed to be the state of mind prevailing at the round table discussions of the Institute of Pacific Relations in which I participated last summer. Shortly after that meeting, a liberal journal of opinion in the United States advocated editorially that all American merchants and firms trading in China should

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be withdrawn from that country and that the American Government should undertake to compensate their losses out of the money saved from scrapping the American navy. I need not mention the other organs of opinion which advocate creating a big navy and a big air force as the only sort of language which Japan can understand. I do not propose to comment on such views. I only wish to point out that there is this defeatist attitude toward the international situation in the Pacific. To build a big navy without backing it with a constructive policy is defeatism. To advocate the abandonment of the principle of non-recognition — the only surviving reminder of the sanctity of a set of great and idealistic treaties — is defeatism. And the mere pious wish to avoid a clash by scrapping the American navy and abandoning a continent of commerce and investment is no less defeatism.

I venture to suggest that this defeatism in all its forms is based upon an erroneous understanding of the present situation in the Pacific area. It is erroneous today to think of that situation as one of Japanese supremacy unmitigated by any changes in the balance of forces. Such changes have been taking place since 1931.

The plain historical truth is this: "*Japan's supremacy in the Far East*" *was a fact in the period of seventeen years from 1914 to 1931; but since 1931 it no longer has been a fact.*

It is unnecessary to recount how at the outbreak of the World War in 1914 the semblance of a balance of power which had prevailed since the close of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 completely broke down. Great Britain, Russia and France were engaged in a life and death struggle in Europe. The Far East was left in the hands of Britain's ally, Japan, who proceeded to wipe out all German possessions and influence on the Chinese coast and in the Pacific Ocean. For seven years, from 1914 to 1921, Japan ruled the Western Pacific almost without a rival. This supremacy was evidenced by Japan's "Twenty-one Demands" on China in 1915. It was still more clearly evidenced at the Peace Conference in 1919 when the victorious Allies, against the nation-wide protests of the Chinese people and against a world-wide sentiment for the Wilsonian principle of self-determination, conceded to Japan the right of free disposition of the former German concessions in Shantung.

The Washington Conference was called to readjust the problems of naval disarmament and the Pacific problems left un-

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solved by the Paris Peace Conference. It had a direct bearing on the Pacific situation in four ways. First, the question of Shantung was amicably settled between China and Japan. Secondly, the eight signatory Powers (other than China) of the Nine-Power Treaty pledged themselves "to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China; to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government; . . . [and] to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States." Thirdly, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not renewed and its place was taken by the Four-Power Treaty. Fourthly, the ratio 5–5–3 was adopted for the naval strengths of Great Britain, the United States and Japan, respectively.

While it is true that the Washington Treaties aimed at the establishment of a set of new checks and balances on Japan's preponderate power in the Far East, it is no less true that the supremacy of Japan was never in fact curtailed by the actions taken at Washington. On the contrary, Japanese power in the Pacific was never greater than during those first ten years after the Washington Treaties (1921–1931). The real result of the Conference was to rectify some of the most pressing troubles between China and Japan, remove much of the tension between Japan and the other naval Powers, and thereby secure Japan's preponderate position in the Western Pacific by practically legalizing it.

There is such a thing as power becoming greatest when it is made innocuous. The best example is the supremacy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere. Japan's position in the family of nations was the highest when she abided by the results of the Washington Conference and remained one of the Big Four in the League of Nations. Since she began to abuse that power in 1931, and particularly since she withdrew from the League in 1933, she has not again attained her former heights of power and prestige.

Thus we may say that "the supremacy of Japan in the Far East" was not only true of the period of the World War and the years immediately following its conclusion, but also true of the ten years after the Washington Conference. While the League

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Covenant and the Washington Treaties and the Pact of Paris prevailed there was *no* balance of power in the Pacific. There was only a New World Order, or at least the semblance of it, within which Japan was tacitly acknowledged by all as the undisputed leader in the Far East and in the Western Pacific.

But since September 18, 1931, that is to say, since Japan's militarists started their aggressive campaigns in Manchuria, in Shanghai, and in North China — what a tremendous change has taken place! By those acts of aggression, Japan threw into the discard the whole postwar machinery of peace. Japanese power ran wild. It upset not merely the East, but the entire world. It destroyed that semblance of international order which alone had legalized and tacitly protected Japan's supremacy.

What are the new factors brought forth since 1931 as a result, at least in part, of Japan's violent action?

In the first place, Soviet Russia has come back to the Pacific as a first-rate military Power. At the time of the Washington Conference, she had not yet been recognized by the other Powers. She was neither a participant in the Conference nor a signatory to the Washington Treaties. But since 1931 the Soviet Union has brought to the Far East a huge armed force estimated to include between 300,000 and 500,000 finely trained and well equipped men. She is developing one of the greatest air forces in the world. Since 1931, her submarine and destroyer fleet in the Pacific is reported to have quintupled and the coast guard fleet to have increased elevenfold. In these years she has constructed about 7,000 miles of new railways along the Mongolian and Siberian borders, and 3,000 miles have been double-tracked. And behind all these there has taken place the most remarkable progress in industrialization, not only in European Russia but also in the Soviet Far East.

In other words, Russia has now definitely returned to the Pacific area as a fully armed Power. She comes, too, possessed of new and vast industrial resources. Japan must now reckon with her more than ever as a factor in the Pacific scene.

The second new factor is the rapid rearmament of all the non-Asiatic nations bordering the Pacific or having possessions there. A continuous ring extends from the Aleutian Islands to Singapore and the Dutch East Indies. We read the other day that for the month of July 1936, the Dutch Indies were the heaviest buyers of American ammunition. The construction of the British naval

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base at Singapore, after being suspended for a time, was vigorously resumed after the fighting at Shanghai early in 1932. This most gigantic naval base in the world is now practically completed. New Zealand and Australia, the two paradises of the Southern Pacific Ocean which had never dreamed of the necessity of arming, are now seriously working out their own schemes of coastal defense. Each is recruiting an enlarged militia, manufacturing its own planes, and laboriously extracting gasoline from coal and shale. Recently when I was in Winnipeg I read in the *Free Press* that Canada, too, is going to have a new navy. And the United States is constructing new armaments and fortifications from the Philippines to Alaska, and undertaking a heavy naval building program.

This ring of nations newly armed or rearmed must be considered a new factor produced since 1931 by Japan's actions.

Last but not least we must note the rapid rise of the national state of China. The unification of China under the National Government at Nanking is the outcome of Japan's aggression. In the dark shadows of national humiliation, a unified Chinese state is taking form.

During the first two years following Japan's aggression in Manchuria, Japanese spokesmen everywhere declared that China was not an organized modern state and should not be accorded the full rights and privileges which such states enjoy. In the last three years such pleadings have ceased. In their place we constantly hear statements from Japanese militarists to the effect that the Empire of Japan cannot co-exist with Chiang Kai-shek's government. "Shall the Empire surrender to him? Or shall it crush him?" Such were the alternatives stated recently by General Tada. Long before the outside world became aware of it, the shrewd eyes of the Japanese military had begun to see the growth of a nationalistic China and perceived that it would have an increasing power of resistance to external aggression.

This new factor in the Pacific scene may indeed turn out to be the most important of the three which I have enumerated. For, as John Hay knew, an independent and strong China is necessary not only for the maintenance of the Open Door but also for the stability and peace of the Far East. For over thirty years China failed to live up to Hay's expectations. Now she is earnestly endeavoring to qualify herself as one of the stabilizing forces in Asia.

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Such are the new factors which now are entering into the balance of forces in the Pacific and changing that balance so that Japan, though she still plays a mighty rôle, is no longer supreme.

Evidently if these new factors are not properly organized they may lead towards a terrible international conflagration. It might begin with a war forced on China by Japan's continued aggression, and gradually it might involve Soviet Russia, Great Britain and ultimately the United States. In the modern world war is as truly "indivisible" as peace. No nation bordering on the Pacific, or interested in its fate, can hope to escape being involved in any major Pacific conflict.

But wise statesmen may also discern in this changing balance of power new possibilities for a peaceful adjustment of the Pacific world. They may now discover a way to create a regional peace machinery which has as participants the United States, the Soviet Union and the British Empire (with all its Pacific members), as well, of course, as Japan and China. What is certain is that the alternative to such a peaceful collective arrangement will be another world conflagration the magnitude and the horror of which will be beyond anything we now envisage in the boldest stretch of our imagination.

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THE SPANISH REBELLION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

By Philip C. Jessup

NO ATTEMPT is made in this article to appraise the causes of the revolution which is today racking Spain.[1] Nor is it my object to discuss the present political alignments of Europe in order to determine whether we are witnessing a new balancing of powers, with fascism arrayed against "democracy," as once legitimist monarchs were leagued against the "republicanism" of an earlier era. It is the purpose of this article to see whether amidst these arms the laws are silent, and to consider what laws there are to speak.

But before we turn to a consideration of the applicable rules of international law, it may not be amiss to draw attention briefly to a few of the past instances in which Spain's European neighbors have concerned themselves in her domestic upheavals. As one skims the record of the last few centuries the newspaper headlines of the last few months leap irresistibly to mind.

In earlier times, as at present, the embroilment of various European Powers in Spanish affairs was generally connected, superficially at least, with changes in the government at Madrid. Then, however, the Powers made their alignments on the basis of support accorded various contending candidates for the Spanish throne. In 1698, the contest was between Archduke Charles of Hapsburg and the Dauphin of France for the succession to the childless Charles II — a question involving either Hapsburg or Bourbon domination of Europe. England supported France; and the treaties between the two countries in 1698 and 1700 provided for the partition of Spanish possessions in Europe. Indignation ran high in Vienna as well as in Madrid. (This was half a century after Richelieu had fomented a Catalonian rebellion for the purpose of establishing a separate republic.) There came a shift in alignment, and in 1702 England, the Emperor and the Dutch began the War of the Spanish Succession against France. Other Powers joined, although some were diverted by the concurrent Northern War. When England virtually abandoned the allies, they were defeated by the French; and Spain supplied the spoils,

[1] See "Back of the Spanish Rebellion," by Lawrence A. Fernsworth, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1936, p. 87.

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acquiescing in the division after being defeated by the Anglo-French forces in 1720. England was now mistress of Gibraltar.

When Napoleon elevated his brother Joseph to the Spanish throne in 1808, Spain appealed to England. The Peninsular Campaign soon followed. In 1820 a liberal government was established in Spain under the new constitution of 1812. It succeeded only in ushering in two years of civil war, with the French unofficially aiding the absolutists. At the Congress of Verona in 1822, the Powers decided upon intervention in Spain, through the agency of France, to restore the power of Ferdinand VII. England protested; but in 1823 France, Russia, Austria and Prussia demanded the abrogation of the Constitution of 1812. Spain futilely declared that such intervention was contrary to international law; the French army marched to Madrid and the absolute rule of the King was restored. Here one finds a definite example of the absolute monarchs aligned in their Holy Alliance against a spread of republicanism. The Powers in the Holy Alliance would have liked to go further in checking revolution by helping Spain to hold her American colonies, but the Monroe Doctrine, with the aid of Canning and the English navy, forced them to desist.

With the outbreak of the Carlist revolt ten years later, England, France, Spain and Portugal were soon aligned in support of the established governments in Spain and Portugal, while Austria, Russia and Prussia supported the Carlists. The French promised not to allow the export of arms to the Carlists but they permitted loyalist troops to cross French territory to execute an enveloping movement. England promised to supply arms to the Queen's government and suspended the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 in order to permit the enlistment of English volunteers in the Spanish service. The variations in the situation as it developed were too numerous to mention here, but note may be made that England was again found opposed to the other Powers in her support of the liberal or radical factions within the loyalist ranks.

In 1869, it was again a question of succession to the Spanish throne which was used to involve two other European Powers in war. Bismarck and William I of Prussia supported Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. Napoleon III's government announced in vehement terms that it would not tolerate a Prussian or Hohenzollern prince on the Spanish throne. Although England and Austria sought to mediate, France pressed her demands that

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the Kaiser forever abjure the candidacy of Leopold, the famous Ems telegram was dispatched, and Bismarck cleverly manœuvred the French into declaring war on July 17, 1870.

The story is a continuing one, but perhaps the chapters already summarized will suffice to introduce the present scene.

II. THE EXISTENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

There is a not inconsiderable lay opinion — shared, unfortunately, by some members of the bar — that international law exists only in books. The persons who hold this view would admit that international law issues forth into real life when war breaks out, but only for the purpose of attending its own immediate and not too decent burial. Without attempting to argue the point at length, we might note that international law is enough of a reality in the affairs of nations to warrant the inclusion of large legal staffs in every foreign office. The opinions of the law officers of the Crown in England, delivered throughout more than two centuries, show that diplomatic proceedings in many important and complex international situations were based upon legal opinions as to whether the course of action planned was legally defensible. It is not daring to assert that in the present Spanish crisis, Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay have taken no step in matters relating to blockades, arms shipments, recognition and like matters without first studying the precedents of international law, or that these foreign offices are unique in this respect. What are some of the pertinent legal rules and precedents which all these legal advisers would amass and (one must in frankness add) interpret in support of policies considered desirable on other grounds?

Several issues should be considered: first, the bases for the non-intervention agreement which has functioned through the Committee set up in London on September 9; second, the question of the recognition of the belligerency of the contending groups; third, the problems involved in the recognition of the Franco "government."

It may be well to clear up at once certain questions of terminology.

American newspaper readers have been greatly confused by the multiplicity of terms applied to the two contending factions in Spain. Here we shall refer to the Government of President Azaña which was in office when the revolution broke out in Spanish

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Morocco on July 18 as the "established government." We shall refer to the revolutionary group as the "rebels." Lest it appear that the choice of these terms implies any bias in favor of one group or the other, it may be noted that the terms are chosen in order to avoid any suggestion of a preliminary commitment on the legal questions involved if one considers the rebels "insurgents" or "belligerents" or if one seeks at once to decide whether the present struggle should be called a "revolution" or a "civil war."

In the second place, one should be on guard against the common use by the press of the word "neutrality" as applied to the Spanish situation. The misuse of this term is indicated by Acting Secretary of State Phillips' circular instruction of August 7: "It is clear that our Neutrality Law with respect to embargo of arms, ammunition and implements of war has no application in the present situation, since that applies only in the event of war *between or among nations*. On the other hand, in conformity with its well-established policy of non-interference with internal affairs in other countries, either in time of peace or in event of civil strife, this Government will, of course, scrupulously refrain from any interference whatsoever in the unfortunate Spanish situation. . . ." It is true that the neutrality act of 1936 applies only to wars between or among nations, but others of our neutrality statutes and the general duties of neutrality apply in civil wars when belligerency has been recognized. On an analogous occasion, President Taft, in his Message to Congress of December 7, 1911, commenting on the disturbances in Mexico, said: "Although conditions of actual armed conflict existed, there was no official recognition of belligerency involving the technical neutrality obligations of international law." At the time this article is being written no state yet appears to have recognized the belligerency of either party. Therefore the rights and duties of neutrality in a legal sense do not as yet come into play. If the newspapers correctly report that some governments have used the word neutrality in their declarations regarding restrictions on the export of arms to Spain, then the governments themselves have been inaccurate in their use of that term.

It is not possible to be quite so precise in speaking of the words "intervention" and "non-intervention." "La non-intervention," said Count Rechberg, the Austrian Foreign Minister in 1859, ". . . n'est pas un principe, mais un terme exprimant la

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négation d'un simple fait." The whole problem of intervention and its legal regulation is one in which the detractors of the science of international law may well find comfort. There is much difference of opinion among writers on international law regarding the rules respecting intervention. European statesmen have generally recognized that intervention in the domestic affairs of another state was contrary to international law but, at the same time, they admitted such broad exceptions that the rule was emasculated. Two statements of Lord Russell in 1859 when he was British Foreign Secretary are typical:

> With regard to the general question of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, Her Majesty's Government hold that non-intervention is the principle on which the Governments of Europe should act, only to be departed from when the safety of a foreign State, or its paramount interests, require it. . . .
>
> The best writers on the law of nations allow intervention, where it is rendered necessary for the safety or essential interests of a State, as much in favour of subjects justly discontented, as in favour of a Sovereign, or regular Government. The intervention of the States-General of the United Provinces in the affairs of England in 1688, which is approved by Vattel, rested on no other basis.

It is not surprising that Count Apponyi replied for Austria that the British "principle of non-intervention was a very elastic one and seemed to be applied as . . . [their] interests or policy directed." Nevertheless, unless there are certain grounds for intervention, such an act must be looked upon as a breach of an international law obligation. *Quaere:* whether there exists in the present Spanish situation any justifiable ground for intervention by any outside state. As in the case of reprisals during war, it is always difficult to prove which state has first committed an illegal act. But an intervention of State B might be justified by a prior intervention of State A.

One of the difficulties is that since under international law states have had great latitude in resorting to war without a breach of customary international law, there is much force in the argument that they are equally justified in using the less violent resort to intervention when their interests so demand.

Interests naturally vary according to a state's proximity to the area of conflict. Thus the European Powers have asserted special rights of interference in Spain, in the Balkans, in Italy before the unification. Japan has followed suit in China. The United States, before it became a "good neighbor," acted on very many occa-

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sions upon the theory that it had peculiar interests in the Caribbean which justified it and no one else in interfering in cases of civil strife in that area. The contrast which exists today is well revealed by a bare recital of certain events in 1927. The United States was active in revolution-torn Nicaragua. On February 21 of that year its naval forces undertook the protection of the railroad between Corinto and Managua, in order to maintain communications between Managua and the coast and to protect American and other foreigners in the interior. Less than two weeks before, in contrast, the American legation in Lisbon, Portugal, had been abandoned when hit by gunfire during the revolution there. A British warship sailed up the Tagus. According to the *New York Times* of February 9, 1927, the Department of State announced: "The position of this government is one of hands off. The uprising is regarded as distinctly one concerning Portugal alone."

Another important point to keep in mind is the difference between helping the established government and helping a revolutionary group which has not yet been accorded recognition. In the words of the Duc de Gramont, French Ambassador to Vienna in 1867: "Il y aurait intervention étrangère quand une Puissance étrangère se place entre un peuple et son Souverain; mais, quand une Puissance appelée par le Souverain vient à son aide contre des étrangers, il y aurait dans ce fait une alliance, un secours, mais non pas l'intervention. . . ." The same principle applies when the established government calls upon a friendly foreign Power for assistance against rebels — always assuming that the belligerency of the latter has not been recognized. This is the theory underlying the Pan American Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. This treaty was signed at the Sixth Pan American Conference at Havana in 1928 and was ratified by the United States two years later. In general the treaty provides that in case of civil strife the established government will be aided by the other contracting parties. In particular, they agree: "To forbid the traffic in arms and war material, except when intended for the government, while the belligerency of the rebels has not been recognized, in which latter case the rules of neutrality shall be applied." The existence of such a convention among the European Powers might have made unnecessary the special non-intervention agreement regarding Spain were it not that in the present European situation this

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amount of partiality in favor of the established government would not have been welcomed by Italy, Germany or Portugal. The Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, if it had come into force, would have served somewhat the same purpose and would have been open to the same objection.

When in 1895 a revolt broke out in the French protectorate of Madagascar, Great Britain allowed English ships to transport materials of war for the French Government forces.[2] The British Government would have been justified in taking a similar stand in the present Spanish troubles; but because of the non-intervention agreement it is forbidding British ships to carry arms and munitions to either party in Spain. Mexico, on the contrary, has followed the line which England took in 1895; President Cardenas told the Mexican Congress on September 1 last that Mexico, in selling arms and munitions to the Spanish Government, had granted "a petition made by a constituted Government." If the Mexican Government itself has sold the arms and munitions, it has gone beyond the British precedent and would need to defend its position by asserting that there existed in Spain merely rebellion and not civil war.

The importance and the difficulty of distinguishing between a mere internal disturbance and an actual case of civil war is indicated by the Brazilian case of 1930. There was a revolution in Brazil. Belligerency had not been formally recognized. By the middle of October the revolutionists had made great progress and, in retrospect, it is apparent that their final victory was close. Nevertheless, on October 22, at the request of the established Brazilian Government, President Hoover issued a proclamation forbidding shipments of arms to the Brazilian rebels but expressly authorizing shipments to the established government. This action was taken under our statutory policy of 1912 and 1922 which gives the President authority to issue such an order in case of civil strife in Latin America or in countries where the United States enjoys extraterritorial privileges. On the next day, apparently because of press criticisms, the Secretary of State issued an explanation. He stated that under international law only the legitimate recognized government of a country was entitled to buy arms from a friendly nation, while insurgents had no such right. He said: "It is not a matter of choice on our part, but is a practice of mankind known as international law." Within

[2] John Bassett Moore, "Digest of International Law," v. I, p. 205.

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a few days the victory of the Brazilian rebels was complete. Their government was promptly recognized by various other governments; the United States followed suit on November 8.

The action of the United States in this case has been severely and properly criticized by Judge John Bassett Moore.[3] In view of the fact that neither the insurgency nor the belligerency of the rebels had been recognized, there might be a technical defense for the position of the United States. Practically, however, a state of civil war did exist and the action of the United States inevitably constituted interference in the struggle. As the Law Officers of the Crown advised in 1864, "the question, whether a state of war does or does not exist between insurgents holding possession of a particular territory, and a Government claiming their allegiance and attempting to subdue them, is one of fact, quite as much as of law: and, if the facts are such, as really to constitute a state of war between the contending parties, according to the law of nations, it is not, we think, competent, by law, to any neutral Power, to withdraw its ships and subjects, upon the high seas, from the operation of the ordinary laws incident to that state of things, merely by declining to acknowledge its existence." During the Cretan insurrection of 1867, the Law Officers of the Crown gave to Lord Stanley another opinion on similar problems. The following two paragraphs represent a sound view of the law which was accepted by the Foreign Secretary:

> When a Civil War has broken out in the dominions of a Friendly State, and Armaments are brought into the Field, or upon the Sea, by the contending parties, it is undoubtedly competent for a Neutral State without any breach of International Law, to recognize both parties as belligerents and to declare herself Neutral between them.
>
> It is always a question of fact to be determined by the Government of the Neutral State, whether the Insurrection has or has not assumed the dimensions of War, and whether the legitimate interests of the Neutral State do or do not require that she should claim from both parties the performance towards her of the obligations incident to the *Status* of a belligerent; — according equally to both parties in return, the recognition of that *status*.[4]

President Wilson's policy in Mexico constituted in practical effect a choice between the contending factions, and therefore interference. One may compare today the statement of the Spanish Foreign Minister in the Assembly of the League of Na-

[3] "Candor and Common Sense," an address before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, December 4, 1930.

[4] Herbert Arthur Smith, ed. "Great Britain and the Law of Nations," v. I, p. 263.

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tions on September 25, 1936, to the effect that his government regarded non-intervention only as a policy of intervention against the constitutional government. A somewhat amusing feature of the Brazilian episode is the fact that the Department of State apparently momentarily overlooked the Pan American Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife which was already in force for the United States and for Brazil and which constituted a full justification for the action taken. In March 1931, when the embargo was raised, the Convention was invoked as an explanation of the original imposition of the embargo.

III. THE SPANISH NON-INTERVENTION AGREEMENT

The initiative for an agreement not to intervene in Spain came from France and was announced in a Cabinet communiqué of August 1, 1936. The French Government decided to appeal to the British and Italian Governments for "the rapid adoption and rigid observance of an agreed arrangement for non-intervention in Spain." The purpose seems to have been primarily to reach some general agreement which would prevent the shipment of arms and ammunition to either party in Spain. The underlying purpose was undoubtedly to prevent the Spanish revolution from developing into a general European crisis through the intermeddling of some other Power or Powers. History had abundantly demonstrated the real danger of such an eventuality.

One must accept with reserve some of the newspaper reports of aid furnished to one party or the other from various foreign states. In some cases, assuming that assistance was sent, it is impossible at this time to say whether it was sent with the approval or connivance of the government in question. As already noted, the legal consequences of sending aid to the established government are different from those produced by assisting the rebels. Moreover, it cannot be denied that one of the burdens which must be accepted by a totalitarian state or dictatorial government is an enhanced international responsibility for the acts of its individual citizens. The United States, by referring to the rights of freedom of speech and of the press, has often adequately defended itself against complaints of foreign governments that derogatory statements have appeared in American newspapers. Such a defense is not open to a government which assumes to exercise a rigid control of the press. The same distinc-

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tion applies to mass meetings and even to contributions of clothing and medical supplies. On the other hand, the enlistment of volunteers and the shipment of such things as military planes are within the control of any government. If the laws of neutrality are applicable, all governments are under a duty to prevent such forms of assistance and *a fortiori* to avoid direct governmental aid.

In Soviet Russia there naturally existed great sympathy with the established Spanish Government. A similar sympathy was felt in France, though perhaps to a slighter extent and with less unanimity. On the other hand, Germany and Italy would naturally be sympathetic toward the rebels who, even if at this time they cannot be definitely classified as "fascists," certainly contain elements of a fascist nature. Fortunately, Premier Blum in France has refused to allow any feeling of an international solidarity of leftist governments to control the foreign policy of France to an extent sufficient to embroil Europe in general conflict. Foreign Minister Delbos declared in a speech on August 2 that "there must be no crusade of ideals in Europe, a crusade which would inevitably end in war."

Following the first *démarche* of the French Government on August 1, there were protracted negotiations with the other European governments. There was a good deal of jockeying on the part of some of them to make sure that they would not be accepting an obligation to refrain from aiding the party which had their sympathy unless the states having opposite sympathies should be similarly bound. After five weeks of negotiations, the "International Committee for the Application of the Agreement regarding Non-intervention in Spain" met in London with the representatives of the following twenty-six states in attendance: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Irish Free State, Italy, Jugoslavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Rumania, the Soviet Union, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. The only notable absentee was Portugal. That country finally joined the Committee and attended the meeting held on September 28.

The Committee has continued to hold frequent meetings and has occupied itself largely with examining charges by the Soviet Government against Portugal, Italy and Germany, and reciprocal charges against the Soviet Government, all alleging violation of the non-intervention agreement by the rendering of aid to one

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faction or the other. It is of course impossible to consider the charges or counter-charges made in the Non-intervention Committee apart from the general European situation. The violently threatening attitude against the Soviets taken by the Nazis at the Nuremberg meeting, the corresponding reaction in Moscow and, still more recently, the announcement of a German-Japanese alliance against communism, together with the German-Italian rapprochement, are all factors which once again make the question of intervention in Spain merely an aspect of general European diplomacy.

IV. THE RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY

The international legal problems involved in the recognition of belligerency can perhaps best be understood if one considers various types of domestic disturbance in their relative degrees of magnitude. First of all, we may witness a condition of domestic violence which amounts to no more than rioting in various parts of the country. In general, such a condition raises no question of outside interference. If the opposition to the established government gains in strength and in organization, the riot may assume the dimensions of a rebellion. The term "rebellion," however, is not a term of art in international law. It therefore probably is not possible to draw a nice legal line between a rebellion or an insurrection and a revolution except to suggest that a revolution implies a somewhat more serious upheaval. There is again a fine line between revolution and civil war, but the latter term is applied to a situation where a comparatively well-knit body with civil as well as military organization opposes the established government by force of arms. In one sense, this term still applies to the internal or domestic affairs of the state. From an external or international point of view, the rebellious group has no standing unless it achieves at least the status of insurgency. "Recognition of a condition of insurgency in a foreign country is merely a reckoning with a state of facts. It confers no special rights on the insurgents; it manifests no design to aid them; it affords no ground of complaint to the parent State; it imposes on the foreign State none of the burdens of a neutral."[5] One practical effect of a recognition of insurgency is that the insurgents, if operating on the high seas for example, will not be treated as pirates although they are not admitted to have any of the usual rights of belligerency.

[5] Charles Cheney Hyde, "International Law," v. I, p. 82.

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The British and other governments have taken the position that they refuse to admit the right of the Spanish rebels to interfere with foreign ships on the high seas but they do admit their right to do so within territorial waters where they exercise *de facto* control. The belt of territorial waters within three miles of the coast constitutes a part of the territory of the state and contending factions therefore have the same rights in those territorial waters which they have upon land. (Parenthetically, it may be remarked that the Spanish Government has frequently attempted to claim a six-mile limit of territorial waters but has never been able to maintain this claim in the face of British opposition.) [6] In 1858, Attorney-General Black rendered an opinion to the Secretary of State in which he remarked: "It has been doubted whether a mere body of rebellious men can thrust itself among the family of nations, and claim all the rights of a separate power *on the high seas*, without some sort of recognition from foreign governments; but there is no authority even for a doubt about the right of the parties to a civil war to conduct it, with all the incidents of lawful war, within the territory to which they both belong." Secretary of State Hay concisely laid down two applicable rules in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy on November 15, 1902:

1. Insurgents not yet recognized as possessing the attributes of full belligerency can not establish a blockade according to the definition of international law.

2. Insurgents actually having before the port of the state against which they are in insurrection a force sufficient, if belligerency had been recognized, to maintain an international law blockade, may not be materially able to enforce the conditions of a true blockade upon foreign vessels upon the high seas even though they be approaching the port. Within the territorial limits of the country, their right to prevent the access of supplies to their enemy is practically the same on water as on land — a defensive act in the line of hostility to the enemy.

There are, however, exceptional cases in which the right of insurgents to establish a maritime blockade has been admitted. This was true of the British attitude in the Chilean revolution of 1891 and of the attitude of the United States during the Brazilian naval revolt of 1893.

In the present Spanish situation the German Government announced after the German steamship *Kamerun* had been interfered with on the high seas, that it would resist by force any further interference with German shipping; German warships were

[6] The Law Officers of the Crown in 1864 gave an opinion on the legality of blockades in the San Domingan revolt against Spain. They remarked that Admiral Hope had conceded the rights of the insurgents to interfere with shipping in territorial waters off the coasts they controlled but denied their "preposterous claim" to a six-mile limit. (Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 315.)

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sent to the Spanish coast with this purpose in mind. Similarly, the British Government has sent warships to the Spanish coast with an announcement that they would protect British ships on the high seas. There are many precedents for action of this kind. It was the position taken by the British Government during the Peruvian Revolution of 1877; the same position was taken by the United States in the Colombian insurrection of 1885. Similar was the warning of the commander of an American naval vessel during revolutionary disturbances in Haiti in 1902. It may be noted also that under section 4295 of the Revised Statutes of the United States it is declared to be lawful for a United States merchant vessel to resist restraint, search or capture on the high seas by any armed vessel, "it not being a public armed vessel of some nation in amity with the United States."

If the insurgents have reached a very considerable degree of organization and stability, and if they are contending on more or less equal terms with the forces of the established government, they may attain the status of belligerency. If their belligerency is recognized, they thereupon acquire the same rights which are granted to a sovereign state when it is at war. In other words, recognized belligerents may establish blockades, may visit and search the ships of third powers on the high seas, may seize and confiscate contraband goods, and the like.

As an example of a formal recognition of a state of civil war bringing into play the obligations of neutrality, reference may be made to President Van Buren's proclamation of January 5, 1838, during the course of an insurrection in Canada: "Whereas information having been received of a dangerous excitement on the northern frontier of the United States in consequence of the civil war begun in Canada . . . any person who shall compromit the neutrality of this Government by interfering in an unlawful manner with the affairs of the neighbouring British Provinces, will render themselves liable to arrest and punishment under the laws of the United States . . ." President McKinley's proclamation of June 12, 1895, was similar; he recited that Cuba was "the seat of civil disturbances, accompanied by armed resistance to the authority of the established Government of Spain" and admonished all persons in the United States to respect our neutrality laws.

A recognition of the belligerency of an insurrectionary group may be made inevitable by the very action of the established

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government which is most eager to prevent such a development. During the Carlist revolution in Spain in 1874, the British Government was informed that the established Spanish Government which they recognized was about to establish a blockade on the northern coast of Spain. Lord Grenville informed the British Ambassador to Madrid that the British Government would recognize the blockade if it were effective but "the result however will be that the Carlists henceforth become belligerents . . . I have therefore to instruct you to warn the Spanish Govt. that the establishment of the proposed blockade must lead to the issue by H. M.'s Govt. of a proclamation of neutrality . . ." The situation was similar during the American Civil War. Secretary Seward labored and argued vehemently to prove that there was no "war" in the United States; there was only "indeed, an armed sedition seeking to overthrow the government, and the government is employing military and naval forces to repress it." But when the North declared a blockade of the Southern ports, the game was up. A blockade can be enforced against ships flying foreign flags only through the exercise of belligerent rights. Belligerency is never a unilateral position; there must always be at least two belligerents. By asserting belligerent rights on the high seas, the North thereby recognized the belligerency of the Confederates, as the British Government was quick to point out. Similarly, in a brilliant note to Mr. Pike, American Minister at The Hague, Baron Van Zuylen, the Dutch Foreign Minister, recalled that in 1778 England used against the revolting American colonies the same arguments which Mr. Seward was now advancing; the Dutch Government was content reply to the latter as the French Government had responded the former.

If one may judge from newspaper reports regarding the nature d scope of the present struggle in Spain, it does not seem that re would have been any impropriety in the recognition of the ligerency of the two parties by foreign states; but at the time article was written no such action had been taken. So far, ı, no questions of neutrality have come into play since the reak of the Spanish rebellion.

THE RECOGNITION OF THE FRANCO "GOVERNMENT"

ıe final stage a rebellious faction may attain is one in which have actually overcome the former established government

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and have in turn established themselves as the government in control of the country. Apparently in the judgment of at least four governments the rebels had already reached this stage in November.

On November 18, the Italian Government officially recognized the rebel government of General Franco on the ground that his movement had "taken possession of the greater part of Spain and the development of the situation shows ever more clearly that in the remaining parts no responsible government any longer exists." At the same time the Italian diplomatic representative accredited to the Madrid Government was recalled and a chargé d'affaires was dispatched to establish official relations with the Franco government. Similar action was taken on the same day by the German Government. The official German communiqué gave the same reasons as those advanced by Mussolini, in practically the same terms. Although these were the first large Powers to accord official recognition to the rebel group, it had been reported on November 9 that the government of El Salvador had recognized the Franco government. We may note in passing that the Salvadorean Government was also the first government to recognize the independence of Manchukuo. Albania, which has close ties with Rome, followed Italy in according recognition to the Franco government on November 26.

The consequence of the extension of recognition by Italy and Germany is that thereafter for them the Franco government is the government of Spain and the established government is merely a rebellious group. In other words, the tables are completely turned. Following the principles outlined above, Italy and Germany would now be legally free to supply aid to the Franco group just as previously any states would have been free to supply aid to the established government. However, the Non-intervention Agreement officially precludes the Italian and German Governments from granting aid to the Franco government just as it has officially precluded France and Russia, for example, from aiding the established government. The danger implicit in these new legal relationships is clear. If the Non-intervention Agreement were terminated, Italy and Germany might well be found officially helping the Franco government which they recognize, while France and Russia might officially help the established government which they recognize. Both groups of Powers would assert that they were merely helping *the*

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government of Spain to suppress a rebellion. Practically, the danger of the conflict spreading to the rival sympathizers would be enormously enhanced.

The established government has protested against the action of the Italian and German Governments. On November 27, Foreign Minister Alvarez del Vayo telegraphed the Secretary General of the League of Nations asserting that this recognition of the chief of the rebels was the crowning act of the "armed intervention of Germany and Italy in the Spanish civil war." The Spanish Government also called attention to the announced intention of the rebels to blockade Spanish ports which, it was asserted, would "cause difficulties of an international order." Spain appealed to the League under Article 11 of the Covenant and asked the Council to take action. A meeting of the Council was accordingly scheduled for December 10.

It is only natural, of course, that the established government should protest in a case of this kind and there are many precedents for such protests. It may be sufficient to call attention to the protest of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies when Garibaldi's blockade of Messina and Gaeta was recognized by the Powers. In this instance, in October 1860, the Garibaldi revolutionists had not yet been recognized as a government but the protest is strikingly similar to the recent Spanish note. "The European Powers," wrote Count Ludolf, the Minister of the Two Sicilies in London, to Lord Russell, "cannot recognize a blockade decreed by an illegitimate Power. In order to impose a sacrifice of the liberty of the sea, and the interruption of their commerce, upon other nations, it is requisite that a Government be openly and officially acknowledged by others. Garibaldi does not represent a Government. Naples in revolution is not a nation. The only nation recognized by Treaties is the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies; and the Sovereign of this kingdom, recognized as such by all the others, is now at Gaeta."

It is difficult to form an unbiased opinion on the propriety of the Italian and German recognition because it depends on a state of facts. One can not be sure from newspaper reports precisely what the facts were on November 18. One may however indicate the applicable rules or precedents which can be applied to whatever state of facts is accepted as true.

It is, or should be, true, as the Belgian Foreign Minister declared in 1861, that "de la part d'une puissance étrangère, recon-

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naître un autre gouvernement n'est que reconnaître un fait. . . . En reconnaissant le nouveau royaume d'Italie, nous reconnaissons, à leur example, un état de possession, sans nous constituer juges des événements qui l'ont établi. . . ."

John Quincy Adams as Secretary of State had to deal with the question of the recognition of the Spanish colonies in South America. In general, of course, the United States was sympathetic to the revolutionists, but it tried to steer an even course and to make its conduct rigorously correct. Two of Mr. Adams's statements may be combined to show the attitude of the United States:

> So long as a contest of arms, with a rational or even remote prospect of eventual success, was maintained by Spain, the United States could not recognize the independence of the colonies as existing *de facto* without trespassing on their duties to Spain by assuming as decided that which was precisely the question of the war. . . .
>
> But there is a stage in such contests when the parties struggling for independence have, as I conceive, a right to demand its acknowledgement by neutral parties, and when the acknowledgement may be granted without departure from the obligations of neutrality. It is the stage when independence is established as a matter of fact so as to leave the chances of the opposite party to recover their dominion utterly desperate. The neutral nation must, of course, judge for itself when this period has arrived; and as the belligerent nation has the same right to judge for itself, it is very likely to judge differently from the neutral and to make it a cause or pretext for war, as Great Britain did expressly against France in our Revolution, and substantially against Holland. If war thus results in point of fact from the measure of recognizing a contested independence, the moral right or wrong of the war depends upon the justice and sincerity and prudence with which the recognizing nation took the step.[7]

Lord Liverpool, dealing with the same situation, remarked similarly that "he had no difficulty in declaring what had been his conviction during the years that the struggle had been going on between Spain and the South American provinces — that there was no right while the contest was actually going on. . . . The question ought to be — was the contest going on? He, for one, could not reconcile it to his mind to take any such step [as recognition] so long as the struggle in arms continued undecided."

It naturally follows that recognition before the rebels have actually established themselves is premature and constitutes intervention. This was a theme repeatedly developed by Secretary Seward in the early days of the American Civil War. "We freely

[7] The first sentence is taken from his instruction to the American Minister to Colombia, May 27, 1823, and the rest from his letter to the President, August 24, 1818. (Moore, v. I, p. 89 and 78.)

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admit," he wrote to Mr. Adams in London on April 10, 1861, "that a nation may, and even ought, to recognize a new State which has absolutely and beyond question effected its independence, and permanently established its sovereignty; and that a recognition in such a case affords no just cause of offence to the government of the country from which the new State has so detached itself. On the other hand, we insist that a nation that recognizes a revolutionary State, with a view to aid its effecting its sovereignty and independence, commits a great wrong against the nation whose integrity is thus invaded, and makes itself responsible for a just and ample redress. . . ." [8]

It is interesting to note that, through the force of circumstances, the Government of the United States at this period found itself less in sympathy with the Jeffersonian principles of the right of revolution. This came to be reflected in Seward's policy regarding the recognition of new governments in other states.

A fact frequently persuasive in determining when recognition should be granted is the occupation and control of the national capital with its archives. This was the point emphasized by Sir Charles Wyke, the British Minister in Mexico in 1861, when he declared that foreign diplomatic agents "were obliged, on the principle now universally recognized, to acknowledge a real *bona fide de facto* Government holding the capital and the archives of the nation." It seems reasonable to suppose that when the Italian and German Governments accorded their recognition on November 18 they imagined that the forces of General Franco were on the eve of capturing Madrid. In retrospect, and in the light of general principles of international law, it appears that it would have been more correct for them to await that event. Nevertheless, possession of the capital is not a *sine qua non*, as was suggested by Lord Grenville in an instruction to Sir James Crampton, the British Ambassador to Madrid during the Spanish revolution of September 1868. "As long as Her Catholic Majesty holds sway in Spain," Lord Grenville wrote, "however trammelled or embarrassed by internal Convulsions may be Her Majesty's Freedom of Action, so long can the British Minister recognize Her Majesty alone as the ruling Power of the Country; and even if Her Majesty were compelled to abandon Her Capital

[8] *Caveat:* Mr. Seward and John Quincy Adams were speaking of the recognition of a new *state*, which is, of course, different from the recognition of a new *government* in an old state. The statements quoted, however, are applicable to the latter case.

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and to establish the Seat of Her Government in a Provincial City, it would still be the duty of the British Minister, if invited, and if his Colleagues should receive and act upon a similar invitation, to follow Her Court, although while doing so, he should give no further Countenance nor Sanction to the Course of Policy she might adopt than would be implied by his bodily Presence at the Seat of Her Government." In 1859, Mr. McLane was sent to Mexico with discretionary authority to recognize the government of President Juarez if he found it entitled to recognition. He "was specifically instructed that it was not an essential condition of the recognition of a government that it should be in possession of the capital, but that it was enough if it was 'obeyed over a large majority of the country and the people, and is likely to continue.'"[9]

It is impossible to deal here at length with the question of the recognition of new governments. It might be interesting to trace the vagaries of the recognition policy of the United States from the days of Jefferson, when we considered it sufficient to find that a government existed; through the days of Seward, when we were inclined to be fearful of revolts; back through a long period where Jefferson's principles again prevailed; on through the days of Wilson's moralistic stand in Latin America; on through the period when we adopted a special policy for Central America and the Caribbean; down to the recent attitude toward the recognition of the Soviet Government. One might also mention the Stimson non-recognition doctrine, particularly as applied in the case of Manchukuo, where recognition is still withheld as a penalty or sanction. However, the United States, in recent times at least, and when dealing with new governments in Europe, has been inclined to follow the lead of the European Powers. Its recognition policy is therefore not of prime importance in connection with the existing Spanish situation.

Attention should be drawn to the fact, however, that we have been witnessing in recent times a tendency to give a new aspect to recognition. Formerly, the recognition of a new government which had been successful in obtaining *de facto* control of the greater part of a country as a result of revolution was generally determined by the foreign government's ascertainment of that fact. Nowadays, governments seem inclined to withhold or to extend recognition as an instrument of national policy. There was no question that

[9] John Bassett Moore, "Digest of International Law," v. I, p. 147.

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the Soviet Government was the government of Russia for a very long period of time before the United States "recognized" that fact. It seems clear that recognition was withheld partly because of our dislike of the form of government prevailing in that country, partly in order to secure certain concessions in exchange for the eventual granting of recognition. This statement is made without ignoring the reasonable argument that one test applied in extending recognition is to determine whether the new government is able and willing to respect its international obligations. This new attitude toward recognition as an instrument of national policy is not peculiar to the United States. Nevertheless, it remains true that the legal correctness of recognition or non-recognition must be judged by the established standards of international law. As already indicated, these standards involve a fair and unbiased appraisal of the factual situation. International law does not impose upon states a duty to recognize new governments at any particular moment. To that extent, recognition lies within the realm of policy. But international law does brand as an illegal intervention in the domestic affairs of another state a recognition prematurely accorded to an insurrectionary group with a view to aiding that group in ousting the established government.

If one were to venture an answer to the question posed earlier in this article, it might be said that no official arguments have yet been seen which would justify such intervention in Spain by any foreign Power.

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NEUTRALITY AND PEACE

The View of a Small Power

By Halvdan Koht

WHEN the world was preparing in 1898 for the first Peace Conference at The Hague, the Norwegian Government put forward as one plank of their country's program a claim to obtain permanent neutrality, this to be formally recognized by all foreign governments. A petition supporting this program was quickly signed by fifty thousand names. Four years later, in 1902, the same claim was unanimously adopted by the Storting. At that time, however, the union with Sweden still prevailed, so that Norway could not carry on an independent foreign policy; and the Government and the Riksdag of Sweden refused to agree with the Norwegian desire. The question therefore did not appear on the agenda of the Hague Conference nor did it attract attention in any of the international discussions of the day. But the program was in keeping with the traditions of Norwegian policy, and it even helped to strengthen Norway in her struggle to take into her own hands the control of her foreign affairs.

It was in those days that the uncrowned king of Norway, the poet-politician Björnstjerne Björnson, put forth the slogan that when the time came for the country to set up an independent foreign office the object of that office ought to be to have no foreign policy at all. Of course, Mr. Björnson, perfect poet though he was, had too much insight in international affairs to propose such a program literally. What he intended was to set himself against the tendency in contemporary politics to seek security by means of military alliances with foreign countries. In fact, there was a current belief at that time — unfounded, I am inclined to think — that the Swedish Government (and particularly the King) was striving to bring the two United Kingdoms into a defensive alliance with Germany. What Björnson wanted for Norway was absolute neutrality. He wanted her not to take sides in the formation of opposite blocs then proceeding in Europe, and so to keep clear of all political rivalries. He had made himself the champion of the demand for an independent Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs in order to

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provide his country with an effective instrument for defending such a policy of neutrality, and he clearly understood that this policy had to be accompanied by, or even founded on, constructive action for the formation of a universal peace organization.

This attitude taken at the opening of the century has been basic to all the foreign policies of Norway since that time. I think, moreover, that in essence it is representative of the political aims of every small country in Europe. Historical conditions may have implanted them more deeply in the mind of the Norwegian people than elsewhere. In any case it is an impressive fact that since 1720, that is to say during a period of 216 years, Norway has had but seven years of war; and during the last 122 years no Norwegian soldier has had to fight. It may also be taken into consideration that during several centuries the direction of Norwegian foreign affairs was in the hands of a government situated outside the country, in Denmark or in Sweden. That condition may have influenced the development of the nation in many unfavorable ways; but certainly it helped root out of the Norwegian soul any military ambitions or any aspirations for political domination. Norwegians have set their minds on the honorable achievements of peace; their policy throughout has been and is for peace.

But the maintenance of neutrality in the world of today raises more and more difficult problems. It already required a remarkable measure of prudence and balance for us to escape being drawn into the World War of 1914. You may think of Norway as a country on the periphery of Europe, not directly touched by the waves of European storms; but the fact is that, militarily speaking, it is situated on the border line between Great Britain and Germany, and in addition it has a mercantile marine — the third or the fourth of the world — spread over all the seas of both hemispheres, and consequently extremely vulnerable in all cases of disturbance. Finally, since the peace of 1919 one can hardly think of any country as being peripheric. All European countries have been brought into the political unity created by the League. That means a change of the whole notion of neutrality; the problem of remaining neutral has not only become more difficult than it was formerly, it has become quite different.

In the last Assembly of the League of Nations, on September 28, 1936, the first delegate of the Soviet Union, Mr. Litvinoff, spoke with some harshness, even contempt, of the countries

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which in face of the dangers of war threatening from aggressive Powers "strove to seek salvation in neutrality." He reminded them that the recent lessons of history as to violations even of neutral positions which had been internationally recognized ought to make clear that it was not sufficient to write the word "neutrality" on a frontier. This scoffing tone might have been perfectly justified if the countries to which he alluded were really planning to observe a neutrality in the old sense of the word in case a new war should set the world ablaze. But that sort of neutrality had already become impracticable in essential respects during the World War, and with the organization of the League of Nations it has become absolutely unthinkable.

Professor Shotwell has recently pointed out[1] the complete reversal of the old ideas of neutrality internationally recognized by the Declaration of Paris of 1856. At that date the rights of neutrals were defined as the privilege of maintaining commerce with both parties in a war. During the war of 1914–1918 the neutral nations found out that this privilege was put under severe restrictions. And the Covenant of the League of Nations definitely put an end to it by laying down the quite opposite rule that all the members of the League had the duty to sever all commercial and other relations with an aggressor. That was the end of neutrality as formerly conceived. Now all League members are bound to come to the assistance of the nation recognized as having been unjustly attacked, inasmuch as they would be allowed to maintain their commerce only with this party.

Since 1919, then, the problem of neutrality is exclusively a military one. But as such it still exists. Originally, by the first draft of the Covenant, the victorious Powers of the World War had intended to bind all members of the League to participate in military coercive measures, later better known as "military sanctions," against the aggressor state. But the Scandinavian governments in particular protested against the imposition of new military duties, and the final form of Article 16 of the Covenant left the decision as to the application of military sanctions to the judgment of each government. One might say that such was the case even as regards the adoption of commercial sanctions, as the said article provided for no kind of common action but left all initiative and responsibility with the individual members. In fact, however, no government could think of adopting

[1] "On the Rim of the Abyss," Macmillan, 1936.

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commercial sanctions entirely independently; such action must usually be doomed to be ineffective. On the only occasion when there was a manifest desire to put measures of this character into effect, the Assembly of the League made haste to create a common organ of deliberation, a "Committee of Coördination." On the other hand, military sanctions might easily be imagined as independent actions; their efficacy would simply depend on the power of the governments resorting to such action, so that each nation's liberty in this respect would appear to be quite real.

Switzerland reserved her neutrality from the moment she entered the League of Nations; and she even succeeded in obtaining recognition of a limitation of her obligations in regard to commercial sanctions when, for the first time, they were brought into play in the Ethiopian conflict. The idea of such a limitation was put forward by the Scandinavian governments during the first years of the League's existence. Indeed, they succeeded in having it included in the Geneva Protocol of 1924, Article 11 of which introduced the idea that the geographical situation of each country should be considered when enforcing sanctions. I think I am right in saying that Denmark in particular was strongly interested in seeing this limitation recognized.

The deliberations over the Protocol afforded at the same time the only extensive discussion that has taken place inside the League of Nations about the military duties of its members. Conflicting views were expressed. Some delegates asserted that all members of the League were obliged, or ought to be obliged, to participate even in military sanctions. But the delegates of the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands firmly maintained that only by their voluntary decision might they become parties to military actions on behalf of the League. In the end their contention was upheld by the Assembly, the Protocol formally stating that each member was pledged to coöperate in the execution of sanctions only in so far as its particular conditions allowed.

As the Geneva Protocol was never ratified it is not legally binding. The problem involved may therefore be said not to have received any formal solution. But the Powers which then defended their liberty of judgment regarding the use of military sanctions have asserted it with unalterable determination ever since. Only recently (July 1, 1936) the Foreign Ministers of all the northern countries, Finland included, meeting in Geneva with those of Spain, the Netherlands and Switzerland, published a common

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declaration to the effect that so long as the Covenant of the League of Nations was applied in a defective and inconsistent way they had to take this fact into account in applying the article regarding sanctions. In particular, they pointed to the non-fulfilment of the engagement to disarm, thus emphasizing the existence of a close connection between the general limitation of armaments foreseen by the Covenant and the obligation to apply coercive measures against an offender. The conclusion would be that if all the provisions of the Covenant were to be carried into full effect, the small nations named would be willing to fulfil all the duties foreseen therein, but that until such time they were reserving their power of free decision.

Now, all this may hold good as an interpretation of the Covenant, and in theory it seems unobjectionable. But the question involved is not exclusively, perhaps not primarily, a theoretical one. Of course, it would be of great importance to the said Powers to be able to prove that their attitude was consistent with the Covenant if at a given moment they should have to refuse to coöperate in military measures. But in the event that sanctions were adopted and applied by the League of Nations in order to stop a war, facts might be stronger than theories, and there always will be a chance that one might be drawn into the war against one's own wish and will. This possibility is even foreseen in a particular provision of the Covenant of the League, which prescribes that the members of the League are obliged to support one another mutually "in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their members by the Covenant-breaking State." The practical implication of this provision was brought to the attention of a certain number of the League governments when, in the autumn of 1935, Great Britain addressed herself to all the Mediterranean countries and their allies, asking them to declare whether they were ready to come to the assistance of the British fleet in the Mediterranean if in the fulfilment of its duties in enforcing sanctions it were attacked by Italy. Almost all the governments so addressed declared their readiness to act in accord with their obligations under the Covenant; and some governments even thought it their duty to give a similar declaration spontaneously. None of them was called upon to take action in execution of their promise, because Italy did not attack Great Britain. Certainly such an act on the part of the nation hit by sanctions might have led to a general war, involving even the small Powers.

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During the Ethiopian war it was very often said by the opponents of sanctions that even purely economic sanctions involved a danger of war for the participants, and this was made an argument for withdrawing from the League of Nations. If now we are entitled to draw a conclusion from the experiences of this war (the only experiment, so far, with sanctions), we are forced to state that economic sanctions do not necessarily lead to war. But it must be added at once that the experiences of the Ethiopian war do not furnish sufficient proofs in this respect, chiefly because the sanctions applied were relatively weak ones, falling far short of the measures presupposed by the Covenant. Further, one of the parties in the war, the nation which was the object of aggression and which was to be helped by the sanctions, was by its geographical situation so completely cut off from the outside world that no assistance could reach it. For that reason any collision between the aggressor and the sanctionist Powers was virtually precluded. The danger of military encounters might otherwise have been considerable, and a small country like Norway, which sends her ships all over the world, might have been at least as much exposed to the danger as any of the big nations.

Actually, recent developments seem to have a tendency to make wars more likely to become universal than ever before. We may discern this tendency clearly in what is going on in Spain. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Señor Alvarez del Vayo, representing his government at the last Assembly of the League of Nations, formulated his conception of future wars in his speech of September 25. "The era of national wars," he said, "the classic form of war by the attack of one state upon another, is steadily vanishing. The war of the future, although it may assume the appearance of a conflict between two States, will, in fact, be a conflict, a collision, a clash in the drama of history, between two ideologies, two mentalities, two different conceptions of life. Just as in the Europe of the sixteenth century men took sides and fought for two religious ideals — Catholicism and Protestantism — so today men may be said to be divided by two political ideals — democracy and oppression." Possibly others would prefer to define the opposed ideals by other words, for instance, Communism and Fascism. But that does not matter in the present connection. What is important is the conception of wars of opposed ideologies. Manifestly the civil war in Spain has ranged peoples on opposite sides in accordance with their political sympathies,

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thus continuing, in fact, the movement started by the Russian Revolution.

In such a war, neutrality in the old sense is impossible. The authorities may agree to keep hands off, at least so far as military assistance to any of the parties is concerned. As the events have demonstrated, even such a limited neutrality is very difficult to maintain, and the mutual charges about violations of the non-intervention agreement have come perilously near to disturbing the general peace. But apart from the official authorities and regardless of their admonitions, popular sympathy has found ways of expressing itself by acts of assistance in a large number of countries. In particular, the representatives of the working classes have formulated strong demands for the abandonment of neutrality, which, to them, appears as a "fake neutrality."

Nobody can conceal from himself the fact that the same classes of society which now oppose the nationalist insurgence in Spain are identifying dictatorship with war. They believe, and think they have strong reasons for believing, that Fascism in Italy and Naziism in Germany are fostering a mentality that almost inevitably will lead to war. They see no possibility of maintaining neutrality toward such political systems and they want to arm themselves against them. Perhaps the most notable event resulting from this current of opinion was the resolution adopted on October 6 last, by the British Labor Party — against a strong minority it is true — in favor of rearmament. This remarkable change of policy on the part of British labor was expressly based upon "the threatening attitude of dictatorships, which are increasing their armaments at an unprecedented rate, flouting international law and refusing to coöperate in the work of organizing peace." On the other hand, we hear the representatives of dictatorial countries demanding the union of all nations which want to maintain what they call the principles of capitalism in a struggle against "Marxist revolution." The very first words, of the new German Ambassador to England, Herr von Ribbentrop, arriving there at the end of October, contained a warning of the danger of Communism, resistance to which he described as being in the nearest interest of both countries.

Even amongst the small nations we can observe a tendency towards a division along similar political and social lines, and an increasing willingness even to go to war to defend certain political ideals. But in these smaller countries any such desires are allayed

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by their sense of military insignificance. In fact, many of them have had to admit to themselves that they would hardly be able to defend their own independence in a war with one of the greater Powers. How, then, could they think of plunging into foreign wars, even for the noblest of causes? If they want to give their support to what they think is the cause of justice, then they will have to find other means for acting than military power.

At the present moment, then, the will to keep out of war prevails in all the small countries. We have just seen it illustrated by the speech made by the King of the Belgians on October 14 last. People who had not observed the trend of Belgian politics very closely were surprised by the royal announcement, and several newspapers (some of them motivated by considerations of party politics) tried to give it a misleading and sensationalist color. As a matter of fact, it was the natural outcome of the changes in European politics effected by the German denunciation of the Locarno Treaties last spring. That act struck hardest at Belgium, laying bare its eastern frontier. Since that event, the Belgian Government has been forced to reconsider the country's position, and for a couple of months in advance of the King's speech it had been clear that they contemplated abandoning their alliance with France and reverting more or less to their prewar policy. This was really the purport of the proclamation of October 14. It did not and it could not mean a reversal to the old neutrality; there was no idea of retiring from the League of Nations or of deserting the duties imposed by the Covenant. But Belgium, like Poland on the other side, could not help realizing the dangers of its situation between two great and hostile Powers. The Locarno Treaties had seemed to remove that danger. Now it presented itself again, even more threatening than before, and the Belgian Government became convinced that the alliance with France, far from averting the danger, might even increase it. "Our policy must solely aim," the King declared, "at placing us outside the quarrels of our neighbors and keeping war from our territory."

Such must be in fact the policy of all small states. Even before the Belgian proclamation there was a rumor about a movement among the smaller European states to form a block — alluded to as a neutral non-military bloc — as a counterweight to the major Powers. The increasing prestige and influence of this bloc was seen at the Assembly of the League of Nations this past autumn, when it succeeded in upholding the general principles of

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international justice as opposed to the considerations of political opportunism urged by most of the great Powers. The events of this Assembly furnish sufficient evidence that the so-called neutral bloc has no idea of abandoning international action in support of universal law. But it is also evident that the small nations so united have no intention of letting themselves be drawn into wars which, in the last resort, might endanger or destroy their own independence. The importance of the Belgian announcement lies in the fact that it signifies Belgium's adherence to the group of states which are determined to resist tendencies to divide Europe and the world into two hostile camps, whether the dividing lines are determined by ideologies or by the competition for power. Such a division would lead fatally to a new universal war.

It must be openly admitted, however, that thus defined the policies of small states inevitably raise a new problem. If the small states declare themselves unwilling or unable to accept military obligations for purposes of international justice or peace, the question arises whether it is safe to leave the military defense of the principles of the League of Nations to the great Powers alone. That seems to be the only alternative. But I think it fair to say that such a delegation of power to a limited group of strongly armed states will awaken much distrust all around in the world. In the various conflicts that have occurred inside the League of Nations we have seen the great Powers acting in furtherance of their own interests. Nobody has a right to reproach them for protecting their interests; every nation has that duty. But it has been disillusioning to the small states to see how often the question of the balance of power has influenced the great nations when they must make decisions regarding the maintenance of international law. This disillusionment accounts to a great extent for the resolution of so many small states not to take any part in military measures, even those destined to defend the general peace.

Today we listen with a certain degree of skepticism when the great Powers talk about the duties of collective security, because we see them using it as a cover for defensive alliances which are uncomfortably similar to the military alliances of prewar days. I would not deny the possibility — or perhaps even the probability — that honest purposes of peace lie at the base of such alliances, and if they could be firmly linked up with the essential rules of the League of Nations they might be expected to serve the peace of the world. But when they can embrace only a small num-

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ber of the great Powers themselves, the dangers they provoke are more apparent than the security they afford.

Generally speaking, a small state can never put its trust in military power. Recent events have made us rather incredulous about wars to stop war. We have reasons, too, to fear that even armaments are not the best means to ensure peace. Therefore, when we discuss the problem of peace and the reform of the League of Nations, we are not inclined to emphasize rearmament and military measures. Article 16 does not appear to us the most important part of the Covenant. On the contrary, we think much more of the articles regarding the prevention of war through conciliation and peaceful action. Here lay the real purport of the proposals formulated last summer by each of the Scandinavian governments. All of them asked for stronger League activity to prevent conflicts and, as a means to that end, more elasticity in the interpretation of the rules of the Covenant so as to enable the League to make better use of its powers of mediation.

In the Covenant there is one article that seems to me particularly adapted for use in the furtherance of an active peace policy. That is the article which authorizes the Assembly of the League "from time to time to advise the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." It is astonishing that there are members of the League who solemnly announce that they would regard such an action by the League as hostile, and who protest against it with all their power. One might think that all the articles of the Covenant would be equally sacred to all the members. Instead, one finds that the mere mention of this article (Article 19) is like putting one's hand in a wasp's nest. In my opinion, hardly any other article in the whole Covenant is of such importance as this one, because it affords the opportunity of taking up for peaceful discussion all the problems liable to engender international conflicts. It seems to me essential in the work for peace to take the possible elements of conflict at the root and try to settle them before they have ranged nations against each other in a passionate fight for what seem to them vital interests or questions of honor. By proceeding in that way the League of Nations may become a truer and more powerful instrument of peace, and the need for military measures will gradually lessen. The small nations have no greater hope. Neither have the great Powers.

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BRITISH EXPERIMENTS IN STATE INTERVENTION

By Raymond Gram Swing

THOUGH the British and American forms of government descend from a common ancestry, British democracy is younger than our own. Those who devised the American republic after the Revolutionary War gave a great deal of thought to establishing a democratic form of government which should avoid the danger — then feared — of pure majority rule. The result, the system of checks and balances, marks the main difference between the American system and the modern democratic government which began in Great Britain in 1841, and which has developed and expanded ever since. That was the year when the Tory Government took office, accepting fully the principles of the Reform Act. The British were not as conscious as had been our own Founding Fathers that they were creating a new kind of state. After 1841 the power of Parliament expanded without any explicit, ceremonious assertion that the power of the Crown was being reduced. The Crown waned, it was not extinguished. And steps by which authority was transferred to Parliament could become fixed because the British had discovered the "unwritten constitution," one of the most useful ideas born of the abstract Anglo-Saxon mind. Since the British did not, at a given moment, by a formal and fully aware decision, launch out upon a system of unmitigated parliamentary rule, a birthday cannot be assigned to it. It unfolded. And its unfolding continued until the Lords were shorn of their veto rights in this century.

Thus democratic government in Great Britain not only is younger than our own, it renews its youth more easily. Those who complain about America being a quarter of a century behind the British in social policy state the matter unfairly. The British are ahead because they turned to actual democracy later than we did, and because they have a simpler formula for keeping abreast of changing needs. We are not behind because we are backward, but because our democracy is older, and is embedded in the less elastic and considerably more fearful concepts of an earlier period.

Certain acts of the Roosevelt Administration have marked a departure from the American system of government. The departure was widely attacked in the presidential campaign as lead-

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ing the nation down the wide path to dictatorship. This conjunction of ideas is noteworthy. Departure from the American system, it was assumed, could lead only in the one direction, toward the anti-democratic state forms of the continent in Europe. It was not appreciated that most of the Roosevelt novelties were bringing our practice more into line with those of British democracy.

A strong protest, for instance, was made against Mr. Roosevelt's scheduling of "must" legislation in Washington. Since in the field of legislation the Chief Executive has only the right of advising Congress, and of interposing a veto, the protest was legitimate, but it was wrongly worded. Mr. Roosevelt in scheduling "must" legislation has not been like a fascist dictator. As head of a party as well as of the government, and as a creator of policy who must answer to the people at the next election, the President took up a position similar to that of a British Prime Minister. "Must" legislation, of course, is the standard practice in Great Britain. To vote against a "must" bill is to defy the party "whip," and that in turn is to lose the official support of the majority party's organization in the next election. Only an occasional rebel does so often without forfeiting his seat. The President lacks most of the Prime Minister's disciplinatory powers over legislators. He cannot keep a congressman from being nominated. And his discipline is limited to an exercise of his own prestige or to the withdrawal of patronage. The President, in scheduling "must" bills, is being a Baldwin, not a Hitler. The difference, of course, is in the ultimate appeal to the free electorate, which Mr. Baldwin faces but Herr Hitler does not. No president can become dictator unless elections cease to be free. The bulwark of democracy is not decentralization, certainly not the system of checks and balances, but the full exercise of civil liberties. Even though centralization and greatly strengthened state powers are essential to dictatorships, they are not what distinguish them from democracies. The trend toward them has been and is being accepted in Great Britain without any weakening of democracy. It is not enough to say that there can be a centralized democracy; Great Britain *is* one.

Now I am not asserting that Great Britain will for all time remain a democracy. But I am startled by the ease with which some American writers, conjuring up the dangers which they see lurking in any course that would modify the old American system, land in their imagination in an Italian or German or

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Russian port, sailing past London as though it did not exist. Or if they refer in passing to British experiments with centralization and state initiative it is only to argue that Great Britain, being a small, compact country, has nothing to teach a country which is as vast as a continent. The smallness of Great Britain is not a justification for British centralization, only an explanation of Britain's greater ease in getting it. A large country may need more of some kinds of centralization than a small one if it is to carry out a national policy. The British have a vast experience to offer any democracy which by the use of government action is trying to shape capitalism to meet modern human needs. For that has been the task to which they have devoted themselves, save for the years of the World War, for a generation.

One can date this phase of British development from the institution of the social services in 1912. And that is a good starting point for a review of those actions in Great Britain which throw any light on recent trends towards an increase of government initative in our own country. We shall find some of the British experiments startlingly similar to the improvisations of the New Deal. Our review will also show the British Government using loans and tariffs as a leverage to force industries to adopt reforms. It will show the direct delegation of legislative power to private associations. It will show a predilection for taking certain kinds of economic activities both out of politics and out of the field of free enterprise, transforming them instead into semi-public-service corporations. In other words, we shall find evidence that Mr. Roosevelt has not gone so far as his British predecessors and contemporaries in interfering with business and individuals.

II

In the matter of social services Mr. Roosevelt has not gone so far as the British. They have never accepted the idea of pure insurance. The state has always made a contribution to most of the services. In the case of the contributory unemployment scheme it amounts to a third of the total sum raised. The whole of old-age pensions after seventy is paid by the state. And now that "transitional" benefits paid after insurance "rights" are exhausted have been recognized as a permanent part of unemployment relief, the state takes on an additional and exclusive financial burden. As about three-fifths of British national revenue is derived from direct taxation, assessed according to ability to pay,

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the social services in Great Britain are a deliberate effort to redistribute wealth through government interference. Money is taken from the haves and paid to the have-nots. This is a recognition of the belief that capitalism does not distribute its rewards equably, and that it can be somewhat democratized by social action. Both the British and American systems of social security are confusing and hard to analyze. The redistribution of wealth is an element in both. But redistribution is much more stressed in the British schemes than in our own. Non-contributory old-age pensions under our social security act are paid by the federal and state governments; but as more of our tax revenue comes from levies on consumption than is the case in Britain, less redistribution of wealth occurs. Otherwise our scheme is nothing but enforced savings. And even our work-relief, since it is financed by loans, and since the method of servicing them is not defined, cannot be called the redistribution of wealth. The British Government pays around $600,000,000 annually toward the social services, and the rising cost of old-age pensions will probably bring the contribution to more than $800,000,000. Roughly three-fifths of this represents the redistribution of wealth, a tax on those who get more than their social share from the working of capitalism. We are nearly three times as large as Britain. If we undertook to do as much redistribution of wealth as she does it would cost close to two billion dollars and would considerably lighten the weight on the poor of our social insurances.

Though they are her most imposing instance of state interference, Britain's social services can hardly be called lavish. There is a limit, however, both to the amount of wealth subject to redistribution and to the possibility of enforced savings. The British after a generation of experience in this field have probably approximated the maximum that can be done with safety under their own standards. Under the unemployment insurance scheme, men workers make a weekly contribution of 18 cents a week, women of 16 cents; if out of work, they receive in benefits $4.25 and $3.75 a week; a married man is allowed $2.25 for a dependent wife and 75 cents for each child. This gives a married man with three children $8.75 a week. To qualify for these benefits he must have made 30 contributions in the preceding two years, and he is entitled to full benefits for 26 weeks of a year. Thus it is possible for a married man with three children, who has paid the minimum in contributions and receives the maximum in benefits, to draw

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from the system $235.50 in return for an outlay of $5.40. Obviously this is not insurance. And his security does not end at the expiration of his rights; he becomes entitled to "transitional" benefits towards which he has made no contribution.

Characteristic of the British system is the combination of employment agencies with unemployment insurance. A man's right to benefits depends on his willingness to accept work, which can be demonstrated only if there is centralized control both over available openings and over the insurance scheme. The vacancies notified to the National Employment Exchange system in 1935 were 2,911,000; and of these 2,512,000 were filled. The total number of insured persons was 12,560,000.

The British system of old-age pensions, as in our own Social Security Act, is dual. A contributory system is combined with a so-called pension. In Britain the workers pay toward the pensions they receive between the ages of 65 and 70, but after 70 the state bears the entire cost. In both periods pensions are small, $2.50 a week for a single man and another $2.50 for his wife. The pensions received after 70 are subject to the means test, and are not in reality old-age pensions at all but a form of old-age relief. However, the cost to the state of the non-contributory pensions, which was $125,000,000 in 1925, has already reached $225,000,000 a year; and due to the increased expectancy of life it will ultimately be $400,000,000 — all of it, be it noted, raised from taxation. The contributory pension received between the ages of 65 and 70 is not subject to the means test. In addition, there are widows' and children's pensions, and orphans' pensions. Widows are entitled to $2.50 a week, with an allowance of $1.25 for the oldest child under 14, and 75 cents for each younger child. The allowance for orphans is $1.82, paid until the age of 14.

The pensions schemes are part of the Health Insurance system, which derives the rest of its revenue from a weekly payment of 20 cents by each male worker and 14 cents by each woman, with a like payment by the employer. The part devoted to medical care and sickness benefits is neither enforced savings nor redistribution of wealth. It is the financing of socialized medicine, the state delivering to the entire working population better medical care than it otherwise could afford. It does so by exercising its power of compulsion, as the contributions must be made by everyone with an income of $1,250 or less. A worker need not use the "panel" physician employed under the act, but he must help support the

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system. From the "panel" doctor he has free medical attendance and medicine. If incapacitated by sickness, the worker draws $3.75 a week ($3.50 for women) as sickness benefit, up to twenty-six weeks. If still unable to work at the end of the 26 weeks, he becomes entitled to a disablement benefit of $1.82 a week. A straight maternity benefit of $10.00 is paid to mothers.

This brief summary is enough to show that the British system goes beyond the New Deal's social security program in two particulars. One is the point already stressed, the element of redistribution of wealth; the other is the socialization of medicine. Both differences are important. One represents a deliberate effort toward democratizing capitalism through government intervention; the other makes national health a government concern. In both instances, the function of the democratic state is widened beyond any concept yet tolerated in this country.

III

The story of the British social services is widely though superficially known in this country. Less has been told of the state's intervention in British industry and agriculture. To understand the motive of the various interventions one must recall that British industry, supreme in the nineteenth century because it was fairly free from effective competition, began to suffer as other countries became industrialized. And a structure already shaky was then pushed badly out of shape by the terrific strain of the war. After 1919, four of the major activities on which British industrial supremacy had largely been based were in a pitiable condition. Coal, iron and steel, shipbuilding and textiles were partially paralyzed, and because of plant redundancy and world changes they seemed beyond hope of complete recovery. The core of British unemployment was in these industries, and a considerable number of the unemployed in them will probably never find work there again. This is particularly true of coal; its problem has yet to be solved. If one adds agriculture to these four, one sees the magnitude of Britain's postwar task of reconstruction and recovery.

The assumption is often made that the British recovered by adhering to the old-fashioned wisdom of letting things alone. This view is grotesquely mistaken. The government has stepped in, gingerly it is true, but with utter disregard of the proprieties of laissez-faire. The obstacle to recovery often lay in the stubborn

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resistance of manufacturers, who dallied long before they would accept sacrifices for the good of their own industries, not to mention the common welfare. If there was an excess of plant capacity, said the individual owner, let the other fellow shut down his plant. In other words, capitalists squirmed before taking their losses. The minority could keep the majority in the red, without the majority being able to do anything about it. This was something like the "unfair competition" and "chiseling" which led to the NRA in this country. The British went about their matters in a much more tentative way, without street parades and ballyhoo, and without increasing the bureaucracy. Their task was easier than ours in that they did not need codes for the benefit of labor in most industries, because labor unions had long been accepted as a basic element of industrial stability. What they needed was adjustment between plant capacity and the market. They could reduce the capacity or increase the market, or do both.

In applying the description of "planning" to the actions leading to British recovery it must be explained that the term can mean the rigid and complete rule of a government over economic affairs, and it also can mean the analysis of economic ills and the deft intervention of government to effect essential changes. This latter can consist of prodding reluctant individuals to act of their own accord, or it can require the surrender of a balky minority. In order to succeed it must be accompanied by financial policies which provide conditions favorable to recovery. In this sense British recovery has been due to planning. After the abandonment of gold a cheap money market was established, and interest rates were kept so low that notable economists voiced the fear that a permanent twilight of capital earnings had set in. The next major step was the adoption of tariffs. But if Americans believe these were clapped on in the spirit of Smoot-Hawleyism they lose a subtle but vital lesson from the British experience. To begin with, the tariff barrier was not high. Secondly, it was set up in a manner so that it could be pierced with gateways for the admission of a controlled volume of imports in certain lines. And finally it was used as a highly persuasive means of inducing British industries to put their affairs in order. Protection, in other words, was a national policy for national and not particular ends. Above all, it was not to serve as the lifebuoy for inefficient producers.

A notable instance of the use of tariffs as a part of planning has

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been the reorganization of the British iron and steel industry. Forced to expand while making war munitions, the industry found itself after the war with far too much plant. It was weakened internally by the bitter rivalry of its small units, and outwardly it faced both a reduced foreign market and the stern competition of foreigners who had already learned the lesson of rationalization. To some extent, the industry responded voluntarily to economic necessity. Amalgamations did take place, vertical organizations were formed, and production to some extent was concentrated in the more efficient plants. But as long as foreign supplies and semi-manufactured goods could come in without limitation, and frantic competition remained, the industry could not complete its consolidation or deal as a unit with European cartels. So the government gave iron and steel the benefit of tariffs, hoping for voluntary consolidation. It did not ensue. The tariff of itself brought easement, and tended to slow up the efforts for voluntary reform. So the government had to threaten not to renew the tariff unless the industry produced a scheme for further reorganization. The threat is illustrative of the nature of state interference in Britain and of its success. The industry responded. What else could it do? A national committee drew up the plan for the British Iron and Steel Federation which was approved by the industry and then by the government, and now is in force. Each branch of the industry has its own autonomous association. These associations are affiliated with the Federation, which has power to give effect to the collective will in matters of general policy and in conducting negotiations. Once the Federation had been formed, negotiations could begin with the cartels of France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany. The level of exports and imports was fixed in 1935 for a five-year term. Plant is being extended and modernized, and an industry which a few years ago had one foot in the grave is now revitalized.

The British cotton industry in recent years presented an even more lamentable appearance than the steel industry. It had lost whole sectors of its foreign markets for good and all, but it could not bring itself to accept the changed conditions. Voluntary efforts were made to reduce redundant spindles. In 1929 the Bank of England took a hand and formed the Lancashire Cotton Corporation to acquire 10,000,000 spindles and concentrate production in efficient mills. By 1933 a total of 4,620,000 spindles had been scrapped. But the industry still languished, and in 1934 a

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conference was called under Lord Colwyn which resulted in 1936 in the passing of the Cotton Spinning Industry Act. This provides for setting up a Spindles Board with power to buy and dismantle redundant mills, and to borrow $10,000,000 for the purpose. The loan is serviced and the board's expenses are paid by an annual levy of about 2 cents a spindle. This must be paid for 14 years by every spindle owner in the country. Further, wage agreements made in the weaving section, and agreed to by two-thirds of the employers and employees, have legal effect and are enforceable in the courts. These grants of legislative power by Parliament to capital and labor went through Parliament without producing a shudder and, arresting though they are as a development under democracy, they have been unnoticed in the American press. Here is NRA in British disguise. Well may the British bless the absence of a written constitution, for none could have been framed a century and a half ago which would have foreseen such a delegation of the legislative authority to private persons. The story of the cotton industry is not one of state intervention, but of a reform which in the end needed a delegation of the state's powers. The reform is not unlike that made in the Guffey Act for the reorganization of the bituminous coal industry; but it differs in being immune from court inhibition.

Still more spectacularly than in steel the British used the tariff wall to promote internal reorganization in agriculture. This was the work of Walter Elliot, now demoted from the Ministry of Agriculture to be Secretary for Scotland. To what extent his transfer forecasts a partial demobilization of the British marketing schemes is not yet clear. But the schemes are a signal example of government intervention and of the ease with which Parliament delegates it powers to a minister and authorizes the coercion of stubborn minorities. The parallel between the Elliot policies and the AAA is striking, though it is not to be drawn too closely. Britain did not suffer from general over-production but from a market surfeited by imports and from ruinous price-cutting due to internal disorganization. The cure was regimentation. Decried in this country, it produced no flurry in Great Britain. What ultimately was criticized was not the invasion of personal liberties, but instances of unwise planning.

The British formula in most cases was quotas plus regimentation. Parliament passed two Agricultural Acts covering the whole range of agriculture, and applicable to specific industries. "They

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are 'enabling' acts," Mr. Elliot once explained, "by which producers may agree to exercise the powers conferred by the Acts, but are not forced to against their will. The growers of any commodity may elect to set up what is called a marketing board to administer a marketing scheme for that product. If two-thirds of the whole industry vote for a marketing board, the remaining third must fall into line. This marketing board may exercise any of the powers which are set out in the act. Some of the chief of them are the sole right to buy and sell the product; the right to lay down the quantity which each individual producer may sell; the right to fix the price at which the producer may sell. Or the Board may simply control sales by determining what kinds or varieties the producer may sell at any time, as well as the persons to whom he may sell them. The board also may arrange for the producers to sell their wares at exceptionally low rates for special purposes."

Only in the case of potatoes did the British face a problem of over-production, and this they met by an excess acreage levy. Each producer was allotted a basic acreage, usually what he had employed in 1933. If he planted more than that he had to pay $25 an acre. The regulation of supply was obtained through requiring growers to put their potatoes through a riddle, or screen, and forbidding them to sell for human consumption the smaller potatoes that passed through. Prices for production were not fixed, but they were in other schemes.

With such sweeping powers, the marketing boards could and did dominate many branches of the industry under the supervision and guidance of the Minister of Agriculture. Though the industry in theory prepared its own schemes, the minister in fact drew them up and the farmers simply voted on them. He had charge of the quota negotiations, fixing, for example, the amount of bacon which Denmark should be permitted to lay on British breakfast tables, and politely inducing the Dominions, against whom quotas could not be enforced, to reduce their supplies voluntarily. Marketing schemes were adopted for pigs, bacon, hops, potatoes, and milk, and even for Scottish raspberries in 1936. About two-fifths of British production came under the new type of control. Farm prices rose, as did home production and agricultural wages. If the scope of agricultural planning now is to be reduced it will not be because Mr. Elliot curtailed British liberties, but because his economic tendency, being nationalist, is

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at variance with the deep flow of British economic habit. It runs counter to the inclination to buy food from the overseas countries which take British manufactures, particularly the Dominions.

IV

Government loans rank close to tariffs as potent persuaders in bringing about internal reorganization. Amalgamations which economic conditions make expedient can be expedited by the offer of financial help. Thus the *Queen Mary* could be built by subsidy; but the *quid pro quo* which the government demanded was that the long-deferred merger of the White Star and Cunard companies actually take place. Tramp shipping, a large industry in Great Britain, was saved from ruin by the same kind of government help. The British Shipping Assistance Act, 1935, supplied a subsidy of $10,000,000 in that year, and the same sum in 1936. To obtain the money, however, the tramp shippers not only had to agree between themselves to reduce surplus tonnage, they had to obtain international agreement to the same end. This done, the whole shipping position improved, since the shipyards already had worked out a scheme (for which they obtained government sanction) for buying and closing inefficient yards. The shipbuilders took a government loan after they had organized. It amounted to $50,000,000, repayable in 12 years, but it was by no means unconditional. The government insisted that for every ton of new shipping built two tons of existing ships had to be scrapped, and for every ton reconditioned one ton had to be scrapped. Owners were allowed to buy foreign ships for scrapping.

Centralization under government supervision was encouraged in the British railway system, where the 123 existing companies were merged into four by the Railways Act, 1921. A Railway Rates Tribunal was set up under the same act. The further elimination of competition has been authorized by a still later pooling agreement. Faced with competing road transport, the railroads were authorized to buy out their competitors or establish their own road services; and in 1935 all road transport was licensed and put under public control. In this case private ownership has been maintained, and so it has in the latest government intervention in the transport field, the London Passenger Transport Act. This Act took all the companies serving the London area — bus lines, subways, street cars, and the railroads carrying suburban traffic — and welded them into a unit. There was no confiscation of

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property, and as the plan promised steady though low earnings in place of precarious returns, the stockholders rejoiced. But they did lose their rights over their properties. London transport now is managed by a board not chosen by them, but by "appointing trustees" named under the act. Hereafter their one individual liberty is to draw dividends, strictly limited by law.

The solution of the London transport problem is characteristic of the tendency to centralize by inventing new non-governmental entities, working under state supervision, but retaining the aspect of private ownership. The Central Electricity Board and the British Broadcasting Corporation are other examples. The power fight we have had in this country has been circumvented in Britain by the electricity board, a semi-autonomous organization financed by government loans, which has now completed building the "grid" that links up all the main power resources of the country. It is working on a long-term program which ultimately will weed out inefficient plants, and bring down the cost of current.

The broadcasting problem was met by the creation of the British Broadcasting Corporation, operating under charter and financed by a $2.50 fee collected from each owner of a receiving set. Political control is kept at a discreet distance; the Postmaster General is answerable in Parliament for the broad policy of the B.B.C. but in the main the government keeps its hands off — except from the funds of the corporation, which have been quietly raided to help stop gaps in the national budget. The fact that the charter is renewable at stated periods keeps the B.B.C. from abusing the power of its position. It also commits it to conducting its affairs in a safe manner calculated to make as few enemies as possible. Whether this is the happiest way to deal with broadcasting in a democracy is not under discussion here. The point is that the British, without fear that they might be undermining their liberties, made broadcasting a monopoly, socialized it, and chartered a new kind of semi-public body to administer it.

While the British have enormously increased the intervention of government, they are (as the nature of these autonomous entities suggests) unwilling to load onto Parliament the increased work of managing a centralized society. Parliament is painfully aware of the growth of its burdens and of its incompetence to do justice to them. For that reason it has been far less reluctant than our own Congress to delegate powers, either to ministers who already have much more authority than do members of the Presi-

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dent's cabinet, or to commissions and boards, or even to organizations of industry and labor. The state lays down the broad principles and thereafter is inclined to leave wide discretion for those persons and groups who have to deal with problems in the concrete. There is an increased exercise of authority by the state, but it is balanced by diffusion of authority. The fact that the authority is delegated by Parliament shows no signs so far of leading to autocratic practices. There are some in Great Britain who are disturbed by the trend. But they are a handful. The British public does not feel that it is losing control over its own affairs.

The face of many lands has changed in recent years, but not only those where democratic government has been overthrown. The urge toward centralization, under the name of rationalization, gripped big European industry long before Fascism became an acute issue. Stronger centralized industrial power and grave national economic difficulties alike forced governments to deal with problems which previous generations had not dreamt would exist. In some European countries, democracy was not able to cope with the new tasks. In Great Britain, France, Switzerland, Holland and the Scandinavian countries, the older democracies, and in Czechoslovakia among the younger ones, it has succeeded. In all of them, centralization has proceeded apace, along with increased government direction in economic affairs. And in Great Britain, the solidest of them all, the success has enhanced rather than weakened the principle of popular self-government.

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PREREQUISITES TO MONETARY STABILIZATION

By O. M. W. Sprague

THE international gold standard worked reasonably well before the World War — so well, indeed, that with hardly a dissenting voice it was reëstablished at the earliest possible moment after peace had been made. The return was accomplished in the belief that monetary stability would provide a basis for necessary readjustments in the wider field of financial and trading relationships which had been distorted during the conflict and the years immediately following. These anticipations were grievously disappointed. The restored gold standard did not prove an effective means of promoting economic stability, and, within a decade, it was everywhere abandoned. In some countries the action was unavoidable; in others it was taken as a voluntary measure of monetary policy.

This striking difference in the results obtained from the gold standard in the prewar and postwar periods was not primarily due to intervening changes of a monetary character such as variations in the amount of monetary gold stocks, in exchange parities, in banking organization and in credit policies. The gold standard worked well in the prewar period because all the more important commercial countries were not far from financial and trading equilibrium. This position was maintained through the persuasive influence exerted under the gold standard, tending to check departures from equilibrium before they became so extreme as to involve difficult changes in costs and in the employment of labor and capital. Of course, payments were never in exact balance. Now one country and then another would experience an unfavorable balance of payments, reflecting fluctuations in export and import trade, tourists expenditures, shipping charges and the like, as well as on account of capital movements. But such unbalanced situations did not become so extreme as to require intolerably difficult changes in the structure of costs and prices. In the postwar period the departure from equilibrium was so extreme that adjustments under the pressure exerted by gold movements seemed impracticable. Immediate collapse was threatened. At all events, policies of coöperative support were adopted by the central banks in the hope that somehow adjustments would of them-

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selves be made. Broadly speaking, the result was a still further departure from equilibrium. Typical manifestations were a large increase in the foreign indebtedness of many countries and a persistent and growing maldistribution of monetary gold stocks. The experience of those years surely leads to the inevitable conclusion that a reasonably close approach to equilibrium must be reached before there can be established an international monetary system which promises to yield satisfactory results and to be permanent. An international monetary system is a means of maintaining equilibrium; it cannot create equilibrium. And it must be further borne in mind that this equilibrium must be established within nations as well as between nations. Domestic conditions must be sufficiently sound to allow continuous adjustments to be made.

In view of recent unhappy experiences with the restored gold standard, it would seem certain that monetary stabilization in the future can be achieved only gradually, as trade recovery proceeds and as international financial and trading equilibrium is by degrees restored. When we examine the stabilization question in the light of this assumption we find that three problems require consideration. We must determine, first, how far from stabilization we now are; secondly, whether we are moving toward a better balance in trade and finance, both internal and external, a development which we may expect to see accompanied and furthered by greater monetary stability; and, finally, in the event that a reasonable measure of *de facto* stability should be reached, whether definitive stabilization will be desirable.

Two distinct courses have been taken by countries which have abandoned the gold standard. When they departed from gold, some (as, for example, the United Kingdom) went upon an inconvertible paper basis. Others have remained on gold, but with a lower gold content for their monetary unit. These, by appropriate legislation, expressly reserved the power to make further changes. Such, after a short interval of inconvertibility, was the course taken by the United States. We have a gold basis for our currency; but we certainly cannot say that we have more than a temporary or uncertain gold standard. Even so, it does provide some ground for the expectation of *de facto* stability. This must be maintained if any progress is to be made in the near future toward international stability, for the American currency is the only one which, at present rates, and under existing conditions, is in a superlatively strong position relative to other currencies.

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In these circumstances, any fresh revaluation of the dollar would inevitably set in motion a further series of revaluations elsewhere, and these would defer indefinitely all possibility of establishing settled currency relationships.

Those countries other than the United States which have remained on gold, though with their money units at a lower gold valuation, seem to have had no alternative open to them. For budgetary and other reasons, confidence in those currencies would have been dangerously weakened if the tie with gold had been broken even temporarily. As all of these countries have only recently revalued, sufficient time has not yet elapsed to determine whether the new values are appropriate to existing and prospective conditions. Further modifications in the present values of some of these currencies would not be inconsistent with progress in the direction of general monetary stability.

An intermediate position is occupied by the United Kingdom and the countries of the sterling area which are still upon an inconvertible paper basis. In all these nations, confidence was sufficiently strong to permit of a departure from gold without danger of a collapse of currency values. As these countries were the first to leave the gold standard, it might be supposed that the value of their currencies would by now have been adequately tested. Such, indeed, has been the case as regards the relationship of these currencies among themselves. In that respect they have been almost as steady during the last two years as if they had been upon gold; and apparently they have achieved this without difficulty and to the accompaniment of a good measure of business recovery. But during these same years, sterling, and with it the currencies of the sterling area, have fluctuated rather widely in relation to the dollar. The extreme range of the pound has been from $4.70 to $5.06. It cannot be said, then, that an appropriate rate for sterling has been indicated by actual experience. In particular, it should be noted that a special influence favorable to sterling was modified, if not removed, upon the realignment of the gold block currencies last September.

Evidently the next step toward monetary stability involves the determination (if that be possible) of an appropriate sterling-dollar rate in existing circumstances. This does not mean the immediate adoption of a new gold content for the pound. If Great Britain followed the example of the United States, that would mean a rate so far below the existing rate for sterling as to set in

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motion a new series of revaluations everywhere. The proper sterling-dollar rate can be found only as a result of reasonable efforts to maintain some rate sufficiently long to make evident whether it is or is not appropriate. This implies that Britain would adopt, in case of weakness in the foreign exchanges, measures similar to those that would be taken if the country were on a gold basis, *i.e.* short-term money rates would be advanced, though not perhaps so far as might be done under traditional gold standard practice. If, in spite of moderate advances in rates, a considerable loss of gold occurred, without any coincident reduction in foreign funds in the London market, this experience would offer convincing evidence that a lower rate for sterling was required. On the other hand, if no serious effort is to be made by British monetary authorities to test sterling, if at all costs a policy of abnormally low interest rates is to be pursued, then progress toward monetary stability will be deferred indefinitely.

At this point something should be said of the influence that governmental stabilization funds and agreements can exert in bringing about monetary stability. Much can be accomplished through a stabilization fund when a currency is inconvertible. The fund can be used to acquire gold or foreign currencies when the exchanges are strong, and the gold or currencies thus acquired can be employed to moderate declining tendencies. In the case of a country which is firmly on gold (like the United States), it is hardly too much to say that a stabilization fund is a superfluous mechanism. Gold would move in and out of the country if the business were left to the banks as in former times. Only in the event that the fund is used to acquire and to hold balances in foreign markets which the banks would not venture to acquire, can the fund exert a special influence; but this is a practice which on a large scale is undesirable and which, we may surmise, our Treasury would not embark upon. In view of the transfer of the conduct of monetary policy from the reserve banks to the Treasury, the understandings between it and certain foreign governments are to be welcomed. The main advantage presumably will be to prevent misunderstandings and to establish between the various treasuries the sort of relationships which central banks have long maintained. It is to be hoped that both the American and British Governments have the definite objective of arriving at an appropriate sterling rate. A rate which is too high to be maintained is to no one's advantage. On the other hand, an un-

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duly low rate threatens, as was said above, a new series of revaluations. With the best will in the world, and with the use of all available data regarding costs, prices, foreign trade and movements of funds, it is not possible to fix an appropriate rate for sterling in advance. That, as already noted, can be determined only by actual experience. Only when $4.86, or some higher or lower rate, has been held without serious difficulty, accompanied by a well-maintained and broadened improvement in trade, can we say that it is an equilibrium rate. Happily the appropriate rate will probably prove to be not so far from the existing rate as to impose on other countries the necessity for further currency revaluation. The accuracy of this forecast, however, depends upon the extent to which general financial and industrial equilibrium has been restored.

Certainly the world has made much progress toward equilibrium since the beginning of the depression and the departure of the first group of countries from gold. The cessation of foreign lending that came in 1931, though in many cases it precipitated a collapse, was needed. It brought about, *inter alia*, the discontinuance of reparations and war debt payments — payments for which no trade adjustments whatever had been made. The cessation of foreign loans contributed perhaps even more than the departure from gold to make possible low interest rates, particularly in England, and it also stimulated the very desirable diversion of capital into the production of goods and services for home use. In the twenties both production and investment were too greatly influenced by the illusory belief that old channels of trade could and must be restored. The wants of consumers were faultily analyzed. In all the more advanced countries, most of the goods for which there is an elastic demand are necessarily produced locally — *e.g.* those involved in providing heating, plumbing, lighting, shelter, and entertainment, in contrast with, let us say, tea and coffee, which require exports in payment. Moreover, an increased demand for raw materials in manufacturing areas provides a sounder basis for trade than a demand that rests largely upon the granting of loans to distant borrowers, whether they be governments or business undertakings. Other factors that have brought about a closer approach to equilibrium have been the liquidation of debt and the scaling down of fixed charges, both of them developments which customarily occur in depressions, though on this occasion they were doubtless facilitated in

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some countries by the relief afforded through the departure from the gold standard.

These financial and industrial adjustments have by no means been carried through to the same extent in all countries. But they do seem to have gone far enough in a sufficiently large number of countries to warrant the belief that, with an appropriate rate for sterling, *de facto* stability might be maintained even though some countries were still unable to participate. One small country, Belgium, has successfully maintained itself on a fixed gold basis since revaluation in the spring of 1935. The Netherlands, Java and Switzerland can unquestionably do likewise when they have adopted a definite gold content for their monetary units. The United States, of course, rests firmly — one is tempted to say almost too firmly — upon its present gold foundation. The Canadian currency has fluctuated but slightly in relation to the American dollar. If now a stable sterling-dollar rate not far from the existing rate should be found appropriate, all the countries of the vast sterling area might continue to maintain their present stable relationship to the pound. The sterling area includes the entire British Empire, aside from Canada, and the Scandinavian countries. In addition, Japan and Argentina (though not without exchange restrictions) may be mentioned as countries which in practise maintain a stable relationship with sterling. Perhaps no one of these countries, whether those in the sterling group or those previously mentioned, have completely emerged from the depression; but quite certainly they are in no danger of such catastrophic difficulties as marked the depression's initial stages. They all seem in position to test their ability to maintain stable monetary relationships with each other; and they make up so much of the world that they are able to meet possible continued instability elsewhere without resort to further depreciation.

It seems a reasonably safe conclusion, therefore, that progress toward greater monetary stability is both feasible and probable in the immediate future. But what of the more distant future? Can an international gold standard, perhaps with some modifications designed to afford greater elasticity, be reëstablished in the conditions which obtain in the modern world? We must recognize at the outset that, even if there were no other obstacles, confidence in the permanence of any definite stabilization will be far less than it was in the twenties. Then it was everywhere believed that the world would surely remain on gold indefinitely, or at

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least until the outbreak of another war. The fear of war is itself a new and disturbing factor. In the pre-war period there was far less expectation of war than at present; and the probable consequences of war, both economic and social, were but dimly perceived. The possibility that there might be revolutionary changes, whether to the right or to the left, seemed to lie too far in the future for it to effect monetary policies. Considerations of this character suggest that the credit structure in each country must rest for a given degree of strength more completely upon its own gold resources than was perhaps necessary in the pre-war period. This is particularly true of the British credit structure which, as events in 1931 indicated, could not as in former times adjust itself to strains by means of moderate changes in discount rates.

There is every reason to suppose, however, that monetary gold stocks will be sufficiently large to meet the requirements. As a result of revaluation, of the outflow of gold from non-monetary stocks in India, and of a very general increase in gold production, the gold foundation for the credit structure of the world is far more ample than it used to be. Indeed, it is so large as to suggest the possible danger of world-wide price inflation. This gold still is unevenly distributed, the United States holding some three-fifths of the total. Redistribution by means of loans will serve no useful purpose, however, until other countries succeed in developing a sufficiently favorable balance of payments to be able at least to acquire the gold currently produced from the mines. The ability to do so must be clearly evidenced before definite stabilization plans can be seriously considered.

It remains to inquire whether the economic structure of the world may not have become so complicated and rigid that satisfactory results cannot be expected from a return to the pre-war gold standard even if gold supplies are ample, parities appropriate, and a close approach to equilibrium has been reached. Many who have entertained this doubt have suggested a modified gold standard, with each country reserving the power to change the gold content of its monetary unit when not to do so would force it to attempt difficult changes in its cost and price structure.

This proposal is open to the objection that it would almost certainly lead to a general revaluation of currencies whenever any one important country resorted to revaluation. Obviously a slight revaluation, of the order of one or two percent, would only slightly benefit a country which required considerable reductions in costs

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and prices in order to maintain equilibrium. But a change of let us say ten percent would certainly force other countries from equilibrium and lead them to take similar action.

The proposal to adopt variable gold parities is objectionable for another and even more fundamental reason. It would weaken the most desirable single quality possessed by the pre-war standard — its restraining influence in periods of activity. The imposition of restraint at such times is always unwelcome; any lessening of the evident necessity for taking restraining action would be a step in the wrong direction. Experience does not suggest that persistent efforts to maintain easy money conditions during boom periods would have done more than defer the advent of depression. At such times there is small likelihood that maladjustments will be removed under the influence of easy money and the expectation of its continuance, largely because of the tendency of most people to move in herds. They continue to invest more and more capital and labor in the ways that are currently profitable. Some testing of the situation from time to time is in the interest of economic stability. The frequent changes in short-term money rates during the decade and more preceding the World War were not inconsistent with a general economic advance. And again, taking a more recent instance, surely restraint imposed as early as 1928 in the United States would have been helpful in moderating security speculation, and in checking over-development in urban and suburban real estate. Under a policy of credit restraint, reparation and war debt payments would doubtless have ceased at an earlier date and also the flow of British and American funds to foreign countries. Presumably the gold standard would have been abandoned earlier; but in these circumstances the depression itself would unquestionably have been less severe.

As was said at the outset, the international gold standard cannot create economic equilibrium. But that standard without essential change would still seem capable of doing more to maintain equilibrium than can reasonably be expected from it if it is so modified that it loses its restraining influence in periods of business activity. Obviously, the international gold standard cannot be reëstablished at once. Its reëstablishment may, indeed, be a distant objective. But to adopt it as an objective will exercise a more beneficent influence on the immediate course of events than to entertain the more elastic monetary objectives suggested by the emergency requirements of an unprecedented depression.

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CHARTING AMERICA'S NEWS OF THE WORLD WAR

By H. Schuyler Foster, Jr.

WHY did the United States go to war in 1917? For an answer, some point to the banks and munitions makers, some to the character of President Wilson, some to the capitalist system, some to Allied propagandists. In any attempt at presenting a complete answer, careful consideration must be given to what was in the minds of the American people themselves in the thirty-two months during which the United States was neutral. There were speakers, books, periodicals, and movies which gave the American people interpretations of the war and provoked popular emotions and reactions. But it was above all the news of Europe as supplied by the newspapers which provided the bases of contemporary American opinion.

The task of charting the features of this war news might be pursued along several useful lines. In the present case, attention is concentrated upon only two features: (1), the origin of the news which created the American picture of the war; and (2), the appeals contained in this news (not editorials) which might make the reader favor American participation. Reportorial interpretations naturally varied with the countries in which they originated. It seems worth while today to reëxamine the appeals they contained in view of the present controversy as to the motives which determined the United States to join the conflict.

The accompanying diagrams show the origin of our war news and indicate the nature of the appeals which that news contained. The diagrams are based on a compilation of the number of items appearing on the front page of the *New York Times*, the newspaper which published the maximum amount of war news. The diagrams do not cover the entire period of American neutrality; but they include the vital months from the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia through the sinking of the *Lusitania* and the resignation of Secretary Bryan, and the period from the German peace proposals of December 1916 to the American declaration of war in April 1917.

It is not to be assumed that each item counted had an equal effect upon the American public. Certain facts relating to the war were not in dispute. Germany did invade Belgium contrary

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ORIGIN OF WAR NEWS

FRONT PAGE OF "NEW YORK TIMES"



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to the terms of existing agreements. A single sensational fact of that nature made a far deeper impression than did columns of printed matter attacking German culture. Furthermore, the deep impressions so implanted in the public consciousness tended to influence the way in which subsequent news about German behavior and character was received. Although we can now discriminate more successfully between fact and interpretation, the writer's present aim is to present a picture of the news as it reached the American public during the years 1914–1917.

During the period of neutrality some Americans knew the significance which attached to British control of the cables, but there was no wide appreciation of the situation disclosed in the first of the accompanying diagrams. What the British accomplished by cutting the Emden-New York cable is indicated by a comparison of the amount of news coming direct from Germany in July 1914 with what came in August. The cable was used until August 4, when Britain declared war. Several days were required to establish the Nauen-Saybrook wireless link to replace the cable. Those were the days when the German armies were invading Belgium. As a result, the American impression of the German action in Belgium was based almost exclusively upon news received via Germany's enemies. Thereafter, the trans-oceanic wireless was the only direct contact between the Central Powers and America. A breakdown occurred shortly after the torpedoing of the *Lusitania;* and communication by wireless continued to be unreliable throughout the war. During the first year of the war, the news obtained in this manner never exceeded 4 percent of the front-page war news. In the same period, 70 percent was being supplied from the Entente Powers. This distribution (as the diagram shows) is in marked contrast to the distribution in July 1914, when Austria-Hungary and Germany provided nearly as much of the news as did France, Russia, Great Britain, and the minor powers which became allied with them. The period when the largest amount of direct news from Germany (12 percent) was attained was December 1916, when the peace proposals of the German Government awakened great interest. It is to be noted that much of the war news originated in neutral countries; but a great part of this passed through the hands of the London censors.

When the hostilities began, each belligerent established a rigid censorship over all communication, internal and foreign. The

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actions taken by the Germans and the British were especially important for America — that of the Germans because their wireless disseminated their censor's version of the war; and that of the British because the news from the rest of Europe (including cables from the Central Powers) flowed through their sieve. The terms of the British censorship were set forth in 1915 in two memoranda.[1] "All press messages to, from, or through London" were censored by the Official Press Bureau "with the threefold object of preventing information of military value from reaching the enemy, of acquiring similar information for our own purposes, and of checking the dissemination of information likely to be of use to the enemy or prejudicial to the allies." The statements of wartime correspondents bear ample testimony to the activity of the censors in mutilating or suppressing a large proportion of the dispatches intended for America, and even of making numerous interpolations.[2]

This situation affected not only the war news appearing in the *New York Times*, but the dispatches in the other major papers. Investigation reveals that the various trends disclosed are paralleled in each of the seven newspapers then published in Chicago. Even the newspapers unfriendly to the Entente, such as the Hearst chain, published twice as much news from that side as from Germany.

Another significant fact shown by the first of the diagrams is the constant increase in the proportion of war news originating in the United States. In the early months of the war, when military dispatches constituted the bulk of war news, occasional statements or disclosures were made here by representatives of European governments. But as the war came to touch this country more and more directly, this news began to include the answers of American officials and of notable private citizens to the question as to what Americans should do and think in view of the tragic developments in Europe. Such news items dealt at first with the war as a general situation; then they began to pay particular attention to British interference with American commerce; after the sinking of the *Lusitania* they became more and more concerned with the actions of Germany. The items about

[1] Cd. 7680; Cd. 7679. Italics mine.

[2] See George A. Schreiner, "Cables and Wireless and Their Rôle in the Foreign Relations of the United States." Boston: The Stratford Press, 1924, p. 184; and p. 9 of the Introduction by Edward F. McSweeney. See also Captain Schreiner's article, "Censorship is Necessary, but Censors Muddle News of a Non-Military Nature," in *Editor and Publisher*, June 23, 1917.

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the war dealt much more frequently with diplomatic negotiations than with pork, copper or munitions. Naturally many of them originated in Washington and New York; but at a time like the *Lusitania* sinking in May 1915 they came from all over the country and occupied many columns on the inside pages. By February 1917 the war news originating in the United States constituted 42 percent of such news appearing on the front page.

Much of the news concerning American foreign relations naturally originated abroad, and diplomatic news was published with especial prominence after the sinking of the *Lusitania*. It was natural, perhaps, that attention should be concentrated upon specific losses suffered because of our position as a neutral rather than upon the gains we received; but the tendency made each American feel that he was directly involved in the commercial and personal tragedies enacted upon the high seas.

Not all of these war items — not even most of them — incorporated appeals likely to affect our attitude toward the belligerent nations. During the first year, not over 13 percent of the war articles can be said to have contained statements of this character. The items that did are nevertheless of special interest to us. The term "propaganda" connotes the organized dissemination of appeals to influence the behavior of people. In this sense propaganda is not confined to exaggerated atrocity stories, lies, and misrepresentation. The wartime propaganda machines naturally utilized straightforward truth whenever it seemed likely to be effective. But often, even when they did not resort to falsehood, they overlaid the truth with interpretations from a particular point of view. Just how much of the war news received by the American public was colored by organized propaganda no one can say. But every sort of appeal may influence action whether or not it results from organized propaganda. The American press published countless appeals of all sorts. The changing character of the appeals which appeared in the *New York Times* is indicated in the second diagram.

The proportion of news items designed to modify American opinion one way or the other, or capable of producing that effect, varied according to the country where each originated. The fact throws light on the activity of the propagandistic censorships. Throughout the period of American neutrality, the news which showed the greatest proportion of such items was that originating in the United States (28.8 percent) where the censorship was least

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NATURE OF APPEALS IN WAR NEWS

FRONT PAGE OF "NEW YORK TIMES"



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operative. The smallest proportion of items containing appeals came from Berlin via London (16.6 percent), after passing both the German and British censors. The direct wireless news from Berlin contained, proportionately, many more items likely to influence behavior (26 percent) than did the Entente news from London (17.6 percent). On the other hand, the volume of London news was so great that the total number of items containing appeals received from that source was almost as great as the number originating in the United States itself.

As the second diagram indicates, news stories about war atrocities were relatively infrequent. Probably the discrediting of the more horrifying stories about the mutilation of Belgian babies and the crucifixion of soldiers determined the American public not to be deceived again. Even when the appeals based on alleged atrocities are lumped together on the chart with the appeals having as their basis a discussion of a belligerent's alleged insolence, the total is still seen to have been very small during the first months of the war. Charges of murder and piracy became more frequent in 1917 with the resumption of German submarine warfare. Reports of German insolence toward Ambassador Gerard, and the dispatches giving the insolent German announcements regarding the number of American vessels which might pass through the war zone, were published with great prominence. It was at this time that the Hearst papers decided to hate Germany more than England, and began to give indications of favoring war. Appeals based on news of this sort doubtless carried more force than is suggested by their mere numbers; but we more frequently find other types of motivation.

As the war progressed, the news about it reaching America was accompanied by an increasingly large number of appeals which implied verdicts against one side or the other on the basis of law or of ideal morality. The legal items tended to be specific, referring to violations of neutrality (*e.g.* in Belgium or Greece), or of the laws of warfare. Other dispatches left it to the reader to pass judgment upon the Russians who were said to be mistreating the Jews, or the Germans who were depicted as adherents of militarism, Junkertum and absolute monarchy. In some cases there would be no specific details, but the article might create the general atmosphere of, "You just know those British are doing the right and manly sort of thing." When the "mistress of the seas" was interfering with American commerce, these

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appeals to law and idealism were anti-British in their effect; but they became more and more anti-German as the war continued and as German activity on the high seas interfered with alleged American rights. The submarine issue came back strongly into the news on February 1, 1917. With it, the proportion of items containing appeals increased to 20 percent. Even people of German blood and those who had had first-hand experience of Germany came to accept a distinction between a wicked German Government and a misguided German people. The American public was aggravated that the British had interfered with neutral commerce and mails; but the German action produced dramatic losses of American lives, and people began to argue that it might be necessary to avenge these on the field of battle.

It is significant that only a very small portion of the war news carried appeals based on economic interest. In the period analyzed, the *New York Times* carried 7,267 war items on its front page. Only 66 can be classed as having been motivated by the material interest of the United States; and of these, 35 appeared after March 1, 1917. Of the first dozen items referring to this issue in the early days of the war, ten were in opposition to the Entente. On occasion the implication was that the United States should remain neutral. The reappearance of the submarine menace turned almost all of the appeals of this nature definitely against Germany; but in all of February 1917, while we were waiting for a German "overt act," only nine such items appeared.

It was in March 1917 that the economic motivation began appearing daily upon the front page. By this time the President had called upon Congress for power to arm American merchantmen for defense, and he had revealed the note in which Foreign Minister Zimmermann invited Mexico and Japan to fight us in the event we entered the war. This news exploded like a bomb upon the front pages of American newspapers; and the effect was to emphasize, not the advantages of economic relations with the Entente, but revulsion against Germany's various attacks upon American interests. On top of the accumulation of many months of news and of idealistic propaganda which had generated an anti-German feeling, there now flashed the sharp appeal of American national defense — defense of American lives, American property, and American honor.

The appeals heard from abroad in the war years were not different in their effect from those often issued today by propa-

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ganda ministers or ministers of foreign affairs in the effort to influence world opinion. "Hitler's foreign policy has restored Germany to the normal status of equality with other nations." "Reports from the interior of Ethiopia prove that slavery is still practised there." "Natives have welcomed the Japanese army because it brings protection against bandits." But whether or not such statements form part of organized propaganda efforts they constitute an integral part of the legitimate and important news of the world. They may be designed to enlist the sympathies of Americans in this or that foreign cause. But the suppression of news of this nature would be neither feasible nor desirable. It *is* news. But care in examining it is obviously desirable, as well as caution in predicating any action upon it.

The result of the present effort to chart the war news received by the United States in 1914–1917 has been to show that our determination to declare war was preceded by a crescendo of items likely to stir up violent discussion and enlist strong sympathies. Whatever part may have been taken by bankers or munitions makers or the capitalist system in general in producing a decision favorable to war, the American people had not been lacking in news in which idealistic appeals were prominent. Atrocity stories had been comparatively few, and though appeals to economic interest were not especially prominent those which appeared concentrated their appeals on demands for vengeance against an offender rather than for aid to a debtor. Whatever the rôle played by the personal sentiments of President Wilson, there is evidence that the day-by-day news originating in the United States laid chief emphasis on diplomatic exchanges and on what might be termed "national insults." An overwhelming proportion of the news was provided by the side on which we later fought; and as the struggle progressed an increasing proportion of the news about it was composed of the responses of American citizens and officials thereto.

Obviously it is impossible to be completely accurate or final in isolating appeals to idealism, or appeals of a sensational nature, or appeals to self-interest, from straight news. But to whatever extent such appeals constitute influences which lead to war, we can say that the only way of minimizing them is through the vigilant skepticism of the public.

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THE AMERICAN AND BRITISH MUNITIONS INVESTIGATIONS

By William O. Scroggs

DURING the past two years the munitions industry has been under investigation in both Great Britain and the United States. The report on the results of the British inquiry was published as recently as October 31, 1936; the last section of the more voluminous American report had been published on June 19. The investigations were due in both cases to an aroused public opinion resulting from revelations made in course of the disarmament discussions at Geneva, as well as from books and articles published in this country describing some of the grosser aspects of the traffic in arms and armament. Among these was an article entitled "Arms and the Man," appearing in the magazine *Fortune* and depicting the financial interlockings, political ramifications, propaganda activities, and vast earning power of the armament makers of Europe. This article, published in March, 1934, was shortly afterward reprinted in the *Congressional Record*. On April 12 following, the United States Senate adopted a resolution directing an investigation by a special committee of seven Senators into the activities of munitions makers and dealers in the United States.

About ten months later, after the Senate investigation had begun to bring out evidence in which British concerns were frequently mentioned, the British Government decided to follow the American example, and on February 19, 1935, it set up a Royal Commission on the Private Manufacturing of and Trade in Arms. This commission also consisted of seven members but, unlike the American group, they did not hold public office. The Chairman, Sir John Eldon Bankes, was a retired judge, eighty-one years of age. Two members (one a coöperator and one a retired magazine editor) were well over seventy. The other members were a professor of comparative law, a journalist, a business man, and a woman who was formerly an official of the League. The personnel did not offer much promise of an aggressive inquiry; the members themselves had no first-hand knowledge of the problems with which they were to deal, and they were not authorized, as the Senate committee was, to employ experts to direct the investigation and examine the witnesses.

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The terms of reference of the American and British investigators were similar in two respects. Both bodies were instructed to consider and report upon the desirability of converting the munitions industry into a government monopoly and also to inquire into the adequacy of existing legislation for the control of the export trade in munitions. The American committee, however, was further instructed "to investigate the activities of individuals, firms, associations, and of corporations and all other agencies in the United States engaged in the manufacture, sale, distribution, import, or export of arms, munitions, or other implements of war." Under this mandate it was to inquire specifically into the nature of the industrial and commercial organizations engaged in the munitions business, into their methods of promoting sales, and into the details of their export and import trade in war materials.

The British commission's instructions were less sweeping. It was not required to dig into past and present records of the munitions concerns, but only "to consider and report whether there are any steps which can usefully be taken to remove or minimize the kinds of objections to which private manufacture is stated in Article 8 (5) of the Covenant of the League of Nations to be open." The article of the Covenant here referred to merely says that "the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections" and stipulates that the League Council shall "advise how the evil effects attendant upon such manufacture can be prevented," while giving due regard to the needs of the League members who cannot manufacture the implements of war needed for their own safety.

While the British commission was generally expected to soft-pedal its operations, or even finally to apply a coat of whitewash to the munitions industry, the more aggressive Senate committee, composed of experienced politicians and armed with greater power, was expected to go in the opposite direction, perhaps to indulge in "fishing expeditions." These expectations were realized, but only in part; for the work of each body had its redeeming features.

The Senate committee made full use of its power to subpoena witnesses and records. It employed a large staff of investigators to comb through the correspondence and documents in the files of armament companies, international bankers and the Departments of State, War, Navy and Commerce. After about five

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months of this "spade work," the committee began to examine witnesses at public hearings. The testimony filled many thousands of pages, and the committee's findings and recommendations alone filled more than 1,400 closely printed pages. Wide publicity was obtained for the proceedings by the Chairman, Senator Nye of North Dakota, who contrived almost daily to develop some sensational bit of testimony which would assure a news story on the front pages of the metropolitan newspapers. Senator Nye also made full use of the radio and the lecture platform. The total cost of the investigation was approximately $200,000. While this expenditure was criticized as extravagant, it was not too much to pay for the formulation of any practicable plan for lessening the likelihood of war.

Senator Nye was convinced that the way to prevent international conflict was to take the profits out of war, and he directed the course of investigation chiefly with the aim of supplying evidence in support of this thesis. There are indications throughout the proceedings that the case was prejudged in so far as the Chairman and a majority of the committee were concerned. The inquiry touched on every phase of the traffic in war materials since 1914. Senator Nye presented evidence tending to show that private munitions and armament companies had obtained excessive profits during and after the World War; that the efforts of the government to prevent profiteering had been ineffective; and that they could not be made effective without at least three amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Under the lure of profits, American companies were alleged to have brought pressure upon both their own and foreign governments. Shipbuilders and purveyors of military supplies maintained elaborate organizations in the capital to lobby in behalf of larger appropriations for the army and navy. In obtaining contracts from other governments, American concerns were compelled to compete on a very low plane with foreign companies. Officials of the lesser military Powers, through whom most of such sales were made, were not always sea-green and incorruptible, and there was at times much greasing of palms to obtain a contract.

The committee found that, notwithstanding the abuses which attended this business, foreign sales were encouraged as a matter of policy by the War and Navy Departments. It was assumed that the more foreign business the munitions companies could obtain the greater would be their productive capacity and efficiency

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and the greater would be the country's preparedness for national defense. Departmental bureaus often supplied technical information and advice to private companies and aided them in promoting their sales. Several American companies were reported to have sold airplane engines of possible military use to Germany with the permission of the War and Navy Departments, in spite of the fact that the treaty of peace between Germany and the United States embodied the Versailles prohibitions of imports of war materials of any kind by the Reich. Evidence was presented also to show that American companies had violated both the Chinese arms embargo of 1919 and the Chaco arms embargo of 1934.

The committee attached much importance to the existence of a world armaments ring. The principal American munitions concerns were found to have made extensive agreements with foreign producers for the division of markets, the fixing of prices, and the exchange of information concerning new inventions and processes. In the committee's opinion, the violation of the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles was due in no small degree to the close relations existing between the German munitions companies and those of other countries. All such abuses were committed in quest of profits, and they were denounced as carrying "the seeds of disturbance to the peace and stability of the nations in which they took place."

These abuses, in the opinion of Senator Nye and his colleagues, also attested the inadequacy of existing legislation. To prevent their repetition, the committee recommended: (1) that export licenses for war materials should not be issued unless the government of the importing country gave permission for their importation; (2) that the penalties for false labeling, false manifests and false destination should be increased; (3) that the Munitions Control Board, created in 1935, should be empowered to examine all correspondence as well as records concerning orders whenever embargoes were in effect; (4) that licenses for exports of articles adaptable to either civilian or military use should be accompanied by a guarantee from the government of the importing country that they would not be employed for military purposes; (5) that the sale of arms should be confined to recognized governments; and (6) that the government should take steps for more effective international control of the munitions traffic and in particular should urge early consideration of its draft agreement submitted to Geneva in 1934.

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Collectively, these various proposals would have prevented private sales of arms and munitions abroad, even in peace time, except with the approval of the government of the country of destination. Sales in time of war had already been prohibited by the neutrality legislation of 1935 and 1936.

Something besides this rigid control of the export of munitions was necessary if profits were to be taken out of war. The committee therefore made an examination of a plan which the War Department had drafted in accordance with the findings of the War Policies Commission, a body created by Congress in 1930 to study "methods of equalizing the burdens and removing the profits of war." The most important elements of the War Department's plan were: (1) the bestowal upon the President of general power to fix prices and wages in time of war and to regulate all manufacture and distribution; and (2) provision for a universal draft of male citizens over eighteen years of age, who might be inducted either into military service or into industry. The plan was designed to eliminate profiteering by all groups, including labor, and to obtain maximum production at reasonable cost. It was based on the assumption that war should be conducted on a basis of equal treatment for all, and with a view to individual justice as well as military effectiveness.

Although the idea of a profitless war was in accord with the views of the committee, its verdict on these proposals was unfavorable. Since it would be easier in actual practice to fix wages than to eliminate profits, the committee believed that under this arrangement labor would make a greater sacrifice than capital. Furthermore, the drafting of labor to work in industrial plants under something like military discipline would not be conducive to its efficiency.

In preference to this plan, a majority of the committee recommended the nationalization of facilities for the construction of warships, gun forgings, projectiles, armor plate, rifles, pistols and machine guns.[1] Practically the only implements of war not included in the nationalization scheme were airplanes. The airplane industry was to be exempt because the construction of engines and planes was still in the developmental stage "and in that way different from the somewhat more standard articles for which it is

[1] The members advocating nationalization were Senators Nye, Bone, Clark and Pope, all representing states west of the Mississippi. The dissenting majority were Senators Barbour, George and Vandenberg, representing states east of the Mississippi.

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proposed to have the government acquire facilities." These reasons seemed to many to be equally applicable to some of the other industries which the committee proposed to nationalize.

Government-owned plants, as contemplated by the committee majority, would be equipped to supply only the peace-time requirements of the army and the navy. It was realized that factories large enough to meet war-time needs would stand idle most of the time and that the huge investment required for them would be wasteful. In admitting that private plants would be necessary for the bulk of a country's war requirements, the committee majority obviously weakened its stand for the complete elimination of war profits. It proposed, however, that the government should hold a whip-hand by acquiring all necessary tools and equipment for munitions-making during peace time and installing these, presumably on its own terms, in private plants in the event of war.

The minority members of the committee opposed nationalization for three reasons. They claimed that it would be followed by local political pressure for keeping the plants operating at capacity, and that this would increase military expenditures and create opposition to disarmament. They pointed out that state ownership would destroy the "corollary facilities," upon which the government had always relied, and that this would weaken national defense unless the government built plants adequate for its war-time needs. They argued, finally, that unless the government plants were operated at full capacity, the cost of production would exceed that of private establishments. In lieu of public ownership, therefore, they favored rigid control.

This, in brief, is the substance of the relevant portions of the Senate committee's findings and recommendations. But the majority in favor of nationalization wished to strengthen their case by proving that private manufacturers of arms and ammunition played a predominant part in forcing the United States into the World War. In order to develop this thesis, Senator Nye embodied in the committee's report a memorandum on the foreign policy of the United States from 1914 to 1917, prepared by one of the committee's staff, which is in effect an indictment of his own country and its whole people and a justification of the ruthless submarine warfare of Germany. The document accuses the United States of "complete lack of neutrality," and the Allies of "selfish and materialistic aspirations." The United States is ad-

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judged guilty of supplying "materials of murder" to the Allies "in unlimited quantities," while Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare is justified as "her only chance of success," and for its ruthlessness "America's complete lack of neutrality was responsible."

These few extracts will suffice to indicate why the Chairman was considered to be biassed, and why the committee suffered severely in public estimation during the last stage of its investigation. Resentment reached its climax when Senator Nye undertook to show, quite irrelevantly to the purpose for which the investigation had been instituted, that President Wilson and Secretary Lansing had "falsified" when they denied knowledge of certain secret treaties negotiated by the Allies before the United States entered the war. Members of the Senate loyal to the Wilson Administration denounced the Chairman on the floor for going out of his way to defame statesmen long dead and unable to defend themselves. Senator Connally of Texas declared that the committee's activities had reached "their, so far, lowest depth of performance."

Having launched his investigation with the blare of trumpets and predictions of startling disclosures, Senator Nye could hardly avoid something like an anticlimax at its close. His efforts to startle the country may be granted to have been inspired by a desire to safeguard the peace of the nation; but the Senator overplayed his hand, and in the end weakened whatever beneficial results might have been attained had the committee's findings been restricted to matters connected directly with the subject assigned to it for study and report.

In the meantime the British commission was proceeding with its investigation in a more modest way. It had no authority to summon witnesses or compel the production of papers, and it had merely issued a general invitation through the press to all persons and representative bodies who might wish to be heard. It departed from this procedure to the extent of issuing special invitations to Mr. Lloyd George, who had been Minister of Munitions during the World War, to Sir Eric Geddes, who was Deputy Director of Munitions Supplies during the war and is now Chairman of Imperial Airways and of the Dunlop Rubber Company, and to Mr. P. J. Noel Baker, who had served with the Disarmament Conference and other important bodies in Geneva. Invitations were also sent to the National Peace Council, the League of

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Nations Union, and the Union of Democratic Control, because of their special interest in the subject of inquiry. Twenty-seven witnesses appeared voluntarily on behalf of armament and airplane companies, and almost as many on behalf of various peace societies and liberal political organizations.

The witnesses were required to submit in advance written statements of the evidence they intended to offer. Though the preparation of these statements probably slowed up the progress of the investigation, the commission was of the opinion that it added immensely to its value. The commission held twenty-two public sessions. Its hearings, including both the written statements and the oral testimony, comprised only 750 folio pages, and its final report is a pamphlet of 101 pages. The total cost of the inquiry was approximately $36,700. The American investigation produced about ten times as much printed matter at about six times the cost, but it went behind the testimony of witnesses and delved into the records, though more often, it seems, with a desire to prove a thesis than to weigh all obtainable facts.

The British hearings revealed the existence of a well-organized campaign against the private traffic in munitions. The commission received memoranda, petitions and resolutions from religious, civic and peace organizations in all parts of the country urging the suppression of the traffic. A "representation" signed by the Archbishops of Canterbury, York, Dublin and Wales, by the Moderator of the Church of Scotland, and by the heads of various evangelical free churches declared that "it is repugnant to Christian morality that the profits of an organization should depend on the degree of suspicion and hostility which exists between nations" and urged the elimination of private profits either by "appropriate measures of restriction and control, or, if such measures proved to be inadequate, by the transfer of the industry to some public authority." Few of the petitions or resolutions were so conservative as this, and they seldom suggested an alternative to public ownership. A number of them cited the disclosures of the American investigation as one of the reasons for action.

Since the commission was dependent upon the initiative of witnesses for the information obtained, it produced no effects which could be described as sensational. Such an effect, indeed, was not its purpose. Its printed hearings consisted mainly of arguments for and against the continuance of the private manu-

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facture and trade in arms and munitions of war. It was not authorized, under its terms of reference, to undertake a detailed investigation of the evils ascribed to the munitions traffic, and consequently only three instances of alleged abuse were brought to its attention. On the whole, the argument for nationalization as presented to the commission was, in its own words, "purely speculative in character and unsupported by evidence." But under the commission's mode of procedure it was impossible for the advocates of nationalization to present anything more than a speculative case. Possible evils could be cited, but no opportunity was provided to prove the existence of actual evils.

The commission's conclusions and recommendations were exactly what was to be expected under such circumstances. It found that the limitation of arms by international agreement would be the most effective method of eliminating or abating any evils incident to the private traffic in arms, but that in the present state of the world such an agreement was "likely to be impracticable." Furthermore, with the world in so disturbed a condition, public ownership in Great Britain would be undesirable even if it were practicable. In lieu of nationalization the commission recommended the restriction of the profits of armament firms in peace time to a reasonable scale.

As a further step toward removing any existing evils, the commission favored the regulation of the industry through something like a Minister of Munitions directly responsible to Parliament. It recommended more rigid control over arms exports, very much as proposed by the American committee, with shipments restricted to foreign governments and under licenses granted only to specifically authorized exporting firms. The commission's conclusion that the export trade in armaments did not provide sufficient expansion of productive capacity to justify its encouragement by the government was of special interest in view of the policies reported to have been pursued by the War and Navy Departments in Washington.

A final evaluation of the work of the American committee and of the British commission is not yet possible. They have made their reports, and the next steps lie with Congress and Parliament. The American committee added many details relating to the history of the munitions traffic as well as regarding the financing of the Allies during the World War; it did not bring out any general facts which were not known to informed citizens during the war

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period. The British commission, as has already been shown, was not directly concerned with the assembling of new facts.

While both investigating bodies favored the elimination of war profits, they made no reference to the fact that the totalitarian states, where war profits are apparently in the process of elimination, are precisely the states which today offer the greatest threat to peace. None of the advocates of government ownership of munitions plants saw fit to call attention to the enormous military equipment of the Soviet Union, where the profit motive does not exist. If the nationalization of armaments is a preventive of war, Soviet Russia should be the shining example to which all peace advocates point with pride. If complete national control is the solution, then Germany and Italy should be the model for all peace-loving nations to follow. Neither investigating body appears to have given consideration to the possible effects on smaller nations of complete government ownership in the large industrial countries. If the weaker nations cannot obtain arms from private manufacturers in these countries, they must either build munitions plants of their own or risk falling a prey to some covetous aggressor.

In short, the problem confronting the American and British people was not revealed to be the simple one of choosing between war profits and peace. Their investigating bodies could point out ways to remove or minimize some of the admitted evils in the traffic in implements of war; but neither group found a way to take the profits out of war. And even if they had succeeded in doing so, and if their recommendations had been adopted, the old hates, rivalries and ambitions which cause nations to fight would still have remained to torment the world.

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THE JEWS OF EASTERN EUROPE

By Desider Kiss

OF THE ten and a half million Jews who live in Europe some nine million are to be found in the eastern half of the continent, in the cities and on the plains between the River Inn and the Ural Mountains. During the last four years the policies of the Nazi dictatorship in Germany have cast a shadow over the lives of all these Jewish millions. So far they have been unwilling to believe that anti-Semitism in the starkly brutal form which it has assumed in Germany will spread abroad. Yet the fact remains that a great and highly civilized European nation has excommunicated half a million people merely because they adhere to the Jewish religion or belong to the so-called Jewish "race," and thus has given other lands a dangerous example of positive anti-Semitism.

Two hundred years ago all European Jews moved in nearly the same intellectual climate. A Jew from Worms felt quite at home in Lemberg or Kishinev. He found the cultural background and the conditions of life among his co-religionists to be identical no matter where they lived, and he took it as a matter of course that in all Jewish communities the religion based on the Old Testament and the rabbinical teachings was a living force.

But in prewar Europe this had ceased to be true. The nine million Jews of Eastern Europe no longer formed a compact, homogeneous mass. With the gradual spread of emancipation there arose marked divergences among them, and it no longer was possible to speak of a uniform East-European Jewish type. The Hungarian Jews, for instance, were so well assimilated — in their sentiments, their mentality, even their appearance — by the Magyar people that according to the English writer Macartney they cannot be detected today except by an expert. Much the same may be said of Viennese Jewry, cradle of great writers and scientists like Schnitzler, Zweig, Freud. In the period before the Great War, the Jews of Austria-Hungary and Serbia did not regard themselves as belonging to a separate race or people; and in 1914 they fought just as valiantly for their fatherlands as did their Christian comrades (though anti-Semitic literature would have us believe the contrary). In Tsarist Russia, on the other hand, the Jews did not identify themselves with the host nation;

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they continued to constitute a separate people with their own special characteristics and language. In particular was this true of the Polish Jew, whose mentality and appearance changed little with the centuries.

Indeed, the bare fact whether they lived under the Hapsburgs or under the Romanoffs used before the war to be a convenient guide for distinguishing between the two principal types of East-European Jew. But after the war this distinction began to break down under the impact of anti-Semitism, which was widely felt even before the advent of National Socialism in Germany. Even the best assimilated Austrian and Hungarian Jew had to start learning that he was not an Austrian or a Hungarian but simply a Jew. Fortunately, in Austria the Hapsburg tradition of tolerance and innate feeling of equality, and in Hungary a solid tradition of chivalry and liberalism, prevented this incipient anti-Semitism from leading to the discrimination and degradation which took place in Germany. The same can be said of Jugoslavia. But it cannot be denied that a Jewish problem exists even in those countries where hitherto it has never had any violent form. As a result, the Jewish generation that came of age after the war was against its will driven into an attitude of self-defense. It is true that full equality before the law, the great achievement of nineteenth century liberalism, is today enjoyed by Jews in all the East-European countries: Austria, Hungary, Jugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, the Baltic States and Russia. But in many of those countries social discrimination against them is becoming more and more acute.

II

Poland has more Jews than any other European country; there, for that reason, is found the core of the Jewish problem in Europe. Ten percent of Poland's population of 33,500,000 is Jewish. About one-tenth of these Polish Jews are engaged in agriculture; only 40,000 earn their living as public functionaries or in the professions; practically all the rest are traders or artisans.

According to Dr. Borenstein's estimates, only 20 percent of the Polish Jews make a good living. One quarter are semi-independent; another quarter could be rehabilitated with some external aid; while the remaining 30 percent are so hopelessly destitute as to be reduced either to complete dependence on charity or to the

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brutal necessity of emigrating. It is safe to say that 1,200,000 of Poland's Jews live today in utter misery.

It was not until 1931, twelve years after the establishment of the Polish Republic, that the disabilities under which the Polish Jews suffered during the Tsarist régime were completely abolished. Today, they are legally on a perfectly equal footing with all other Polish citizens. The invisible bar between Jew and Gentile nevertheless still exists. In consequence of the reckless agitation of the National Democrats the danger of pogroms has increased in Poland since last year, and in recent months many Jews have been massacred in more than one completely Jewish town or village. The Polish Government's policy is characterized by a quiet but constant endeavor to exclude Jews from intellectual and economic life. Tax and credit policies are made to serve this purpose, for the urban population has to bear the greater part of the tax burden and this means a special hardship for the Jews. Only 15.9 percent of the national income is derived from commerce. Yet the income tax paid by tradesmen amounts to 33.6 percent of the total proceeds of that tax. The state banks supply agriculture and the coöperatives with nearly ten times as much credit as they grant to commerce.

About 40 percent of all the artisans in Poland are Jews. Far the greater part of the Jewish workers are employed in small workshops and therefore are not entitled to the "dole" when unemployed. The coöperatives profit on a constantly increasing scale from the active help of the state; but the Jewish merchant, especially in Galicia, is gradually being ousted from the retail trade. In the government trading monopolies (salt, tobacco, spirits, matches), and in plants owned by the state, no Jews are employed. When we consider that 22.5 percent of Poland's entire industry and banking organization is in the hands of the state, the weight of this discrimination becomes obvious. The prohibition against the ritual slaughter of animals (except for the use of religious Jews) has been a severe blow for the thousands of Jewish butchers who depended for their livelihood on this traditional monopoly.

Two tendencies have come into being as a result of these varied blows. In the first place, the Jewish masses of eastern Poland are relapsing into the orthodoxy of the Middle Ages; and on the other hand, Zionism and the emigration movement connected with it have won many followers. In 1934 about half of all Polish

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emigrants were Jews. And half of the postwar Jewish immigration into Palestine was from Poland. The Polish Jews resort to all sorts of expedients to elude the immigration controls established by neighboring nations. This illegal percolation, even into distant countries, goes on incessantly. And is it surprising that it should? Living in misery, and in continuous fear of his life, the Jew never knows what misfortune the following day may bring him so long as he remains on Polish soil.

In their habits and ethnic characteristics the Polish Jews are closely connected with those in Lithuania. For centuries — since the time of the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom — the two groups have lived in intimate contact. At the end of the last century the population in the territory of the present Lithuanian Republic included about 300,000 Jews. This was about 13 percent of the total population. At present they number in round figures only 150,000. The decrease is due to emigration. In South Africa, for instance, 80 percent of the Jewish population is of Lithuanian origin. One-third of Lithuania's Jews cannot read — a ratio exceeded only in Bessarabia. Their range of economic opportunity is meanwhile gradually narrowing. Though equality is guaranteed them by law, racial and confessional discrimination has in practice degraded them to a status of second-class citizenship.

III

In Rumania there are about one million Jews, which means six percent of the total population. The figures are mere estimates, however, since no precise statistics have been made available for more than ten years. These Jews do not form as homogeneous a mass as do those of Poland, due to the fact that before the war certain sections of them were subjects of the Hapsburgs or the Romanoffs. Most of the Rumanian Jews live in the old Kingdom (the *Regat*) and in Bessarabia, formerly part of Russia; there are a comparatively small number in the territory formerly Hungarian.

Before the Great War, Jews did not enjoy equal citizenship in the Kingdom of Rumania, although those in Bucharest and other large cities were pretty well assimilated. In Bessarabia, the Jews were the most oppressed and backward of any in all Russia. Suffice it to mention the terrible, government-inspired massacre at Kishinev in 1903 which resulted in the loss of thousands of Jewish lives. In sharp contrast, three generations of Transylvanian Jews had enjoyed comparative freedom under the Hapsburgs, and a

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general and intensive Magyarization had resulted — especially noticeable, of course, in the upper strata. In consequence, there are many Jewish physicians, lawyers and manufacturers in Transylvania today who still profess to be Hungarians even though the territory has been transferred to Rumanian rule; and as a result these have to bear the double burden of being both Hungarians and Jews.

A small number of the Rumanian Jews — only about 2.5 percent — live by agriculture; considerably more are engaged in professional work; while 80 percent earn their living in industry and commerce. Economic conditions are better for the Jews here than in Poland, for though the country is rich in undeveloped resources, the Rumanian people are rather primitive and not particularly hard-working. The Jews thus have considerable opportunity to carve out careers for themselves in expanding industries. Another point to note is that the administration is chaotic and graft-ridden; this condition offers the lower type of Jew many opportunities of gaining a livelihood.

In recent years a wave of passionate anti-Semitism has spread through Rumania, led partly by the Transylvanian Saxons and partly by the sons of the peasantry who are trying to secure entrance into the bourgeoisie. Most of the leaders of the notorious "Iron Guard" are of peasant origin. Yet the mass of the peasantry itself — more than 80 percent of the population — has no real animosity towards the Jew. The Rumanian Government does not officially sponsor anti-Jewish movements, and so far it has not adopted the extensive program of state socialism which in other countries has resulted in the curtailment of Jewish business enterprises. All in all, then, the economic and political situation of the Jews is better in Rumania than in Poland, notwithstanding the noisy anti-Semitism of the Iron Guard.

IV

In the three Danubian states of Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia the Jews live under quite different conditions from those so far described. Except in eastern Slovakia these Jews belong almost entirely to the middle class.

The proportion of Jews is highest in Hungary. In 1930 there were 440,000 of them, that is to say 5.1 percent (as against 5.9 percent in 1920) of the total population. Only 4.3 percent are engaged in agriculture; those in the professions and the public

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services account for 8.7 percent; while the bulk, more than 75 percent, earn their living in trade, industry and banking. In 1848, almost a hundred years ago, they participated in the national revolution, and since then the process of assimilation has been intense.

Before the war, Hungarian Jewry grew up in an atmosphere of complete freedom and equality. This evolution was stopped by the postwar collapse. The Communist régime in Budapest, which counted many Jews among its leaders, helped produce a very strong anti-Semitic sentiment. This subsided during the premiership of Count Stephen Bethlen, but it blazed up again after the Nazi victory in Germany. It is not a noisy or brutal anti-Semitism, but it is felt in all strata of social and economic life. Its aim is to push the Jews out of the professions — in particular, journalism, the army, and the public services — and also from some branches of trade.

Yet in spite of all this, the material situation of the Hungarian Jews can be said to be a good one. They play a leading rôle in banking and in the development of industry (the textile industry has been built up almost entirely by Jews), and they contributed greatly to the expansion of the fruit and vegetable export business. Jewish scientists, physicians, lawyers and writers are among the most prominent in Hungary. The greatest theatrical success in Budapest during the past year was a romantic drama written by a Jew. As the Hungarian Jews still regard themselves as Hungarians, Zionism does not find a great following among them. Though Hungary was the first state to introduce the *numerus clausus* in its universities, the rule is not rigorously applied and the number of Jewish students is many times the prescribed ratio.

In Austria the Jews number about 190,000, or 2.8 percent of the whole population. Of these, 174,000 live in Vienna; 15,000 dwell in the two provinces near the capital (Burgenland and Lower Austria); only a handful are to be found in the Alpine provinces. But the Viennese Jews, once wealthy, have fallen on evil days. The ruin of Vienna's banks, the dwindling of the city's export trade, and the loss of business that once flowed to her as the capital of the great Hapsburg Empire have impoverished the Jewish community.

Of all the European Jews, those in Austria are the most directly exposed to the dangers of National Socialism. This sword of Damocles suspended over their heads has atrophied the intellec-

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tual activity which was once so distinctive a feature of Jewish life in Vienna. It lends poignancy to the difficulties they must in any case cope with growing out of the grave economic situation. For the moment they enjoy complete equality of rights; but the limits of their activity are constantly being restricted and the opportunities for gifted young Jews to find outlets for their talents are becoming fewer and fewer.

In Czechoslovakia the ratio of Jews is still smaller — 2.4 percent. The number is around 36,000, but they are not evenly distributed, there being proportionately fewer Jews in the western areas than in the Sub-Carpathian provinces. The greatest part of the Czech Jews — 46 percent — live by trade and industry. In the east they are chiefly inn-keepers; in the west a relatively high percentage of them (9.2) are found in the professions. Anti-Semitism is manifest only in the Sudetic German provinces and in some parts of Slovakia. Even among the Jews who have been assimilated the tendency to profess Jewish nationality is very noticeable.

In spite of the depression that weighs on industry, and notwithstanding the very strong economic nationalism of the Czechs, the material situation of the Jews in Bohemia may be said to be favorable. But the fate of those in the Sub-Carpathian provinces is miserable indeed. Eighty percent of them are on the verge of starvation. Poverty even more grinding than in Poland is the rule. As might be expected in these conditions, the attraction of Zionism is very strong.

V

In two states of Eastern Europe the number of Jews is negligible. Jugoslavia has only 77,000 (0.55 percent of the population), the majority of them dwelling in the former Hapsburg provinces. They nevertheless play an important part in the country's economic development. They are accorded legal and economic freedom by the government, and in view of their small number the country may be said to be practically without a Jewish problem.

In Estonia there are about 4,500 Jews, or only 0.4 percent of the population. Since Estonia grants each minority of 3,000 souls or more full national and cultural autonomy, the Jews have no occasion for complaint.

Latvia has a somewhat larger Jewish population — 100,000, or

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about 5.9 percent of the total. The proportion, however, is slowly decreasing. Here the government's minority policy is not as correct as it is in Estonia. But the Latvian Jews do not as yet suffer serious hardship or have to fear pauperization.

In Russia the latest census reports 2,700,000 Jews. These are very unevenly distributed, 59 percent of them living in the Ukraine, 22 percent in Great Russia, and 15 percent in White Russia. Under Tsarist rule the Jewish masses were not permitted to emigrate from the western provinces into other parts of the country. This restriction no longer holds, so that large reservoirs of Jews are now free to spill over into all parts of the Soviet Union. The census of 1937 will very likely show a quite different distribution from that of a generation ago. The present Jewish population of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov and Odessa is five times as great as it was in 1918; in fact, about one-third of Russia's Jewish inhabitants dwell in these cities.

The proportion of Jews engaged in agriculture in Russia has risen to ten percent and in industry to 40 percent; to offset this, the number of traders and artisans is decreasing. A remarkable fact is that the number of mixed marriages has jumped to 30 percent. The creation of the Soviet régime and the subsequent adoption of the Five Year Plans opened up careers to young Jewish men and women in the state bureaucracy, the great industrial trusts, and the armed forces; and though there are only two Jews prominent in the inner councils of the Soviet Government, the proportion of them in the civil and military administration as a whole exceeds many times their ratio in the general population. Russian Jewry today appears to be in a state of slow but steady absorption, and within two or three generations will probably be incorporated in the bulk of the population — partly by voluntary assimilation, partly as a result of the increasing number of mixed marriages — just as many Finnish and Turanian peoples have been swallowed up in the past.

VI

Due to the differences found between the Jewish populations in different countries, and in some countries between the different groups and strata of Jews, it is very difficult to arrive at generalizations valid for all the Jews of Eastern Europe. But there are a few fairly universal trends that might be worth noting.

It is to be observed, for example, that the strength of anti-

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Semitism is in direct ratio to the proportion of Jews in the population of any given country. This obviously was not the case in Germany; but in the Eastern European states it may be taken as a fairly rigid rule. Jugoslavia, with a Jewish community amounting to only about half of one per cent of the population, knows hardly any anti-Semitism; but in Poland, where ten percent of the people are Jewish, anti-Semitism has assumed a violent, though illegal, form. The same tendency appears in individual cities. In Vienna, one-tenth of whose inhabitants are Jewish, anti-Semitic agitation is much more intense than in cities where the proportion of Jews is smaller.

Another general observation is that while in Germany it was the lower bourgeoisie which furnished the chief Jew-baiters, that rôle has usually been taken in Eastern Europe by the ambitious sons of peasants and artisans. A universal phenomenon in Eastern Europe in recent years has been the gradual rise of the peasantry. Before the war, very few persons of peasant antecedents could be found among the middle classes in Hungarian, Polish or Rumanian towns. But after the war came the land reforms. These greatly improved the economic and social position of the peasants, whose sons and daughters thereupon sought to enter the ranks of the urban bourgeoisie. These additions to the middle class invaded the fields of economic activity that formerly belonged to the Jews. Whatever benefit the development may have conferred on society as a whole, it certainly has been disastrous for the Jews.

The same may be said for another phenomenon common to the East European countries — the rapid development of coöperatives. The coöperative movement has contributed greatly to the material progress of the peasantry, but at the same time it has deprived the small Jewish retailers and middlemen of their means of livelihood. Even in such liberal countries as Estonia, where the constitution grants full equality to all national minorities, the coöperative store is slowly supplanting the shop of the Jewish merchant. Further, when the agricultural crisis diminished the purchasing power of the rural masses, the distressing economic situation of the Jews, who depend largely on the peasant's trade, was greatly aggravated.

Another general observation connected with the progress of the peasantry concerns the taxation policies of the various Eastern European states. Even in highly industrialized Austria and Cze-

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choslovakia, agriculture is favored by shifting the bulk of the tax burden to commerce and industry. Since the majority of Jews are engaged in these fields, the weight of taxation falls on them with greater force than it does on the rest of the population.

VII

Except in Russia, then, the situation today of the Jews of Eastern Europe must be painted in sombre colors. Almost everywhere the liberal and humane ideals of the nineteenth century are under attack, and as they weaken the anti-Jewish trend becomes more pronounced. The Jew is being pressed back with varying degrees of violence into his mediæval state of servitude. The most tragic victim of this social process is the assimilated, cultivated Jew. The orthodox masses of Galicia, Bessarabia and Ruthenia are less conscious of what is happening except when there is some special outbreak of terror. They still live the religious, often mystic, life of their ancestors — a life of fear and privation, cut off from contact with the world around them, confident in Jehovah's wisdom and relying on his protection. The waves of anti-Semitism now rising in Eastern Europe are as incapable of destroying these Jewish masses as were the systematic persecutions they underwent in past centuries.

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WARS WITHIN WARS

By A. L. Conger

WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE. Vol. V. 1917–1918. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1936, 464 p. $3.00.

POLITICS and military strategy are like oil and water. They do not mix well. In a war between merely two nations, such as the Franco-German War of 1870–71, politics should and in fact must govern: that is, the commander must lay his plans and policies before his political chief for approval or, if there are possible alternative courses, with the arguments pro and con for each. But once a course of action has been adopted the military commander should be unhampered in its execution. The relations between Bismarck and Moltke, and between Lincoln and Grant, are ideal examples of how a war can be conducted with the minimum of friction and the maximum of effect.

In a coalition war the friction at best becomes intensified and at worst makes any satisfactory achievement almost impossible. In this respect the Central Powers in the World War were much better off than the Allies. The Austrian Emperor was old and feeble and made no claim to any voice in the military decisions; Turkey and Bulgaria were distinctly minor Powers dependent upon Germany both for help and for ultimate success and could not demand to be consulted in the planning. None the less, the friction between the armies and general staffs became bitter, especially between the German and the Austro-Hungarian. The contempt of the German General Staff for the Hapsburg military establishment was expressed in the common saying, "Germany entered the war tied to a corpse."

Nor were the relations between the Allies to be described as amicable. True, they were engaged in mortal combat against a common enemy; but while the troops and commanders near the front were usually content to coöperate, the respective war departments in the rear were seldom in accord or willing to waive their special interests. And as for the political cabinets in control of the various governments, they were constantly at loggerheads. The basic difficulty was not quarrelsome tendencies on the part of individuals. The opposing national interests were fundamental; throughout the war the nations were concerned with the problem of what each was going to get out of it and how to get it at the

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lowest individual cost. Thus, while all the Allies wanted to defeat Germany, the English were naturally much more willing to sacrifice the last French soldier to attain that objective than to drain the dregs of British man power. The French heartily reciprocated and were prepared to shed only crocodile tears over damage to the British navy or to British financial supremacy.

The fact that the Allied Governments were working at cross purposes was brought home to us by the advent in Washington of two diplomatic and military missions, sent by Great Britain and France respectively, each having as its purpose to inform the American Government what it must do to save the war from being lost.

It was learned afterwards that the French Government had taken the initiative in proposing to the British the sending of a joint Anglo-French mission to coach the United States as to the imperative necessities dictated by the real situation as distinguished from that assumed in Allied propaganda. But the British had replied to the French suggestion that, while approving in principle, they felt the time for such a mission was scarcely ripe, and that it was better to wait and see what the American Government proposed doing in the war, and then to draft the joint and necessary counter-proposals. The result was that both governments sent their own missions, each apparently hoping to forestall the other.

The missions of the two principal Allied Powers were alike in giving the President and his advisers a gloomy outlook on the situation as contrasted with the propaganda view commonly accepted, in this country at least. Both demanded immediate assistance in money, supplies of every kind, and man power. Marshal Joffre, moreover, wanted an American military unit, a division if possible, sent to France at once to hearten the French army and people; and after that as many men as possible to build up the French forces.

The chiefs of mission, naturally, were discreet in pressing their respective desires, though each wanted men to incorporate in his own army. Their subordinates, however, were more frank in talking with our General Staff officers. The French Army, according to members of the French mission, was the greatest in Europe. It had the best trained and most experienced officers, who would soon learn our language. The English officers, they implied, were an ill-assorted lot who, moreover, handled their men in an auto-

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cratic way that Americans would never stand. The French argued further that our common republican institutions would form a basis for good fellowship between their men and ours.

The British members, meanwhile, presented the view that their army was now the chief bulwark of the Allies. All it needed was man power, and that we alone could supply. It had the finest officer corps in the world, ready and waiting to train and lead our men, while the French officers, on the contrary, were hopelessly undependable. Further, the language difficulty would be an insuperable obstacle to a mutual understanding between our men and the French. If there were more time, we might of course raise our own army; but, they said, the desperate situation did not permit of delay, and consequently the only solution was to send over our men to be incorporated in the British Army, as a preliminary measure at least.

President Wilson was duly impressed with the gravity of the situation as presented to him, but did not accept either of the two solutions offered. He would send a division at once if they considered it necessary, and later would send an army; but it would have to be an American Army, fighting as such under its own commanders, in coöperation with the Allies.

This was the first of the series of great decisions made by President Wilson which paved the way for the victory in 1918. It was incorporated in the orders under which General Pershing was sent to France. These read, in part:

> The President designates you to command all the land forces of the United States operating [in Europe]. . . . In military operations against the Imperial German Government you are directed to coöperate with the forces of the other countries employed against that enemy; but in so doing the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved. This fundamental rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particular circumstances as your judgment may approve. The action is confided to you, and you will exercise full discretion in determining the manner of cooperation. . . .[1]

Let us rapidly review the war up to the time of our participation. In 1914 the greatest military machine the world had ever seen was turned loose against the combined armies of France, Great Britain and Belgium. Minor forces were detached to hold back the Russians in the east. But the German military colossus had a fatal weakness; unlike the Biblical image of Babylon with feet of clay

[1] "Newton D. Baker: America at War," by Frederick Palmer. New York: 1931, v. I, p. 173.

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it proved to have a head of clay in that it lacked, for the first three years at least, a competent commander-in-chief.

The years of preparatory staff planning enabled the German Army to gain a complete initial success in the west; but at the crucial moment it incredibly surrendered its advantage by turning to a defensive rôle and neglecting to occupy Paris, which would have compromised the rail communications of the French army, or the Pas de Calais, which would have cut the channel communications of the British Army.[2]

It is true that the French Army had the necessary numbers to cope with the German advance, but a faulty initial strategic deployment operated in combination with deficiencies in training, equipment, staff work and tactical leadership to paralyze its effectiveness. As to the British Army, it was "contemptible" only in size. In training, leadership and morale it proved itself superior to the German throughout the war.

Owing to events in the east, the Germans remained on the defensive in the west until 1916. Then the high command continued its blunders by attacking the wrong army, the French, at Verdun, failing to realize that "Kitchener's Army" was not its most formidable opponent. The Somme battle soon neutralized the minor advantages gained by the Germans at Verdun.

By the autumn of 1916 the Germans at last secured a good commander in Hindenburg, the first one able to dominate the imperial busybody. However, he was handicapped by the lack of military intelligence, not in respect to the spy service — the Germans had that and knew what was going on in every cabinet on the continent of Europe — but of ordinary everyday military information. Thus when it came to the fateful question of resorting to unrestricted submarine warfare, despite President Wilson's having plainly indicated that this act would bring America into the war, the German Staff displayed its dense ignorance of economic and military facts by asserting that the United States had no army and could not organize one (it organized one of 4 millions); that even if it had one it could not be transported to France (it transported 2 million in one year and a half); and that even if it got organized and reached the battlefield it would lack the trained commanders and staffs necessary for it to be effective.

[2] Some may question this statement and ask about the Battle of the Marne. Germans not only did not fight on the Marne, save with their advance guards, but the main bodies of their columns did not even deploy.

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Like the French, the Germans knew little of our military history and nothing of our system of intensive staff and higher command training prior to the war. Happily, British officers were better informed; but, regrettably, British politicians were not — those in the War Cabinet at least. As an interesting side-issue it may be noted that, in general, the French naval officer appeared better acquainted with our military history than did his brother in the land forces.

Until the winter of 1916–1917 the French commander, Joffre, had taken the bit in his teeth and been in supreme control of the front zone, to which members of the cabinet and deputies were alike refused admittance. His position was that the business of the government was to furnish men and munitions and that the fighting was the job of the army commander and his staff. How the latter chose to conduct the fighting was their business. Not only should the government not control, but in order to prevent leaks it should not even be informed of war plans and policies. The deputies grew irked at this state of affairs and sought a more pliable commander. Nivelle promised the moon, and displaced Joffre. His belief was that the German Army "has ceased to exist." The Chemin des Dames, April 1917, proved otherwise and was the end alike of Nivelle and of the offensive capacity of the French Army. A wise choice was Petain's assignment to the French command.

In the British system, the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Forces in France was the subordinate of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The latter was the military adviser of the War Cabinet. In effect, General Sir William Robertson, while he held office as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, acted as a useful buffer between Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig and the prime minister.

The friction between the Allied Governments was not the only source of difficulty in the conduct of the war. The tenure of office of the prime ministers of both Great Britain and France was dependent upon their parliaments. There were frequent changes in the French ministry until, in November 1917, Clemenceau was called to the highest office; and while during the war Great Britain had only two prime ministers, Asquith and Lloyd George, the position of the latter was felt to be far from secure. From his "War Memoirs," we learn that he was by no means satisfied with the plans of either the Imperial General Staff or the Commander-

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in-Chief of the British armies in France for the prosecution of the war in the summer of 1917; but as he was not sustained in his views by the War Cabinet he did not dare either to change commanders and chiefs or insist upon the adoption of his own views for fear of a parliamentary upset for himself and his cabinet. After a perusal of the Lloyd George volumes one feels that in his conflicts of judgment with Field Marshal Haig and General Robertson it was Haig's force of character which prevailed over the volatile prime minister rather than that the latter had any real appreciation of the strategical principles involved.[3] However that may be, there can be no doubt that Haig's Third Ypres Battle, or "Passchendaele" as Lloyd George calls it, not only saved the situation in 1917 for the Allies but was the only course that, by eating up the German reserves, could have saved France from being overrun by the enemy as surely as was Northern Italy after Caporetto. Colonel Repington, in his "First World War" (v. II, p. 58), under date of September 25, 1917, reports the following conversation between General Maurice and himself:

> M. thought that we ought to have a chair at some University to teach budding statesmen the rudiments of war. . . . "A sort of Senior Officers' Staff College Course," I said. "Yes," said M., "to make them understand all the things that the War Cabinet has not been able to grasp throughout the war and cannot grasp now." I told M. that I had said to the Frenchmen that after the war it would be found that 50 percent of the time and energy of soldiers had been expended in fighting their own politicians. M. thought that my percentage was much too low.

Such was the rather gloomy outlook which confronted the American commander and staff upon their arrival in Europe in June of 1917. Not that the British and French Governments were not cordial; both in London and Paris we were greeted as the saviors of the Allied cause. But behind the scenes were unmistakable evidences of inter-Allied and governmental friction which boded ill for a successful outcome to our enterprise.

The fog cleared, however, when we went to Haig's headquarters. There we were informed of the underlying realities of

[3] Lloyd George, in his memoirs (v. IV, p. 530) quotes Robertson as stating: "The first rule of all wars is to concentrate in the main theatre all forces that can be supplied. Any departure from this rule has invariably proved to be disastrous." Lloyd George then comments: "I wonder what Grant would have said to this rule when Sherman was sent marching through Georgia in order to turn the Confederate flank!" We wonder what Grant would have said had Lloyd George in 1864 proposed to him to abandon his campaign in the east against Lee in favor of western "sideshows." His Virginia campaign of 1864–65 gives the answer.

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the past and present, of the new developments of staff organization and control, and of his appreciation of the situation. His conclusions and plans may be tersely summarized as follows:

> The French Army is finished; it cannot undertake another serious offensive. (It never did!)
>
> Our (British) man power reserve is down to the last eight hundred thousand. After that we are finished. That reserve will be used here for the rest of this year to keep the Germans engaged at a spot they have to defend, thus preventing their having any surplus with which to break through the French lines elsewhere.
>
> This year it will be a British war. But this year will not end it.
>
> Next year it will become America's war. Of course we know you have to have your own army and fight it your way. All our resources, knowledge and skill are at your disposal to help you organize for the tremendous task which confronts you, because we recognize that a successful outcome will be possible only if you are ready to take over the conduct of the war in 1918.

This statement was something for us to tie up to amid the confusion prevailing in the rear areas. Stubborn adherence by Sir Douglas to his plan, despite all interference from the rear, and loyal coöperation between the French and ourselves, was what saved the situation in the fall of 1917 and the spring of 1918 and made possible the victorious end in November 1918.

The fifth volume of Lloyd George's "War Memoirs" has now appeared. In it he presents the point of view of the British Cabinet regarding the events that led up to the spring campaign of 1918. He points out the dearth of information about the real situation behind the enemy's lines and stresses what slender hopes were felt by British and French Headquarters that any effective military aid would be received in time from America. Chapter IV emphasizes correctly enough the fact that British maritime requirements ate heavily into British man power, and also points out the extent to which modern demands for munitions and transport reduced materially the number of men available for technical military service. Foch, he says, "could never understand how essential sea power was to the very existence of the alliance." He gives statistics on this point which will be very important for future Staff College students. But he is unable to understand why Haig and Robertson were continually harping on "rifle strength," seeming not to know that this is the basic element in determining frontages of units.

The volume also gives many important documents concerning the organization of the Supreme War Council, the inter-Allied

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reserve, the alleged attempt by Robertson to overthrow the British Cabinet, and the final appointment of Foch as Generalissimo. It is hard to believe that in the absence of an inter-Allied Commander-in-Chief the organization of an inter-Allied Reserve was a sound military measure.[4] To the writer it seems fortunate for the favorable outcome of the defense against the German offensive in March that there should have been friction only between the individual headquarters on the Allied side, without the further complication of another headquarters handling a "General Reserve." Concerning the appointment of Foch as coördinator of "the action of the Allied Armies on the Western Front" on March 26, and the entrusting to him of "the strategic direction of military operations" — with reservations — on April 3, the Memoirs shed little new light. They do reveal, however, the great confidence which Foch inspired in Lloyd George.

On the question of whether or not it was necessary to extend the British Front early in 1918, Lloyd George justifies his belief that this was the case and gives good reasons for having ordered it over the objections of Haig. It was fortunate that he did so, for had the first brunt of the March offensive fallen on a French instead of on a British army the results would have been more serious and recovery more difficult.

It was the general opinion in Paris in the winter of 1917–18 that the war would be over before the end of the calendar year of 1918. Neither the French Army nor the French people, it used to be said, would endure another winter of war; this year's campaign was to decide merely whether France of Germany was to dictate the terms of peace. No competent unbiassed observer will now challenge the correctness of that view.

Both the British and the French armies were at a low ebb for replacements; the French had no more men to give; the British dallied with theirs in the illusory hope of filling their units with American replacements. They were faced by the prospect of a reinforcement to the German armies on the Western Front of forty additional German divisions released from the Eastern Front by Germany's peace with Russia. To meet this situation there was only one solution: ten American divisions would reëstablish the equilibrium; twenty American divisions would give the Allies a winning superiority.

[4] See "The Evolution of the Unified Command," by General Tasker H. Bliss, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, v. I, no. 2, p. 18.

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The United States had the divisions but lacked the shipping which only England could supply, and then only by temporarily suspending her "business as usual" policy. But Lloyd George temporized and sought through intrigue to induce Wilson to change his initial decision that if necessary he would send, not men, but an army. He now tells the story, at any rate in part. As early as December 15 (v. V, p. 411) he sought to influence the President through Colonel House by cabling him pressing for "the inclusion with the British units of regiments or companies of American troops, an idea which was discussed with you at Paris." He had already stressed (v. V, p. 401) to the American Mission then in London the importance of man power and shipping, making it clear that by "man power" he did not mean an army but "as many men as you can spare, to enable us to withstand any possible German attack."

Lloyd George admits (v. V, p. 414): "Yet if it became a life and death issue, where extra American troops promptly thrown in would turn the scale between victory and defeat, we came to the conclusion that it would be worth while to take the risk of even letting our own and Allied stocks of food and raw materials run down while we diverted tonnage to bring those extra troops to France. But it would not be worth our while to take that gravely hazardous step unless the tonnage so spared were utilised to its utmost capacity to bring over fighting troops. If it were merely going to carry across numbers of divisional H.Q. details and non-combatant personnel and equipment in order to minister to the pride and enhance the consequence of a single General, we could find a far more urgent use for it. Pershing demanded the ships, but would only bring over intact divisions in them."

Lloyd George apparently did not understand then, and evidently does not realize yet, that had he succeeded in his attempt to impose on the President's better judgment he would have had in 1918 instead of three armies to stop the Germans only two psychologically unsound mobs, which would have been incapable of effective defensive action and even more incapable of offensive action, and that the final Allied success in the war would have been hopelessly compromised. Only a new and separate American Army could have become the new propelling force which in the intensive drive of September 12–November 11, 1918, finally broke the morale of the German Army. The same officers and men scattered through British or French units could not have accom-

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plished anything decisive. The result would have been a stalemate, or possibly even a German-dictated peace, instead of the Allied victory actually achieved. Such considerations as these are a closed book to Lloyd George. From his own testimony it seems evident that he conceives of strategy as a matter of places and positions rather than the interplay of forces. Thus he harps on Haig's failure to capture the Belgian coast in 1917, not realizing that the German desire to defend that coast caused the German high command to concentrate there all the reserves it could muster and so saved the French from being overwhelmed elsewhere during that year. Similarly, in 1918, the northward thrust of the American Army against the German line of communications through Metz-Sedan compelled the Germans to use up the last of their reserves and directly brought about their collapse.

During the spring months of 1918 Lloyd George tried by every possible means to win over General Pershing, Secretary Baker (then in Europe), and General Bliss, our representative on the Versailles Supreme War Council, to the theory he held regarding the manner in which American participation in the war would be most effective. His arguments were of no avail. In March and April he played his trump card. He appealed to Lord Reading, then in Washington, to try in a series of personal conferences to break down the President's "sales resistance" to the Lloyd George idea (v. V, p. 426–437). Finally Reading cabled that the President had acquiesced in his demands. Pershing was called to London and, at the end of a conference which lasted hours, was confronted with Reading's cable. It was said at the time that Pershing's reply was simply: "The President does not understand the case. I will not comply until I have communicated with him." The result showed that his faith in the President was justified.

Lloyd George recognizes that "the ultimate formation of intact American divisions was facilitated" as a result of General Pershing's stand, but ungenerously accuses him, in the passage quoted above, of having been influenced by the desire to enhance his own consequence. He is oblivious to the fact that in the American Army, as in the British Army, all ranks, from Pershing and Haig down, were imbued with the spirit of "anything to beat the Germans no matter what happens to any individual," and further blind to the fact, obvious today, that Pershing's stand at that time and later saved the war for the Allies.

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HOW SANCTIONS FAILED

By M. J. Bonn

THE failure of the sanctions applied against Italy poses on the one hand the problem of the League of Nations, its structure and its functions. On the other hand it raises an even more important issue: Can the denial of economic facilities, the shutting down of sales and purchases of commodities and services on a sufficiently wide basis, offset military power? What conditions are essential to the success of this policy of economic pressure?

Power and coercion have always been "tripartite" — spiritual, military and economic. When certain groups of men held the keys of heaven, they could exercise spiritual coercion over peoples' minds. Since the weakening of religious tenets, the place of spiritual coercion has been taken by propaganda or terrorism, both closely related to such material factors as physical threats or risk of starvation. Economic power, on the other hand, though never absent, has been increasing in importance. Armies have always marched on their stomachs. The sea Powers, especially England, have systematically used the withholding of trading facilities, either an embargo on national or neutral exports to the enemy, or a prohibition of his export trade, as an accompaniment to actual fighting. But the use of economic pressure has always been accessory to military coercion. Without Aboukir and Trafalgar the British blockade could not have worked.

The growth of industrialism, while widening the scope of economic pressure, has led to violent attacks upon its uses. To the Manchester School war was the arch enemy of the industrial system. It should be limited to professionals and must not encroach upon business. Blockades ought to be prohibited; contraband ought to be limited and rights of search should be restricted. The sea should be as free in time of war as in time of peace. It seemed senseless wickedness to punish the British artisans by a blockade of the cotton states, whose military resistance the Northern armies could not break until Sherman's march through Georgia spread economic devastation.

In the Great War, again, economic measures accompanied but did not displace military action. The success of the blockade of the Central Powers and of the submarine campaign against

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Allied shipping depended on the application of purely military weapons on sea and on land. In a few isolated cases economic pressure, not accompanied by military measures, has worked. Since the Boston tea-party boycotts were frequently used as a substitute for, and not as a complement to, military action. But here again physical violence was rarely completely absent, and military consequences frequently arose from it.

Nevertheless the conception of using economic force completely disassociated from military measures as a substitute or even as a counterfoil for war has been in the air. The paralysis which overtakes a modern society as a result of a general strike or boycott is evidence of the strength of these economic weapons. To threaten an aggressor with their world-wide application might either deter him from his nefarious plans or, if the threat has to be carried out, deprive him of the fruits of his enterprise.

II

The first section of Article 16 of the Covenant obliges members of the League *immediately* to subject the aggressor "to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nations and the nationals of the Covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the Covenant-breaking state and the nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not."

The application of this article against Italy was an experiment attempted under rather favorable circumstances. Economically, Italy is not on a par with the United States, the United Kingdom, France or Germany. Her natural resources are slender, the density of her population (353 per square mile) is great. Her capital wealth and national income are small; the latter was not one quarter of that of Great Britain in 1929. Her vulnerability is great, for she is dependent on the import of foodstuffs and of many raw materials. Most goods needed for war purposes — coal, copper, iron, cotton, lead, wool, oil — come from abroad; she has neither nickel, chrome, platinum, tungsten, tin nor rubber. Her balance of trade has always been unfavorable. Its deficit rose from nearly 1.5 billion lire in the years 1931–33 to 2.4 billion in 1934 and nearly 1.4 billions in the first six months of 1935. The deficit was covered mainly by the tourist trade (1,300 million lire in 1933) and emigrants' remittances (900 million lire in 1932).

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Italy's geographical position is strategically weak; entrance and exit to the Mediterranean are controlled by Great Britain. Goods crossing the land frontier must pass through League territory. Italy's immediate small League neighbors, Switzerland and Austria, were unwilling to offend her, but such oversea supplies as they could forward had to pass through either Germany or France. Germany's international economic situation was far too delicate to permit her running risks for the benefit of a Power with which she was not at that time on the best of terms.

On the other hand, neither the United States nor Japan nor Brazil were members of the League. Japan's economic attitude was of no great importance; she could scarcely afford to provide Italy with commodities of which she herself is in want. The United States could have satisfied most of Italy's needs — with a few exceptions — if it had insisted on exercising its unhampered rights as a neutral. It could even have reëxported rubber and nickel, which it did not itself produce.[1] Great Britain would not have stopped American supplies at Gibraltar, even when acting as mandatory of the League. But this situation need never have arisen. Public opinion in the United States sided strongly against Italy. A new conception of neutrality was formulated. The export of armaments was stopped. The maximum Italy could hope for was a continuation of supplies on a prewar scale. And it was quite possible that the definition of war material might have been stretched had the League Powers been willing to undergo heavy sacrifices in the interest of collective security.

The main factor in Italy's favor was the comparatively small scale of the war. As Ethiopia had no mechanical equipment, Italy's needs were limited; she had accumulated considerable stocks during the months of preparation when she was inconvenienced by her own financial weakness but not by foreign intervention. And she could replenish these stocks with comparatively slender imports. Italy never experienced the same need for imports that would have been involved in fighting a first-class Power.

Moreover, the glut prevailing in most markets made producers eager to sell, even though payments were not assured; their gov-

[1] Nickel exports from the United States to Italy between December 1935 and March 1936 amounted to about $120,000 (gold) and crude rubber exports to $460,000 (gold). For figures on the exports of the United States for the period just prior to the Ethiopian War see Dulles and Armstrong, "Can We Be Neutral?," Appendix 13.

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ernments were loath to add new contractions to the shrinking world trade. Italy's imports had fallen from 21.6 billion lira (1929) to 7.4 billions (1933). Of these imports, 14.6 percent came from Germany, 15 percent from the United States, 9.8 percent from England and 5.5 percent from France. This drop was due to her strict quota system and her inability to pay her commercial debts. She owed large sums on clearing agreements.

III

One object of economic pressure — or frequently described as such — the prevention of war through fear of a League boycott, could not be accomplished.[2] This fear was non-existent on Italy's side; and events showed that her attitude was fully justified. She may have relied on the League's repeating its purely negative behavior in the Manchurian affair; she may have assumed that a colonial war against a half civilized people would not be considered an attack on collective security. Great Britain's reticence at Stresa and her subsequent failure to draw attention to her probable course of action in case of an attack may well have appeared to Italy as a kind of silent connivance. The strong and clear words which no longer admitted of any doubts were not heard until September 11, when for a brief spell British statesmanship seemed to have reached a high level of moral achievement. The fact that during the period of conciliation Great Britain scrupulously maintained an arms embargo against both sides might easily be taken as a sign of acquiescence in the planned aggression. For Italy had prepared herself; by May 1935 the East African expedition had already cost 620 million lire;[3] she could easily manufacture her own armaments if raw materials were freely admitted, while Abyssinia had neither the cash nor the credit to buy them, nor the skill for making them. The pressure on Mr. Rickett to hand back his oil concession (August 1–September 3), which could have provided the Negus with some badly needed cash, might appear as a distinct favor to Italy. And, last but not least, the Italian Government knew very well that the French Government, if not French public opinion, was willing to accept an Italian protectorate in Ethiopia in return for an Italian protectorate over Austria.

Economic sanctions have not failed as a measure for preventing

[2] Article XVI does not deal with prevention, but with pressure.
[3] Royal Institute of International Affairs, "Italy and Abyssinia," London, 1935, p. 33.

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war; they were not tried for that purpose. Nobody ever threatened Italy with expulsion from the League if she violated the Covenant, as laid down in Article XVI, Section 4. And she rightly assumed that the several governments concerned would not recommend to the Council, as in duty bound under Section 2 of the same article, "what effective military, naval or air force the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenant of the League."

IV

Italy was declared the aggressor on October 9, 1935, and economic sanctions were adopted on October 19, but they were not enforced until November 18. They were not applied *immediately*, nor did they extend to *all* trade or financial relations between the League members and the Covenant-breaking state.[4]

On October 14, 1935, the Coördination Committee of the League proposed the prohibition of all financial operations in favor of Italy. Government loans by subscription as well as government banking or commercial credits were forbidden; and so were all other loan operations — the issue of shares and bonds as well as banking or commercial credits in favor of public or private corporations or of private persons. This financial boycott was very stringent; but though it imposed a good deal of inconvenience on commercial life its practical importance was very small. For Italy's finances were on the down-grade (which may have been one of the motives driving her into the Ethiopian adventure). Her foreign indebtedness was slight, not sufficient to inconvenience her or to make repudiation an instrument of retaliation. Neither the public nor the mercantile interests anywhere were inclined to lend money to Italy.[5] Foreign exporters experienced great difficulties — on account of exchange control — in getting payments for their goods. By August 1935 very nearly £2,000,000 were owed to British importers. The financial boycott did not imply a much more than moral sanctification of a prudent business-like attitude.

On October 19 it was proposed to prohibit the importation of goods grown or produced in Italy, goods en route or previously

[4] It might have impressed Italy had the League immediately adopted the proposal made by Finland in 1926, *e.g.* to provide for an issue of bonds, guaranteed by the members of the League, in support of a victim of aggression who was financially weak. After the Abyssinian collapse, the Abyssinian representative at Geneva asked for a League loan of £10,000,000 — with no response.

[5] On October 5 the American Import and Export Bank refused further credits for Italian trade.

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contracted for being excepted. Fifty governments acceded to this proposal, some with slight reservations. Their trade covered the bulk of Italy's exports to foreign countries.[6] Exports had averaged about $20,000,000[7] in each of the three months December 1934 to February 1935; they fell to $12,000,000 in the corresponding period 1935–36; the decline after December was from $19,000,000 to $8,500,000. In other words, Italy's purchasing power was reduced by two-fifths. A further decline might have been expected, but the March figures furnished by only 38 countries (the former figures comprise over 60 countries) showed a recovery to $9,250,000. A complete trade paralysis might have resulted from this import embargo. Imports to the United Kingdom fell from nearly $2,000,000 (January 1935) to $9,000 (March 1936); those to France from a similar level to $157,000. But the United States bought as much in March 1936 as in January 1935 (about $1,600,000). Germany's purchases declined a little from their maximum, but surpassed the $3,500,000 of March 1935 by over a million. Switzerland nearly halved her purchases; Austria and particularly Hungary raised or maintained theirs. Owing to exchange control, money owed to Italy in Germany, Austria and Hungary was not available for purchases elsewhere.

Italy produces hardly any goods which cannot be obtained from other sources. No danger of scarcity would exist if she were eliminated. But it was hard on her trade creditors, whose claims had to be settled by payments in Italian goods. The prohibition of imports from Italy in fact gave her a kind of moratorium.[8]

Even a complete embargo on exports could not have fully paralyzed Italy's purchasing power. Gold or silver bullion and coin were expressly exempted from the prohibition. Though their export constituted a heavy drain on Italy's resources, it enabled her to buy goods. The gold reserves of the Bank of Italy had fallen from about $370,000,000 in January 1934 to not quite $270,000,000 in August 1934. The gold drain continued, though statements are no longer published by the Bank.[9] From November

[6] Between 95.5 and 96.5 percent of Italian exports had normally gone to the countries reporting to the League for December 1935 to February 1936.

[7] Gold dollars throughout. These figures are taken from "Statistics of Trade with Italy and Italian Colonies," III. December 1935–March 1936. Coördination Committee 125. League of Nations Publications, General. 1936. 4.

[8] Italy is trying to punish them now. She has intimated her intention of paying post-sanction creditors before pre-sanction creditors.

[9] The profits on Italy's gold holdings by the 40 percent devaluation have been calculated at 657 million lire, bringing the value of the remaining gold reserve to about 1,640 million lire.

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1935 to March 1936, Italy lost $87,000,000 million, a sum sufficient to make up for the loss of 30-odd million dollars purchasing power due to the reduction of her exports. The Italian Government had commandeered (1934 and 1935) the foreign securities belonging to its subjects and exchanged them for five percent Italian bonds which were not quoted on the market. In previous years bond issues totalling $250,000,000 had been floated on the New York market. It is assumed that by this operation the Italian Government acquired from its citizens bonds worth $200,000,000. The government was in no way prevented from reselling them abroad and using the proceeds for purchases. The contraction imposed on Italy's purchasing power was thus rather slight — for the time being at least.

V

Exports to Italy were not stopped immediately and completely, apart from armaments, gas and explosives (October 11).[10] Later on, the prohibited list included transport animals, rubber, bauxite, aluminium, iron ore and scrap iron, nickel and various ores used for steel-making, tin and tin ores. Prohibition extended to contracts in course of execution, but not to goods en route. These measures reduced Italian imports considerably. Imports (from 38 main countries) had averaged $25,600,000 a month for the five months November 1934 to March 1935, and reached a maximum of $28,000,000 just before the blockade became effective in November. They fell to $13,900,000 in January 1936, but rose again to $15,600,000 in March. The average for the three blockade months (from 62 countries) was just $18,000,000 million each as against $32,000,000 in November.

Mineral sanctions of the type chosen are sure to be effective in a long-drawn-out war, provided they are complete and accompanied by prohibition of semi-manufactured goods. Italy's normal production of iron ore (700,000 tons) is not sufficient; her regular imports amounted to about 200,000 tons.[11] An iron ore embargo would have seriously inconvenienced her in a long-drawn-out war, especially as chromium, manganese, tungsten and a good many ferro-alloys were included, for which she is more or less dependent on imports. She regularly imported 850,000 tons of pig

[10] The Resolutions concerning the economic weapon adopted by the Assembly on October 4, 1921, made such hesitancy permissible.

[11] Sir Thomas Holland, "The Mineral Sanction," Edinburgh, 1935, p. 52–3.

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iron, ferro-alloys, scrap steel, etc. But the war was not a big war, in which accumulated stocks quickly melt; and she could replenish them by importing semi-manufactured goods. Pig iron was admitted and so were bars. The monthly total of all mineral ores fell from 78,000 tons (December 1934) to 18,000 tons (January 1936) and 26,000 tons (March). Imports of iron and steel goods declined from 73,000 tons (January 1935) to 15,000 tons (January 1936) and 22,000 tons (March). Prohibited steel goods came from Germany, Austria and the United States; non-prohibited goods from Russia (pig iron) and France (bars). By March the import situation had improved for Italy — to the benefit of non-sanctionist Powers.

Coal, oil and copper were not prohibited. Italy did reduce her imports of coal considerably. From a monthly maximum of about 1,100,000 tons in December 1934 and January 1935, to 617,000 tons in March 1936. Most of the loss was borne by the United Kingdom, whose exports fell from over 420,000 tons to nought, and by Poland; while Germany, Belgium-Luxembourg and the United States improved their positions.[12]

Oil imports from sanctionist countries, though not prohibited, fell considerably:

Crude oil. 8,941 tons (December 1934) to 3,030 tons (February 1936) and 6,703 (March).

Motor spirits. 23,680 tons (March 1935) to 3,774 tons (February 1936) and 9,223 tons (March).

Gas oil and fuel. 99,615 tons (December 1934) to 121,124 tons (January 1936) and 41,583 tons (March 1936).

Lubricating oils. 26,867 tons (December 1934) to 999 tons (March 1936).

Italy had laid in large stocks before sanctions became effective. She shifted part of her oil purchases to the United States, who had contributed only 6½ percent of her supply between 1931 and 1934. For the full year 1935 the American proportion of Italy's oil purchases rose to 12½ percent, and during the three war months of this year (October–December) it was 17.8 percent. The German coal deliveries enabled Italy to punish Great Britain; the American oil deliveries made it possible for her to retaliate in part on Rumania and Russia. Rumania exported 25,000 tons of gas and fuel oil to Italy in January 1936 and 11,600

[12] Coke imports from France increased from 7,400 tons (February 1935) to 17,000 (February 1936).

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tons in March. But exports of petroleum products from the United States in March 1936 were less than a third of those in December 1935. Russia's share had fallen from 20,000 tons in January to 5,200 in March. Copper imports from sanctionist countries fluctuated considerably. The main increase in the supply came from the United States, whose sales rose from $1,329,000 for the period November 1934–March 1935 to $2,201,000 for the same months in 1935–36. The existence of these free markets was the main economic argument against including coal, copper and oil in the sanctions.

The United States Government did not stop the exportation of oil to Italy. It was by no means certain, however, that the term "implements of war" the export of which was prohibited under the Neutrality Act could not have been stretched to include fuel for bombers. It may not have been possible for the League Powers to proceed from a *passive* policy of sanctions to an *active* policy, by which the participants in the boycott would have stopped imports from non-participating countries to Italy by intercepting them at Gibraltar or at Suez. American public opinion might not have stood for it, since the new conception of neutrality, which aimed at keeping the United States out of war by stressing the duties rather than the rights of neutrals, was not yet generally accepted. But the application of economic sanctions presupposed a state of war, on which the aggressor had entered "against all other members of the League" (Article 16). An economic war of defense in the interests of international order was justified by international law and by American public opinion. It might have been possible to induce the United States to prohibit the exports of goods which otherwise might embroil them in the war, without causing unpleasant friction. The attitude of the American Government was by no means averse to such coöperation as was possible under American laws and in existing political conditions. Business interests, eager for profits, might have objected, especially when there was a chance of gaining permanent markets for American oil. Their opposition might have been squared by an offer to take over the normal oil supply sent to Italy by American companies — an item of not quite $200,000 in February 1935. The monopolistic organization of the oil industry would have made such an arrangement easy enough. And it might have been possible to request the American Government to restrain the reëxportation of rubber and nickel.

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Economic sanctions applied under Article 16 created a state of economic war; economic war cannot be waged efficiently without going to the limit of economic pressure. The attitude of the American Government was never properly tested. Would it really have insisted on America's selling oil and copper and reëxporting nickel and rubber had it clearly been shown that a state of war existed, not only between Italy and Abyssinia, but between Italy and the League?

The League's policy was never complete. Not only were certain war materials, such as oil, left untouched, but shipping, the tourist trade and emigrants' remittances were not interfered with. The Italian attitude was simple and clear. "We shall stand all sanctions which do not seriously hamper us; if they do more than inconvenience us, we shall fight." The League had the choice either of accepting this challenge and imposing such sanctions as would make war hopeless for Italy; or of acknowledging that the independence of Abyssinia was not worth a world war. Quite possibly such a war would never have come; but this cannot be known for certain. It cannot be said that sanctions failed. For pressure which has not been exercised cannot have failed. Nor is it proven that the exercise of pressure must have led to war, nor that it must under all circumstances lead to war. If a realistic and rational policy was expected from the Italian Government, war against the League would scarcely have been the appropriate method for winning the war in Abyssinia. If, on the other hand, its policy was due to irrational motives, if it was directed by a madman, who, driven to despair, might be willing to smash the world, overwhelming military pressure should have been in evidence from the beginning.

To brand Italy as the aggressor at a meeting of the League for having broken a solemn Covenant, and to implore this moral offender at the same time to remain within the League, whose statutes he had violated deliberately, was so incongruous that moral failure was inevitable even if material failure had not taken place. There might be reasons for maintaining diplomatic relations with Italy — they exist with non-members of the League, regardless of the moral principle which their governments represent. But to let Italy remain a member of the League Council, entitled to all its privileges, while at the same time breaking its fundamental law, was a mockery which Italy could not but look upon as an encouragement to go to the limit.

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Sanctions inconvenienced Italy considerably: her imports of essential foodstuffs and raw materials declined from $48,500,000 for the period from December 1934 to March 1935 to $26,000,000 for the corresponding period of the next year. However, their pressure might have increased in severity. The exhaustion of the gold supply and the foreign exchange obtainable by the disposal of foreign securities might have brought about real scarcity. But in the meantime stocks on hand, the practice of economies, the development of substitutes, and the purchase of goods with gold, foreign securities, emigrants' remittances and tourists' disbursements kept the country going without too severe a strain. The fear of increasing pressure nevertheless existed; it may have been responsible for the decision to resort to poison gas warfare and to break another solemn engagement.

With the improvement in world trade, the total volume of trade of some countries did not suffer much as a result of the imposition of sanctions. Exports from the United Kingdom to all countries except Italy rose from $118,000,000 in December 1935 to $124,000,000 in March 1936; exports to Italy declined from around $3,000,000 before the embargo to a paltry hundred thousand; thus the loss in Italian markets was made good elsewhere. Other countries, however, were less fortunate. Italian imports from France fell from $1,700,000 in March 1935 to $350,000 in March 1936; France's other exports declined in the same period from $50,000,000 to $49,000,000. Rumania's total monthly trade, March 1935 to March 1936, declined from $5,200,000 to $4,800,000, and her trade with Italy from $830,000 to $219,000.[13]

Arrangements were devised for the mutual support of states, in accordance with which damages resulting from the application of the most favored nation clause, from scarcity due to the absence of Italian goods or to the loss of Italian markets, were to be offset by particular concessions from other sanctionist countries.[14] The proposal for creating a mutual support fund was not accepted. But measures were taken for the shifting of some goods

[13] German exports to Italy rose from a minimum of $3,300,000 (February 1935) to $6,000,000 (December 1935); they declined by March 1936 to about $3,600,000. The minimum of the United States (December 1934) was not quite $3,000,000; it rose to $4,700,000 (December 1935) and remained above $4,000,000 in February and March after declining to $3,200,000 in January. Austria's minimum was $636,000 (January 1935), and her maximum was $1,700,000 (March 1936).

[14] Proposal V of the Coördination Committee, October 19, 1935.

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and for the granting of some compensation quota. As an unequal incidence of losses was inevitable, a certain amount of recrimination between various nations followed. This may account for the decline of pressure which the March statistics seem to reveal.

Evidently it was very difficult for League members to have a uniform economic policy against a recalcitrant state, while their normal economic relations with each other were antagonistic. Collective security in the political field cannot be achieved when aggressive anarchy prevails in economic affairs.

Dissatisfaction was naturally expressed by interested groups which lost trade. Hitherto, foreign wars had offered excellent opportunities for making good profits; sanctions not only prevented such profits, but were bound to inflict losses on certain industries. Some of these losses may have been imaginary; it was easy enough to sell goods to the Italian Government; it might not have been quite so easy to collect for them. Sanctions made safe such trade as remained, by restricting its amount and by putting it on a cash basis. Unfortunately the sanctionist governments refused to pay compensation for loss of trade to their nationals; and indeed the settling of claims of that nature would have been anything but easy. But there is no reason why the burden of economic warfare should be borne by a particular group of people — why, for example, British coal-owners should suffer loss while British oil interests make profits. Had the principle been accepted from the beginning that the nation — not certain groups — should bear the cost of economic warfare, opposition would have been reduced considerably. Moreover, the aggressor should have been told that he would be expected to make good the damage he had done to trade. The payment of a war indemnity is frequently an immoral imposition; too often the victor constitutes himself into a kind of court and assesses damages to himself. But the members of the League, the rules of which had been broken by an aggressor who was a fellow member, would have been entitled to claim compensation.

Though sanctions were not as efficient as they might have been made, they were the only weapon the League held against Italy. To let it slip before the conclusion of peace between the League and the nation which had violated its Covenant was evident proof of the fact that those in positions of responsibility either did not know how to handle the economic weapon, or did not dare to use it properly, or both.

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BRITISH AND FRENCH COLONIAL TECHNIQUE IN WEST AFRICA

By Derwent Whittlesey

THE annexation of Ethiopia has presented the Italian Government with a tremendous problem in colonial administration. No other area in Africa of equal size offers such variety of topography, climate, language, and religion. The task of ruling so conglomerate an empire will certainly not be easy. The British and the French have already acquired a fund of experience as a result of their administration of vast and populous domains; the Italians, if they are wise, will study carefully what these predecessors in colonial government can teach them.

In tropical Africa, it is true, European rule is a thing of scarcely more than a generation. Though various nations had gained toeholds on the coast during the four hundred years following the Portuguese explorations of the late fifteenth century, only by the middle of the nineteenth century was the continent effectively penetrated. The sketchy information brought back from the interior by explorers and traders was used by the colonizing powers as the basis for extravagant territorial claims. The Berlin Conference on the Congo in 1884–85 gave impetus to this scramble in which each nation sought to stake out for itself the largest possible holdings. By 1900 the political map of tropical Africa had by and large assumed its present appearance; the only important changes since then have been the ousting of Germany during the World War and the recent Italian conquest of Ethiopia.

Once in possession of these tracts of largely unexplored land, the colonial powers proceeded to create systems for administering them. The two nations which had acquired the largest prizes — Great Britain and France — embarked upon quite divergent programs. In fact, we might go so far as to say that at only one point do their policies agree: both recognize the fact that Europeans cannot make permanent homes in tropical lowland Africa but must regularly return to the middle latitudes for periods of recuperation. On every other fundamental issue of both theory and practice the British and the French colonial techniques differ widely.

One of the most significant differences concerns the degree to which the natives are permitted to govern themselves. In the ad-

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ministration of the French colonies Frenchmen occupy all the important positions, though properly trained Africans are allowed to fill subordinate posts, and in special circumstances even to become French citizens. Great Britain, on the other hand, has generally adopted the plan of governing Africans whenever possible through their native rulers. This is accomplished by setting up a hierarchy of European officials alongside the native administration. The two methods have come to be known as "direct" and "indirect" rule. Direct rule is the current practice nearly everywhere throughout the world. Indirect rule is being attempted in only a few places. One of those few places is British West Africa — the composite designation for Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone, the Gambia and the British mandated areas in Cameroons and Togoland.

Conditions are propitious in West Africa for a comparative study of direct and indirect rule. British and French colonies alternate with one another along the coast, yet the environment differs very little. As can be seen from the accompanying map, the political frontiers, which run north and south, cut at right angles, generally speaking, the lines separating the climatic belts. The student of colonial government thus finds in these colonies an excellent laboratory for observing and comparing the results of unlike systems of administration.

The first British experiment in indirect rule in West Africa took place in Northern Nigeria, and it came about not through any premeditated design but as the necessary result of circumstances. Geographically, Northern Nigeria belongs to the Sudan. For some centuries prior to European penetration it had been under the rule of a number of independent Arab emirs who had imposed their culture and their religion on the negro aborigines.

During the years following the Berlin Conference the British and French governments sought to convert their grandiose territorial claims into valid title by effective occupation. In order to chastise some of the emirs who had repudiated certain trading concessions, the British in 1900 sent against them a small force under Colonel (now Lord) Lugard, who almost bloodlessly entered one walled capital after another. In thus forestalling French penetration from Dahomey, he unexpectedly found himself after a few months in control of nine million people and a quarter million square miles. Lacking the trained men necessary to govern this great area, Lugard was obliged to leave each emir in control

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on condition that he governed temperately. The only drastic changes insisted upon were the suppression of slave-raiding, the substitution of an equitable tax system for the arbitrary impositions commonly practised, and the abolition of cruel punishments. To insure that British requirements were fulfilled, a Resident was appointed to the court of each native ruler of the first rank. Thus, indirect rule was set up in Northern Nigeria as a means of "muddling through" a particular emergency.

The arrangement worked from the very beginning. A few emirs, unable or unwilling to relinquish practices disapproved by the Residents, have had to be deposed in favor of more adaptable rulers, but care is always taken to make the selection from the



group of heirs eligible according to local usage. As a rule, the emir is amenable to the rebuke which he is sure to receive from the Resident if his administration becomes notoriously lax or venal. The first small group of Residents has expanded into a modest hierarchy of eleven provincial residencies divided into forty districts, each under a subordinate political officer. A district may range in area from 1,000 to 33,000 square miles and in population from 30,000 to 2,000,000. The officer and two or three assistants cover at recurrent intervals all the outlying territory within the district, spending two-thirds to three-fourths of their time in the bush. They hear complaints, sit in judgment on those appealed cases which can properly come before them, ferret out injustice, suggest improvements to be made by the local authorities, and generally maintain the standards of British colonial

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government. This haphazard device not only functions well, it operates at low cost — a fact very welcome to the Colonial Office in London, ever called upon to justify expenditure in the colonies.

As soon as the efficacy of indirect rule was proved in Northern Nigeria, steps were taken to extend it to Southern Nigeria, where the geographic and cultural pattern is quite different. Northern Nigeria has a long dry season. But here there is rainfall nearly the year round. Here, then, instead of grassy plains are dense forests, wide river deltas, and teeming vegetation. As an inevitable consequence of these conditions the natives were found segregated into numerous small tribes, each with its own language and gods, separated alike from each other and from the outside world. Along the coast, too, there were settlements of Europeans which tended to de-tribalize the natives without substituting any new bond of interest or loyalty. The introduction of sectarian missions only accentuated this disintegrating process, for the natives naturally sought to improve upon Christianity by inventing sects of their own, such as the Anglican polygamous church. There were a few large tribes which were well adapted to indirect rule. Other groups, though small in size and occupying only a few square miles of territory, were arbitrarily lumped into provinces staffed by British administrative offices. Though the conditions were not propitious, indirect rule proved flexible enough to function.

In time the scheme was adopted in other British West African colonies. In the Gold Coast, the Ashanti, a tribe on the northern margin of the dense forest, had (like some of those similarly placed in Nigeria) a powerful political organization prior to the coming of the British. A bitter contest (the Ashanti War of 1899–1900) led to the suppression of the native government and the exile of the ruler. Now, after the lapse of a generation, the son of the exiled chief occupies the "stool" of his father, and the native government, which appears to have been operating all the time *sub rosa*, has been drawn from hiding. Small tribes are being accorded similar rights, all the way from the Gambia to British Cameroons.

As has just been intimated, the imposition of indirect rule on pagan tribes often drives the real government under cover, leaving a usurper to represent his people before the British officer. The underground government sometimes goes undiscovered for years — generally until some administrator learns the local lan-

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guage and obtains the confidence of the real leaders of the tribe. He then usually finds that the aboriginal government has been functioning all along and that the usurper has no authority over the people beyond the backing he has been able to obtain from the British. The persistence of traditional tribal government, even when it is deprived of tax money and the sanction of the powerful European, raises a question as to the ultimate success of any sort of government imposed by whites. The Italians might do well to keep this doubt in mind as they proceed with the creation of their administrative system in Ethiopia.

The excuse for the imposition of British rule in West Africa is that Englishmen desired to increase their trade in goods while putting a stop to trade in human beings. The consequences of this double aspiration are the trading firm and the mission. Traders, missionaries, and administrators make up European society in British West Africa. Their total number is small: about 1,300 in Lagos (the metropolis of all British West Africa); a few score in each chief center of the interior; three or four individuals in the many small outlying stations. Until recently there were few women there except missionaries, and even now wives often stay in Africa for short terms only. Practically no children are brought out. Everybody lives in houses owned either by the government, the trading firm or the missionary society. The white man comes out for a definite tour of duty, usually eighteen months, at the end of which he "goes home" on long leave, generally eighteen weeks. When he comes back he is likely to find himself posted to a new station, and frequently he is shifted about during his tour. Nobody contemplates a time when it will be possible for Europeans to put down roots in British West Africa.

Government is administered to benefit British trade only to the extent that it does not prejudice native interests. Concessions to work mineral resources are thus favored, because the Africans have neither the capital nor the skill to initiate mining; but farmland cannot be alienated to Europeans, since agriculture is the basis of African existence. The only exception of importance is a group of plantations, started by Germans in Cameroons and inherited by Britain, which are still owned and operated by Europeans. This guarantee to the Africans of their farmland in perpetuity grows out of the recognition by the British that the West African environment forbids settlement by Europeans. It is the logical foundation for indirect rule. To the African tribe and

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individual it is more valuable than the form of government which happens to be imposed.

The French mode of administration is in theory the flat antithesis of the British. France is in Africa to make Frenchmen out of the Africans. To this end African life is given no official recognition. Administrative officers from France rule directly, native leaders being allowed to handle their own people only by sanction of custom, never of law. All land is French, except that which an individual African registers with the French authorities. This amounts to very little in total acreage, because the African tribes hold their land collectively and individual ownership is a novel idea. Large concessions to exploit forests and mines, as well as allotments for agricultural plantations, may be and are made to Europeans. Since no land is set aside for native reserves, the concessionaires in effect obtain the local labor with the land.

The Europeans in French Africa comprise the same three groups as in British colonies — administrators, traders, and missionaries — although the proportion of administrators is higher. They come for longer tours, generally two years (sometimes three the first time out), and they go home for shorter leaves, usually three months. As many as can arrange it bring their wives and children, and the larger capitals have quite the aspect of European provincial centers. Yet this semblance of European life on alien soil is only a semblance. "Home" is always France, even for the few planters who have taken up more or less permanent abode on the land. The number of Frenchmen living in the colonial centers is considerable: nearly 7,000 in Dakar, the capital, and about a thousand in each of four or five other towns, besides smaller numbers in lesser places.

All France's West African colonies combined — in local parlance known as "A.O.F." (Afrique Occidentale Française) — have an area three times that of Britain's West African possessions. Yet the population of A.O.F. is only five-eighths that of British West Africa. Nevertheless, to administer A.O.F. the French employ a larger personnel. The total white population of the British colonies is about 11,000, that of the French about 31,000. The proportion of traders is notably higher in the British territory because the British employ approximately twice as large a personnel to manage a store as do the French. The ratio of missionaries is probably about the same. The proportion of functionaries is therefore much higher in the French possessions.

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Obviously more political officers are needed for direct than for indirect government. Even though qualified Africans may fill lesser positions in the French colonies, they have not yet taken over so large a percentage of the offices as is the case in the Native Administrations of the British colonies.

The discrepancy in numbers between British and French administrators appears in the technical as well as in the political staffs. The engineering needed to bring Africa into the machine age had to be performed by trained men sent from Europe. Africans could neither build railroads nor drive their engines; they had no doctors who could vaccinate for smallpox, to say nothing of discovering the secrets of yellow fever. With time, many Africans have acquired the skill necessary to run a motor-car, a railroad locomotive, or a gasoline launch. Others have become licensed doctors. In British territory such men have been worked as fast as possible into the expanding technological services of the native administrations. In Gold Coast, for example, all trains are operated by Africans, except for the European inspectors who check up on the honesty of the ticket takers. Hospitals for natives in all the British colonies are manned largely by Africans, although the heads of both the medical and nursing staffs are still European. Road building is generally let out to African contractors whose work is not supervised beyond the final inspection prior to acceptance and payment, an inspection which every such contract job receives the world over. In some of the more advanced emirates of Northern Nigeria the administration of public works is in native hands, assisted by a few Europeans lent from the British service. In Kano the highly technical topographic office, although started by Europeans, is now entirely manned by Africans, who are continuing the detailed mapping of the emirate. Finally, all routine clerical work in store and office is performed by Africans. When the British undertook the administration of the interior at the beginning of the century, they tapped a small local reservoir of Africans who could read and write English, most of them trained in mission schools in Sierra Leone. The increased number of schools in all the colonies, especially in the coast towns, has more than kept pace with the demand for graduates, and nearly every colony is now turning out clerks faster than jobs open up for them.

In the French colonies there is no division between the European and native technical services. Africans who have adequate

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training may hold practically any post, although few of them do occupy positions of much responsibility. True, there was no group already trained in the French language and in French methods of business when France undertook serious administration of the country. Nevertheless, a full generation after the inauguration of French schools, jobs requiring only moderate technical proficiency are still performed by Europeans. White men staff many railroad trains, and white men and women sell stamps at the post office windows. Occasionally an African is found occupying a good position. For instance, one may run across a native as secretary of an important Chamber of Commerce or as a uniformed official in full charge of a principal custom house. But these exceptions only stress the gap between theory and practice. The French continue to draw upon Europeans for their technical and clerical staffs far more than do the British.

The educational system in the French colonies is extensive, unified, and admirably organized. The school is perhaps the most vital cog in France's colonial administration. Her control of West Africa is postulated on the conversion of the Africans into Frenchmen. The French colonial officials recognize that adults are fixed in their African mold, but they expect to model the plastic natures of the young. With this goal in view, the African children are taught French, which they learn easily, and they are steeped in French traditions. Although there is no compulsion to adopt Christianity, missions are everywhere, and an imposing church stands conspicuously in every town, even in Moslem areas. If built to serve solely the religious needs of the European population, smaller edifices would be quite adequate.

All this is markedly opposed to British procedure. Churches there are, but in the Moslem area no missionaries are allowed unless invited by the native ruler. In the pagan country, where proselyting is permitted, church buildings generally bear the cross of sectarianism; scarcely one of them is attractive in architecture or imposing in scale. British schools are likewise left mainly to chance, though a well-planned institution of higher education is sustained by the government of each larger colony. The emirates maintain intermediate schools, conducted in the language of the country, with whatever advice and coöperation they may seek from British authority. Except in the case of mission enterprises, all schools are staffed by Africans.

The contrast between British and French personnel is nowhere

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so striking as in the realm of law enforcement — the police and the army. Wherever native administrations in territory annexed by the British already had native police forces, they were retained and even increased. Elsewhere the police are officered by two or more European commissioners in each headquarters, but manned and sub-officered entirely by Africans. The small consolidated army of the four colonies — Nigeria, Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Gambia — is similarly organized. European officers are seconded from their home regiments for not more than six years, and non-commissioned personnel is selected from the African troops. This is a volunteer force for duty in Africa only. Except for aiding in the occupation of the country at the outset, and helping conquer Germany's African colonies during the World War, its job has been mainly drilling.

The French colonial police may not be more numerous than the British, but a large army cantonment is a feature of every important town in A.O.F. To officer this army requires a commissioned staff of nearly 500, besides the non-commissioned personnel which is also European. Universal conscription is the law in the colonies, no less than in France itself. By no means every male African who reaches military age is ushered into the army; yet no traveller in French North Africa or Southern France can have escaped the frequent sight of negro troops, sent north for two of their five years' service.

Since 1926 conscripts have been divided into two classes: the superior group is trained as troops, the rest are organized into labor units, serving in Africa in peacetime, but available, like the fighting forces, for service anywhere in case of need. Here we come upon the major objective of the French in developing these colonies. They represent an extension of France not merely economically, but in every phase of life, and most of all in providing for a larger army than can be recruited in the homeland. That is not to say, as has often been said, that France is training a negro army primarily for use in Europe. Nevertheless, black troops have in the past seen active service on European fronts. The best of the conscripts are at present being regularly sent to France, supposedly to absorb civilization, and perhaps to become hardened to the rigors of the European climate. It must not be supposed that the natives strenuously object to military service. On the contrary, most of them love it. The African likes a uniform, and police and soldiers in both British and French colonies are

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proud of the hot and inappropriate clothing which their calling compels them to wear. A group of native police is said once to have become thoroughly disaffected because a humane officer ordered them to leave off their woolen wrap puttees.

The French colonials who show the most proficiency obtain preferment in government and business, all of which is conducted in French. In no aspect of administration is the contrast between British and French more interesting than in this matter of language. As a result of British ships having for several generations frequented the settlements of the West African coast, a debasement of English, salted with many Portuguese words, has become the local *lingua franca*. This jargon, like pidgin English on the coast of China, has penetrated inland wherever its knowledge will aid in getting a job as servant or in turning an honest penny in trade. But every British political officer is required to learn at least one of the African languages of the region where he works, and in this region he normally lives out his official life. Africans are not encouraged to learn English, and few officials of the native administrations can speak it. The French administrator, in contrast, need not learn an African language. Indeed, the prospects of his career discourage his doing so, because he is likely to be sent to quite different parts of West Africa for successive tours, and for some of his official life to other of the major French colonial regions — North Africa, Madagascar, Indo-China. Army officers even more than administrators expect to be shifted about the empire. Moreover, an effective fighting force should speak a single language.

It would be unfair to say that French interest in creating a native army is the sole reason why France practises direct administration. It is a method of political control which happens to fit the character and traditions of the French people. Their feeling for logical systems and order would not accept a scheme of government which varied from place to place in conformity with local usage. Furthermore, to govern Africa according to African models would seem to any Frenchman nonsensical, criminal almost, when Africans might be privileged to be governed as Frenchmen. In contrast, it suits the British taste to accept a problem and solve it on the spot with minimum reference to the problems of other places. Besides, the notion that British Africa is being governed for the Africans pleases that powerful liberal and non-conformist element of the British public which first be-

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came interested in Africa during the agitation for the abolition of the slave trade. If at the same time good money can be made by legitimate commerce, neither the humanitarians nor the traders are likely to object.

In some details the two opposed modes of administration are approaching each other. Theoretically at least, direct rule looks toward the extension of the franchise and the ultimate democratization of French Africa by incorporating it with France itself. Already several thousand Africans are French citizens, mainly those who live in Dakar and some of the other old French settlements. These men enjoy the right of electing a deputy to the Chamber in Paris. British rule, on the other hand, tends to perpetuate the form of government found among those groups already highly organized in 1900. The autocratic authority of the emirs has been modified only in so far as necessary to make it conform with British ideals of fair play and justice. The application of indirect rule to small forest tribes has often meant substituting autocracy for local self-government. Village government, instead of being autocratic, is generally in the hands of an oligarchy of the older men.

The British hierarchy appears to be developing into a bureaucracy, which is admittedly one of the chief evils of direct rule. Political officers are required to spend increasing amounts of their time on paper work, the curse of the bureaucratic system. And as the organization becomes set in its mold with the passage of years, elbowing for hierarchical preferment increases. Nevertheless, the British and French systems are still poles apart, and will remain so as long as England concentrates on trade with a minimum of interference in local government, while France organizes her colonies with at least half an eye to the protection of her Rhineland frontier.

Finally, in both the British and French colonies individual land tenure is beginning to supplant collective ownership. The French policy is to encourage individual ownership by emphasizing its legality. In general, the British make no effort to alter the local system of tribal land tenure, although in the coast towns private ownership has long since replaced communal holding. Furthermore, the law permits individuals to register specific parcels of land anywhere so long as the title is clear. Registration is becoming increasingly common, since individual tenure is best adapted for those who produce for the market. The salable crops

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— cotton, peanuts, and particularly tree products, such as cacao, coffee and oil palm — occupy the same land year after year, in sharp contrast to the aboriginal practice of shifting the farms to virgin soil every few seasons. Since local usage recognizes the planter as the owner of his crop, his long-term occupancy of specific plots tends to become identified with ownership of the land. In this way the concept of individual tenure is making headway.

That Italy will adopt indirect rule in Ethiopia is hardly to be anticipated. But the experiments in West Africa have not progressed to the stage where it can be asserted that direct rule is changing the African into a European, and there is a good deal of evidence that the aboriginal organization of life goes on beneath forms imposed by both British and French governments. The Italian acquisition of the penultimate slice of independent Africa by no means signalizes the European administrative conquest of that continent. The vitality of native African institutions has not yet been measured.

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THE FUTURE OF PORTUGAL'S COLONIES

By Robert Gale Woolbert

AS Chancellor Hitler, Dr. Schacht, General Goering and other high German officials have plainly stated in recent months, Germany is resolved to resume her rôle as a colonial power. The Nazis profess to prefer the return of Germany's prewar colonies: Togoland, Cameroons, Southwest Africa and German East Africa. These territories are now held as mandates by France and Britain, and the latter countries do not seem at all disposed to surrender them. However, speaking before the League Assembly in September 1935 concerning the possibility of making better use of the world's economic resources, Sir Samuel Hoare stated that: "The view of His Majesty's Government is that the problem is economic rather than political and territorial. It is the fear of monopoly — of the withholding of essential colonial raw materials — that is causing alarm. It is the desire for a guarantee that the distribution of raw materials will not be unfairly impeded that is stimulating the demand for further inquiry. So far as His Majesty's Government is concerned, I feel sure that we should be ready to take our share in an investigation of these matters."

Some Germans have expressed wonder that the possessor of the most extensive colonial empire on earth does not lead the way in making some of her colonies available to nations less fortunately provided. They inquire, and others with them, what other colonial domains might be considered ripe for transfer. Among those which make the inquiry most anxiously are smaller Powers like the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal. The acquisition of the colonial empires of either the Netherlands or Belgium would be satisfactory, we may be sure, to the German imperialists. However, the line of least resistance does not lead to the Dutch or Belgian possessions but to those of Spain and Portugal. In the case of Spain, the few and unimportant areas still held by her would in no way satisfy Germany's colonial demands. On the other hand, the abundant natural resources of the Portuguese colonial domain offer a very real temptation.

One of the anomalies of modern history is the survival of Portugal as an important colonial Power. True, her present overseas holdings are but a shadow of their former glory. Nevertheless, the possession of an empire containing over 800,000 square miles and 9,000,000 inhabitants represents quite an achievement for a nation which is neither large nor rich. Of course, at the time she laid the foundation for her empire Portugal was not a poor nation, judged by the standards of the times; in the fifteenth century she was one of the leading maritime states in Europe. Inspired by such men as Henry the Navigator, Portuguese sailors in the latter part of that century gradually pushed south along the coast of Africa, until in 1486 Bartolomeu Dias rounded the Cape of Good Hope and in 1498 Vasco da Gama reached Calicut in India. In 1500 King Emanuel assumed the title "Lord of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of India, Ethiopia, Arabia and Persia." Within the next few decades great adventurers like Albuquerque had established Portuguese fortified settlements

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as far east as China. By holding these key ports, the Portuguese gained control of the Indian Ocean and were thus free to monopolize the sea-borne trade between the Orient and Europe. So immensely lucrative was this commerce that other peoples naturally sought to intrude. Fortunately for Portugal, she had made an agreement in 1494 with her most dangerous rival, Spain. In their division of the new world between them, Portugal obtained everything east of the forty-sixth meridian of west longitude. This arrangement the other nations felt under no obligation to respect. The consequence was that when Portugal's power began to decay after her union with Spain in 1580, the Dutch conquered one after another of her colonies in Brazil, Africa, India and the East Indies. Whatever places the Dutch failed to take were soon captured by the Arabs, the Indian princes or the British, until by the middle of the eighteenth century little remained of Portugal's once magnificent empire. Except for a few unimportant stations in the East, all that she still held were certain undefined stretches of the east and west coasts of Africa, used chiefly as hunting grounds for slaves to be sent to Brazil.

The mother country made no serious effort to develop these colonies until the scramble for a place in the sun that marked the last two decades of the nineteenth century obliged her to defend her centuries-old claims against the encroachments of the stronger Powers. In the end, Portugal managed to preserve a considerable portion of her African patrimony. Even then, she would not have been able to retain her best colonies had the 1898 agreement between Britain and Germany for the eventual partition of Angola and Mozambique been put into effect. The British probably had no intention of carrying out this agreement, for in the very next year they signed a Secret Declaration with Portugal renewing the ancient treaty of 1661 by which England obligated herself "to protect the conquests and colonies . . . of Portugal against all enemies, as well future as present." The outbreak of the World War found the Germans again seeking to enter an agreement with the British for the dismemberment of Portugal's African empire.

No one can say whether Great Britain will ever be disposed to countenance the disappearance of Portugal as a colonial Power. Historians point out that the alliance between these two countries is the oldest in Europe, dating back to the fourteenth century. We may be sure, however, that more than mere sentiment holds the policies of these nations together. Portugal's colonies are valuable alike for their natural resources and for their location on Britain's oceanic route to the East, and it is to Britain's interest that they remain under the control of a friendly and dependent Power. Portugal's interest, naturally, is to cultivate this British solicitude, though her behavior in the present Spanish revolt leads one to wonder whether she is tied quite as closely to London's apron-strings as we have usually believed.

In the World War, Portugal threw in her lot with the Entente Powers. Victory won, she was rewarded by being permitted to retain her colonies. The Portuguese Government was under no illusions, however, as to the fact that this might be merely a temporary reprieve. In view of the growing competition for colonial territories it behooved Portugal to do her utmost to demonstrate her capacity as a colonial administrator. The Carmona-Salazar dictatorship of recent years has been particularly energetic in this direction. It has extended

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the principles of the corporative state (the *Estado Novo*) as set up in the mother country to effect a thorough reorganization of the administrative machinery in the colonies. Laws have also been promulgated making the empire a closer economic unit by raising its tariff walls, by favoring Portuguese shipping, and by other neo-mercantilistic measures. Unfortunately, these attempts to create a Portuguese imperial autarchy have disrupted the economic life of the colonies, with a consequent lowering of the standard of living. Portugal is not an industrial nation and can therefore absorb only a part of her colonies' raw materials and supply them with only a fraction of the manufactured goods they need. If there is indeed an incipient communist movement in the colonies, as reports indicate, this is not surprising in view of the repressive economic and social policies of the dictatorship.

II

What are the constituent parts of the Portuguese colonial empire? The Azores and the Madeiras are not colonies but integral parts of Portugal. Their separation from that country would therefore represent not the redistribution of colonies, but the dismemberment of Portugal itself. The British would certainly not be pleased to see a strong naval Power ensconsed in either archipelago. And even the United States might conceivably object to the transference of the Azores to more aggressive hands. In any event, since it is tropical regions that Germany professes to want she must seek further to the southward.

The Cape Verde Islands (area, 1,500 square miles; population, 160,000) occupy a strategic location off the coast of Senegal. Since they produce little, their chief value is as a refueling station on the route to South America and the west coast of Africa. Unlike the Madeiras and Azores, which have almost wholly Portuguese populations, the Cape Verde Islands are peopled largely by blacks and mulattoes — living, it might be added, on a very low scale of life.

On the coast not far to the south of Cape Verde lies Portuguese Guinea (area, 14,000 square miles; population, 375,000), one of the oldest of Portugal's colonies and one of the most neglected. It possesses several good harbors, where German concerns are reported in recent years to have established extensive facilities for their steamship and aviation services. Parts of the interior have never been explored, and in general the colony's very considerable potentialities for the cultivation of sub-tropical and tropical products have lain almost completely untouched. Unfortunately, the altitude is low and the climate consequently unsuitable for Europeans. Nevertheless, an industrial state like Germany could, with the application of considerable capital, find there some of the raw materials for which she now clamors. Such a Power could also use Portuguese Guinea or the Cape Verdes as naval bases, which is one of the reasons why Britain might be expected to oppose their detachment from Portugal.

As we proceed southward down the west coast of Africa, all of which once belonged to Portugal, the next of her colonies encountered is that which consists of the two volcanic islands of São Thomé and Principe, lying in the Gulf of Guinea. In spite of their small size — 372 square miles — they contain some 60,000 inhabitants. Only slightly more than a thousand of these are whites; the rest are negroes imported from the mainland to work the plantations under

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conditions closely approximating slavery. The soil of the islands is extremely fertile, and due to the wide range in altitude there flourish in close proximity such varied products as cacao, coffee and cinchona. The coffee and cinchona, from which quinine is made, have never been important; but up to the time of the World War the cacao plantations were very profitable, both to their owners and to the Portuguese Government. In 1913 these islands produced more than one-sixth of the world's cacao. At present they have been completely outstripped by new competitors, such as the Gold Coast. Still, to a nation desperately desirous of tropical territories they might appear quite valuable, not only for their produce but because their geographic position makes them admirably suited to serve as a starting point for further economic, and perhaps political, expansion in the Bight of Africa. Neither France nor Britain has any motive for rejoicing at this prospect.

Until a generation or so ago, the principal use of Angola, as far as the Portuguese were concerned, was to supply São Thomé and Brazil with cheap labor. Indeed, for at least two centuries slaves constituted the principal export of Portugal's West African possessions; no thought was given to utilizing the land's rich resources, or even to its exploration. But values have changed; and today Angola, with its 487,000 square miles and three million inhabitants, is one of Portugal's two most promising colonies. In one respect it is unique among her African possessions: it has an extensive plateau where, it has been hoped, a large number of European colonists might eventually be placed. For this very reason German and Italian colonial experts (*inter alia*) have turned their eyes in that direction. However, according to Otto Jessen's recent work, "Reisen und Forschungen in Angola," it now seems doubtful whether the Angolan plateau is really adapted to settlement by North Europeans. Colonization by South Europeans would seem less difficult, and since one of Portugal's greatest exports is emigrants, one may well ask why there is not a steady stream of them going to Angola. The obvious answer is that the very poverty which drives these folk from the homeland precludes their going to an undeveloped region where above all else capital is required before colonization can be successful. Americans tend to forget that the conditions which made it possible for their forebears to homestead their way across the continent are wholly lacking in Africa. Statistics show that at present there are in Angola only 60,000 whites, including many half-castes, and that these are concentrated in the larger centers. It is fairly safe to say that Angola's undoubtedly rich potentialities in the production of wheat, sugar, tobacco, cacao, palm oil, rubber, cotton, cattle and many other crops for which its varied climate and soil are well suited, will have to be exploited by European-managed plantations and native labor rather than by small white farmers. If what the Germans want primarily is tropical produce, here they can get it in abundance; they cannot, however, expect to find in Angola any appreciable relief for their population problem.

There are today a number of German ranch and plantation owners in Angola; but, as we would expect, it is the British who have invested most heavily. Indeed the British have a large financial stake in practically all of the Portuguese colonies, their total investments therein have been estimated at no less than £25,000,000. In Angola one of their most valuable properties is the newly completed Benguella Railway which serves as an outlet for landlocked North-

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ern Rhodesia as well as the southern part of the Belgian Congo. It is worthy of note that both of the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, and the Transvaal find their easiest access to the sea through Portuguese colonies.

Angola possesses, so far as is now known, little mineral wealth. But her pastoral and agricultural possibilities are such that she may rightly be considered a rich prize for any colonial Power. That Portugal is unable to develop these riches by her own efforts goes without saying. Yet she imposes all sorts of vexatious regulations to favor her home industries and merchant marine (in which, again, British capital is heavily invested).

In Mozambique we find exemplified in acute form some of the most serious shortcomings of Portuguese colonial policy. Its area (300,000 square miles) is smaller than Angola, but its 4,000,000 inhabitants (of whom 35,000 are classed as whites) make it Portugal's most populous colony. The country is potentially rich in most of the tropical and sub-tropical products, while the altitude of certain regions is high enough to permit the growing of wheat and the raising of cattle. As in other Portuguese colonies, there are no notable mineral resources, though a more thorough exploration might disclose deposits now unsuspected. Mozambique is too large and too distant for Portugal to make any pretense that it can live by its trade with the mother country alone. The presence of Britain's prosperous South African possessions next door has made the slow rate of Mozambique's development all the more evident. Here, then, more than in any of her other colonies has Portugal felt obliged to make vigorous efforts to set up at least a façade of activity.

In view of her own shortage of capital and her lack of talent for exploiting backward regions, Portugal some time ago resorted to the device of the chartered company. Foreign capital and technical supervision were attracted by this means, in spite of the unfavorable political conditions prevailing in Mozambique. At the turn of the century there were three such companies exercising governmental functions there. Whatever progress the colony has made has been largely due to these companies and to the British railways which have developed the ports of Lourenço Marques and Beira as the outlets for the Union of South Africa, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. At present only one of these companies (the Companhia de Moçambique) continues to exercise governmental powers, and its charter expires in 1941. The colonial reorganization being effected by the present dictatorship will undoubtedly make for greater administrative efficiency. At the same time, its restrictive economic policy seems to be making more pronounced the stagnation of the colony's farming and commerce, and consequently to be lowering still further the standard of living.

Portugal's fear that her hold on Mozambique is becoming more tenuous is, then, not without justification. Britain and the Union of South Africa might consider themselves heirs apparent. In that case, both may be expected to oppose the transfer to any other Power of the ports on which so much of their trade depends. The most that they might concede to Germany — and this only under severe pressure — would be a slice along the colony's northern edge.

In the Far East only fragments remain of Portugal's once magnificent empire. On the west coast of India she has retained three small enclaves (Gôa, Damão and Diu), with an area of 1,637 square miles and a population of around 600,000. The economic activity of these districts is derived largely from the

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transit trade; in themselves they originate very little commerce. Portugal's hold on them naturally rests on Britain's sufferance, and it would be difficult to conceive of the latter's permitting them to pass to a third Power.

The oldest European outpost in China is that of the Portuguese at Macao. This city is located on a peninsula and several islands at the mouth of the Pearl River opposite Hong Kong; the total area is 11 square miles and the population is 160,000 (of whom all but about 4,000 are Chinese). With its free port, Macao is a local distributing center; its importance, however, has declined proportionately as that of Hong Kong has risen. The Portuguese themselves are very little interested in the conduct of trade, most of which is in the hands of the Chinese. Though Macao was first settled by the Portuguese in 1557, it was not until 1887 that China recognized Portugal's sovereignty; in return the latter has promised not to alienate it without China's consent. Rumors about the possibility of its changing hands usually mention Japan rather than Germany as the beneficiary. The possession of Macao would be very useful in furthering Japanese expansion southward. The British — as well as the French, the Dutch and the Filipinos — would naturally much prefer to have the place remain under the control of a relatively weak power like Portugal than to see it fall to Japan.

The only Portuguese colony yet to be mentioned is that consisting of the eastern portion of Timor, an island in the East Indies between Celebes and Australia. Despite having an area of 7,300 square miles and a population of nearly half a million, Portuguese Timor is singularly undeveloped economically, due somewhat to the small amount of cultivable soil. A land-hungry Power might nevertheless find it a partial answer to its prayers for tropical raw materials. It could also serve as a base for commercial, and perhaps political, expansion in Australia. Neither England nor the Netherlands can view with equanimity such a possibility, as was recently demonstrated by the prompt and unfavorable reaction in British and Dutch newspapers to the report that Tokio and Berlin had divided the Netherlands East Indies into prospective spheres of influence.

III

From this brief survey of the Portuguese colonial empire what conclusions can we draw? In the first place, Portugal lacks the capital, the man power and the energy to develop her colonies. This does not necessarily give other Powers a moral, much less a legal, right to appropriate them. When, however, the time comes to discuss Sir Samuel Hoare's vague suggestions for a wider distribution of access to the world's raw materials, Portugal will find it difficult to prove that she herself needs or is able fully to utilize the resources of her extensive colonial domain.

In the second place, the Portuguese colonies evidently fulfil many of the specifications drawn up by German expansionists for their prospective overseas empire. The agricultural resources of these regions are very extensive; they now appear deficient in minerals, but systematic exploration may uncover riches so far unknown. In German hands they would give rise to a considerable volume of trade, carried largely in German bottoms. But all of these activities, including the building and upkeep of a large navy to protect them, would de-

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mand the investment of much capital before they could become profitable. Is Germany in any position to sink large quantities of capital in colonial enterprises? The answer, for the time being at any rate, would seem to be clearly in the negative. Furthermore, is it not evident that for climatic reasons Portugal's colonies can in only very small part serve as an outlet for Germany's surplus population? In this respect they are comparable with Germany's prewar possessions. Officials, overseers, entrepreneurs, technicians, professional men, missionaries, and the like could be absorbed in small numbers — just as they are in Britain's and France's tropical colonies. But mass emigration to them by workers and peasants is out of the question.

The third general conclusion is that Great Britain has excellent motives for opposing a change in the ownership of the Portuguese colonies. The intensity of the sentiments she might feel varies, depending on what colony is in question. She might, in order to conjure greater perils, go so far as to share some of them with Germany. But such an action would come only as a last resort, for it must be borne in mind that those colonies line the oceanic route to India and Australia. To permit them to pass to a strong naval Power would endanger the safety of that route and might lead to the destruction of Britain's supremacy in the Indian Ocean, the only sea where she is still undisputedly supreme. Having had to share the Atlantic with the United States, the Pacific with both the United States and Japan, the Mediterranean with Italy (always assuming that the French Navy will be at hand, benevolently neutral), Britain may be depended upon to guard all the more jealously her hegemony in the Indian Ocean. This is why she is strengthening her naval stations all the way from Simonstown (Cape of Good Hope) through Mauritius, Aden, and Trincomalee to Rangoon, Singapore, Darwin and King George Sound. Anxiety lest the Italian possession of Ethiopia establish Italy too firmly on the shores of the Indian Ocean was one of the primary motives for British opposition to Mussolini's invasion of that country. Except for this Italian foothold, the only European nations with territories washed by the Indian Ocean are those on whose continued friendship Britain has fair reason to count: France, the Netherlands and Portugal. To prevent other aggressive Powers from encroaching upon that preserve the British and some of the Dominion governments may be expected to go to considerable lengths.

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JAPAN'S TRADE WITH THE NETHERLANDS INDIES

By John C. Le Clair

JAPAN'S economic and political expansion southward is bringing her ever closer to the Netherlands East Indies. These islands, with a native population of some sixty-five millions, form one of the richest of all colonial domains; yet it is held by a nation which is one of the weakest, militarily speaking, in Europe. There may be no truth in recent reports that Japan and Germany have divided these islands into prospective spheres of influence. But that such rumors can be given credence in responsible quarters is evidence that the extent of Japanese economic penetration there is of political importance.

In terms of world trade the productivity of the Dutch East Indian empire, including as it does the islands of Sumatra, Borneo, Java, Dutch Guinea, Madura and Celebes, is enormous. Here is produced 99 percent of the world's supply of quinine, 50 percent of its wrapped tobacco, 20 percent of its copra and tin, and 11 percent of its petroleum. It has also been estimated that at the present rate of demand these islands could supply practically the entire rubber market. In addition, they export one-eighth of the world's tea requirements, some 80,000 tons of coffee annually, and much palm oil and sisal. They are also the principal source of such gums as benjamin and dammar, and of citronella, patchouli, lemon grass, and cajeput oils. Finally, they provide a good part of the world's rattan and large quantities of cloves, cinnamon, pepper and other spices.

For the present, Japanese penetration in this tropical empire is economic rather than political. Although Dutch colonial rule is one of iron, this is not altogether apparent to the native population, which for the moment appears to have small liking for the Japanese. The Dutch therefore have little fear that any project of these to secure the ownership of the islands will receive native support. But there is sentiment in favor of the idea of an independent native empire; and possibly Japanese strategy contemplates encouraging it at some future time. For the time being, Japan's weapon of penetration is trade, and during recent years her exports to the islands have made such headway that the Netherlands Government has had to try to stem the tide by the imposition of quota restrictions as well as by other measures.

In their competition with the Dutch the Japanese possess the advantages of low production costs, very favorable freight rates, and proximity to the market. In addition, the fall of the yen since 1931 has helped Japan to maintain her trade superiority, as is evidenced by the fact that although the total quantity of Japanese exports to the Netherlands Indies increased from 301,000 tons in 1931 to 304,000 tons in 1932, their value decreased from 93 to 78 millions of gulden — a drop of approximately 15 percent.

During the early years of world depression, when the total trade of the islands fell off some 69 percent, the Dutch were not averse to admitting the low-cost Japanese products into their markets. In that way the native population, whose condition had become particularly bad as a result of the falling off of the export trade, were less conscious of the drop in their wages. The official

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Dutch policy was doubtless based on the theory that Japanese trade was preferable to native discontent. Complaints from export industries at home and from Parliament were ignored — a situation made possible by the fact that the island authorities are answerable only to the Queen.

As a result of this policy Japan's influence in the Netherlands Indies import trade increased considerably. During the period 1909–1913 Japan's share of it had been 1.25 percent; her share had increased to about 10 percent during the period 1914–1918; but from that time until 1929 there had been no great change. Thereafter, however, Japan's exports to the Netherlands Indies began to increase rapidly at the expense of the mother country, as reflected in the following table showing the shares of the two countries in the colony's total imports during the period 1928–1934:

	1928	*1929*	*1930*	*1931*	*1932*	*1933*	*1934*
Netherlands	20.05	19.62	18.92	17.44	15.76	12.37	12.98
Japan	9.54	10.55	11.68	21.24	21.24	31.03	31.88

In value, Japan's exports to the Netherlands Indies increased from 73,414,177 yen in 1928 to 158,450,525 yen in 1934. If we take into consideration the fall in value of the yen in the interim, we can get an idea of the extent of the control Japan has come to exercise over the imports of the islands. By 1934, indeed, the islands had come to occupy fourth place among Japan's export markets.

By 1933 a part of the purchasing power of the Netherlands Indies had been restored, and the Colonial Government began to grow alarmed at the continued encroachments of Japanese trade. Under the general heading "Crisis Import Ordinance," it imposed restrictions on various commodities. Still further protection was given the manufacturers of the Netherlands in 1934 by restrictive measures against the importation of rice, beer, multi-colored cotton woven textiles, cast-iron frying pans, bleached cotton goods, and cement. In 1935 these restrictions were again extended to cover a wide range of new commodities including practically all types of textiles and many iron and steel products. In this year the commodities subject to restriction constituted about 40 percent of the total value of all imports. Complete figures as to the results of these restrictions are not as yet available in all cases, but it is interesting to note that in the case of cotton goods, imports from the Netherlands rose in value from 4,514,000 to 5,819,000 gulden during the years 1933–1934, while those from Japan fell from 47,719,000 to 36,625,000. Dutch statistics indicated a pronounced trend during 1935 in favor of the Netherlands as against Japan, especially in the case of bleached cotton goods.

The Japanese Government has attempted to secure a revision of the existing limitations imposed by the Netherlands Government and in the case of porcelains did arrange a suspension of import restrictions in August 1934. Trade negotiations between the two countries opened at Batavia on June 8, 1934, but they were adjourned at the end of the year without any general agreement having been reached. They have recently been resumed, and possibly some adjustment will be worked out, for Japan is also a heavy customer of the Netherlands Indies. She depends on them, for example, for half of her oil imports.

Regardless of Dutch import barriers and intermittent trade parleys, we shall probably see Japan continue to include the Netherlands Indies in the ever widening orbit of her expansionist activities. For the present, these activities

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are confined to the economic sphere. If in different conditions they assumed a political character, how could the Netherlands protect their possessions? On whom could they rely for assistance? They might hope that Great Britain would play the rôle of rescuer. That the British are aware of the danger threatening them in this quarter seems to be shown by the speed with which they have completed the great naval base at Singapore. They are concerned by many of Japan's activities and projects along the mainland of Asia and in the southern Pacific, by her economic invasion of India, the Malay States and Australia, by her rumored desire to purchase Macao from Portugal, and by the plan to construct a canal through Siamese territory that will permit her to enter the Indian Ocean without passing the fortifications at Singapore. The strategic importance of the Dutch insular possessions to Great Britain is plain. Today as never before the Dutch feel that they can look forward with assurance to British support in the event that their hold on the Indies comes directly into jeopardy.

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THE BALEARIC ISLANDS IN MEDITERRANEAN STRATEGY

THE Balearic Islands, for centuries an important factor in the strategy of the Mediterranean, are again in the public eye as a result of recent brusque changes in the equilibrium of Mediterranean forces resulting from the Italian conquest of Ethiopia and the military revolt in Spain.

The islands are unimportant economically. Their area is less than 2,000 square miles and the population is only about 350,000. They have no valuable mineral resources; and their fruits and vegetables, though they would be useful in a minor way to northern powers like Great Britain or Germany, would certainly not be worth fighting for. They are interesting internationally because their naval ports dominate the sea-routes between France and French North Africa and the British imperial route to India via Gibraltar, Malta and Suez.



England was in possession of Minorca, the easternmost of the Balearics, during most of the eighteenth century; but she was there purely for reasons of strategy. Port Mahon, the chief city of Minorca, has a spacious and easily defensible harbor. Its surrender in 1803 nevertheless represented no great loss to England, since by that time British interest in the eastern Mediterranean had made Malta, captured in 1799, a better base. With the exception of this British interlude at Minorca, the Balearics have, since the Moors were driven out in the Middle Ages, followed the fortunes of Catalonia, first under the kings of Aragon, later as part of united Spain. The leaders of the separatist movement at Barcelona always include the islands in their plans for a "Greater Catalonia." And, indeed, Catalan is the language commonly spoken by the inhab-

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itants. Despite this fact, the islands were not included when the Spanish Republic set up an autonomous Catalonia.

The position of the Balearics athwart France's communications with her North African possessions makes it important that they remain in friendly hands and accounts for the constant efforts of the French Government to cultivate the good will of Spain. For similar motives — to protect the route to India — the British have opposed the alienation of the Balearics from Spain. It is generally believed that at the outbreak of the World War, London had an agreement with Madrid whereby the British Navy was to be permitted to use Port Mahon as a naval base in the event Italy joined the war on the side of the Central Powers. Some years later, consternation was created in Paris by a report, never confirmed, that Primo de Rivera had granted Mussolini the right, in certain specified contingencies, to utilize the islands as a base. Obviously any such agreement lapsed when the Spanish Republic was established in 1931. The Spanish Government has been fully aware of the strategic importance of the Balearics, as evidenced by its efforts in recent years to strengthen their defenses. Not the least active in this work was Gil Robles, Minister of War in 1935, one of the leaders of the present Spanish revolt.

The rapid rise of Fascist Italy as a naval and military power is chiefly responsible for the present interest in the Balearics. Britain has already been humiliated by Mussolini's bold behavior in the Ethiopian affair, and she can no longer regard her short route to India as safe. France's free access to her granary and reservoir of man power in North Africa would be put in complete jeopardy were the Italians to obtain rights to employ one or more of the islands as air and naval bases.

Even under present conditions the western Mediterranean is largely at the mercy of the Italian warships and airplanes based on La Spezia, La Maddalena and other fortified places. If Italy obtained a foothold in the Balearics, France would be forced to depend on the roundabout Atlantic route for her wartime communications with North Africa. As a matter of fact, this danger would exist for France in case a Fascist government were established in Spain regardless of whether or not Italy secured any outright concessions in the islands, for the French could be quite certain that upon the outbreak of war between themselves and the Italians a Fascist Spain would allow Fascist Italy the use of Port Mahon, Palma and other Balearic ports. In other words, there would be a repetition of the present situation in which Italian officers—"Italian volunteers" Foreign Minister Eden described them in the House of Commons on November 30 — seem to have taken over control of the Balearics, unofficially but none the less effectively.

Responsible leaders of the Spanish rebel movement have repudiated the charge that they have promised to cede the Balearics to Italy, or to anyone else. In view of the intense national pride of the Spanish people — the wall against which Napoleon beat in vain — it would seem very doubtful whether any régime, regardless of what it might have felt compelled to promise in advance, could actually surrender any part of the national patrimony and remain long in power. It might grant certain foreign Powers military, naval or aërial privileges, and in time of war these could prove very valuable; but it hardly could go further.

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GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS ABROAD. By HENRY RUSSELL SPENCER. New York: Holt, 1936, 558 p. $3.75.

A handy reference book on the organization of political life in Britain, France, Soviet Russia, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, the Succession States, Latin America and Japan. Better on the morphology of government than on its dynamics.

ANARCHIE OU HIÉRARCHIE. By SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française, 1936, 222 p. Fr. 12.

A well-known Spanish scholar subjects democracy to critical examination and discovers that it has become sadly corrupted. To correct this we must alter our theory of the state so that it becomes a social system in which the individual is permitted freely to develop his own personality. For the attainment of this end, Señor de Madariaga suggests changes in the democratic system, such as conferring greater economic power on the central government.

"WE OR THEY": TWO WORLDS IN CONFLICT. By HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 106 p. $1.50.

The author describes the abyss both in ideology and practice existing between the democratic governments and the dictatorships, alike of the right and of the left; discusses the current foreign policies of the leading Powers as a result of this division, which he considers irreconcilable; and states the conditions in which he believes the democracies can defend themselves successfully.

WORLD POLITICS 1918–1936. By R. PALME DUTT. New York: Random House, 1936, 389 p. $2.50.

A Marxist interpretation of nearly two decades of history. Its distressing conclusions will not make pleasant reading for idealists or liberals.

INTELLIGENCE IN POLITICS. By MAX ASCOLI. New York: Norton, 1936, 280 p. $2.50.

A professor in the graduate faculty of the New School for Social Research seeks to discover to what extent democracy under contemporary conditions is compatible with intellectual activities.

VITAL PEACE: A STUDY OF RISKS. By HENRY WICKHAM STEED. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 346 p. $2.75.

The veteran English journalist is principally occupied in this book with stating the causes of war, the case for and against war, and his explanation of the failure of the peace movements. His program for appeasement is not very convincing.

THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE. By SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS. London: Gollancz, 1936, 287 p. 7/6.

The leader of the left wing of the British Labor Party finds the present competitive

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system between capitalist states to be the primary cause of war. His plan for removing this cause is nebulous.

PREFACE TO CHAOS: WAR IN THE MAKING. By C. Hartley Grattan. New York: Dodge, 1936, 341 p. $3.00.

The author of the insufficiently appreciated "Why We Fought" diagnoses the social and economic diseases that in his view must lead to another universal holocaust. He makes tentative predictions regarding the conditions in which the "post-next-war" revolutions will leave the large nations.

NEUTRALITY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY. By Sir Alfred Zimmern and others. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936, 277 p. $2.50.

Harris Foundation Lectures delivered at the University of Chicago in June 1936 by Zimmern, Ambassador Dodd, Charles Warren and Professor E. D. Dickinson, with an appendix of documents on the Ethiopian War.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND WORLD ORDER. By Georg Schwarzenberger. London: Constable, 1936, 191 p. 6/.

A plan for making the League sufficiently universal to insure peace.

THE FUTURE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Royal Institute of Internationa Affairs. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 188 p. $1.00.

A discussion at Chatham House by men of many shades of opinion who naturally failed to agree on any one solution.

THE PRIVATE MANUFACTURE OF ARMAMENTS. Volume I. By Philip Noel-Baker. London: Gollancz, 1936, 274 p. 18/.

The author was for some time associated with Arthur Henderson in the work of the Disarmament Conference. Though he defers to the second volume his major conclusions, which are in part based on the findings of the Nye Committee and the British Royal Commission, he has nevertheless made his thesis clear in this book. He arraigns the private manufacture of arms as the principal factor in the creation of the huge armaments, which, he holds, necessarily lead to war.

LA GUERRE DEVANT LA SCIENCE ET LA RELIGION. By James Pointe. Paris: Courrier Politique, Littéraire et Social, 1936, Fr. 10.

How the ends for which wars are fought may be attained by peaceful means. A book approved by high French churchmen.

I FOUND NO PEACE. By Webb Miller. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1936, 345 p. $3.00.

The saga of a correspondent who during the last twenty years usually turned up wherever there was any wholesale shooting.

ORGANISATION POLITIQUE ET ADMINISTRATIVE DES COLONIES. Brussels: Etablissements Généraux d'Imprimerie, 1936, 533 p. 25 belgas.

Contributions by various authors on the colonial administrations of Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Great Britain.

THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1936. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 260 p. $5.50.

The seventeenth annual volume of this authoritative collection of individual monographs on timely questions.

GESCHICHTE DES VÖLKERRECHTS. By Arthur Wegner. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1936, 362, xxxvi p. M. 24.

Thorough scholarship from the German nationalist angle, with enlightening excursions into the domain of diplomatic history.

THE LAW OF PEACE. By C. Van Vollenhoven. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 261 p. $3.75.

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A painstaking effort to demonstrate that slowly but surely the law of peace is becoming stronger than the law of war, with concrete proposals for furthering that evolution.

JUSTICE AND EQUITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE. By Norman Bentwich and others. London: Constable, 1936, 59 p. 4/6.

Five essays concerning a proposed international court of equity.

PORTÉE INTERNATIONALE DES LOIS INTERDISANT LA CLAUSE-OR. By Jacqueline Reiss. Paris: Sirey, 1936, 223 p. Fr. 25.

An important financial problem subjected to a painstaking, juridical analysis.

HISTORICAL BIBLIOGRAPHIES. By Edith M. Coulter and Melanie Gerstenfeld. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1935, 206 p. $2.50.

A useful annotated guide arranged by countries.

General: Economic and Social

WORLD TRADE AND ITS FUTURE. By Sir Arthur Salter. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936, 101 p. $1.50.

A bird's-eye view of world trade since the war with a diagnosis of present ills and suggestions for future remedies.

EXCHANGE DEPRECIATION. By S. E. Harris. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936, 516 p. $5.00.

An evaluation of the effects of exchange depreciation since 1931, with particular attention to Great Britain and the United States.

RUBBER. By Howard Wolf and Ralph Wolf. New York: Covici Friede, 1936, 533 p. $4.25.

A chemist and a journalist follow the rise of a great modern industry through its romance and its sordidness.

DIE MINERALISCHEN BODENSCHÄTZE ALS WELTPOLITISCHE UND MILITÄRISCHE MACHTFAKTOREN. By Ferdinand Friedensburg. Stuttgart: Enke Verlag, 1936, 260 p. M. 16.

A solid study supported by a wealth of statistical material and accompanied by useful tables, graphs and a bibliography.

DIE LUFTWEGE DER ERDE. POLITISCHE GEOGRAPHIE DES WELTLUFTVERKEHRS. By Walther Pahl. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1936, 128 p. M. 3.80.

A useful reference work on the political geography of the world's air lines, amplified by 25 maps.

DIE ÖSTERREICHISCHE VÖLKERBUNDANLEIHE. By Arpad Plesch and Martin Domke. Zürich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1936, 143 p.

A case study in the League's financial aid to a small power.

WORLD POPULATION. PAST GROWTH AND PRESENT TRENDS. By A. M. Carr-Saunders. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 336 p. $4.50.

A scientific but non-technical discussion of the trends in migration, death and birth rates, racial fertility and kindred problems throughout the world, illustrated by 60 charts and tables. The author is an eminent English authority.

EUROPEAN TRADE UNIONISM AND POLITICS. By Franz Neumann. New York: League for Industrial Democracy, 1936, 65 p. 25 cents.

A useful and concise historical summary.

PROBLÈME DE LA RENAISSANCE JUIVE. By Joshua Buchmil. Jerusalem: Imprimerie Goldberg, 1936, 342 p.

An authoritative statement of the history and achievements of Jewish Nationalism.

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THE MIDDLE CLASSES THEN AND NOW. By Franklin C. Palm. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 421 p. $3.50.

The author does not see a very bright future for the middle classes — that 30 percent of the population which lives partly by its own labor and partly by its invested capital — but at least he provides them with an important place in modern history.

International Relations of the United States

A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Samuel Flagg Bemis. New York: Holt, 1936, 881 p. $5.00.

This scholarly study, the result of patient research, is the most comprehensive single volume on the subject. The emphasis is naturally on the recent period — half the book dealing with the last forty years. Professor Bemis does not hesitate to pronounce judgment on what he considers mistakes of American statesmanship. There are numerous well-designed maps.

WHY WE WENT TO WAR. By Newton D. Baker. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. New York: Harper, 1936, 199 p. $1.50.

After examining the pertinent documents and consulting his own recollections, President Wilson's Secretary of War comes to the conclusion that it was the unrestricted U-boat campaign, and not the activity of bankers or munition makers or propagandists, that was responsible for the entry of the United States into the World War. His argument is closely reasoned and his style limpid. Not everyone may accept Mr. Baker's interpretation, nor his suggestions as to how the United States can avoid being embroiled in future conflicts, but no one can afford to ignore so sincere and thorough a book. The study, which appeared originally in these pages, is now published in book form with an appendix of documents and a bibliography.

PRE-WAR YEARS 1913–1917. By Frederic L. Paxson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1936, 427 p. $3.75.

The author of the "History of the American Frontier" turns to the first Wilson Administration. Though for America this was nominally a period of peace, the existence of the Great War in Europe during three of the four years causes the author to emphasize the problems of our neutrality. His explanation of America's entry into the war approaches the Seymour and Baker thesis, with its stress on the submarine, rather than that of Millis and Grattan. Political events throughout receive proportionately more attention than social or cultural matters.

THE LETTERS AND JOURNAL OF BRAND WHITLOCK. Edited by Allan Nevins. New York: Appleton-Century, 1936, 2 v., 597 p., 732 p. $10.00.

The memoirs of America's wartime representative in Belgium are very readable. The Journal, covering the years 1914–1921, is concerned principally with the war and its aftermath. The Letters — dealing largely with literature, municipal politics, the progressive movement in America, and travel — go from 1894 to the year of his death, 1934. The Journal is particularly valuable for its frank account of the work of the Commission for Relief in Belgium.

HALF WAY WITH ROOSEVELT. By Ernest K. Lindley. New York: Viking, 1936, 426 p. $2.75.

The author has been in continual contact with Mr. Roosevelt since he became governor of New York. Though he is on the staff of a Republican newspaper, his admiration for the President, already mirrored in two previous books, persists. This volume, with its clarity and detachment, is journalism at its best.

FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES IN THE UNITED STATES. By E. A. Radice. London: Oxford University Press, 1936, 74 p. 3/6.

A brief but penetrating outline of America's constitutional and administrative problems, primarily for British consumption.

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A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY. By Captain Dudley W. Knox. New York: Putnam, 1936, 481 p. $5.00.

A comprehensive narrative by a captain in the United States Navy.

AMERICA'S STAKE IN THE FAR EAST. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1936, 39 p. 40 cents.

A brief answer to the question: What is the Orient worth economically to the United States?

THE ABROGATION OF THE GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT. By Rodman W. Paul. Cambridge: Phi Beta Kappa Society, 1936, 117 p. $1.25.

A Harvard Phi Beta Kappa prize essay on an important aspect in American Pacific policy.

WHY QUIT OUR OWN? By George N. Peek with Samuel Crowther. New York: Van Nostrand, 1936, 353 p. 50 cents.

After his failure to convert the Administration to his views on foreign trade, Mr. Peek, with the collaboration of a well-known propagandist in behalf of autarchy, launches a bitter attack on the agricultural and tariff policies of the New Deal.

PICKING AMERICA'S POCKETS. By David L. Cohn. New York: Harper, 1936, 256 p. $2.75.

A dramatic and lucid analysis of the cost which America, particularly the cotton producers of the South, has had to pay for its tariff policy.

INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. By Ray Ovid Hall. New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1936, 230 p. $3.00.

Well-organized factual information regarding America's balance of trade.

HOW TO RUN A WAR. By Bruce Winton Knight. New York: Knopf, 1936, 243 p. $2.00.

A satirical book which is perhaps overdone and will probably only convert the converted, leaving the heathen for less subtle proselytizing. Nevertheless, the book is full of important facts and sound ideas.

IMMIGRATION AND ALIENS IN THE UNITED STATES. By Max James Kohler. New York: Bloch, 1936, 459 p. $3.00.

Political and legal essays on such problems as the right of asylum, racial discrimination, the registration and deportation of aliens, by an American lawyer long identified with the protection of immigrants.

THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT. By Ernest Sutherland Bates. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1936, 377 p. $3.00.

A chronicle of the major decisions rendered by the Court, projected against the background of the judges' personalities and the politics of the times.

BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL. By Alfred Lief. New York: Stackpole, 1936, 508 p. $3.00.

The career of a man who after acquiring fame as a courageous legal reformer became a justice of the Supreme Court.

RICH LAND POOR LAND. By Stuart Chase. New York: Whittlesey House, 1936, 361 p. $2.50.

A good book for rugged individualists to ponder. With his usual vividness, the author first traces the waste of America's natural resources and then outlines a program of national planning whereby further damage can be minimized.

MAINLAND. By Gilbert Seldes. New York: Scribner, 1936, 443 p. $3.00.

A polemic in defense of the American way of life against the "treason" of the intellectuals and European influences in general; of the West against the East; and of the common man against the "better classes."

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The World War

DOCUMENTS DIPLOMATIQUES FRANÇAIS. Series III, Volume XI. Paris: Costes, 1936, 646 p.

An important volume covering the crucial days between July 24 and August 4, 1914.

THE WAR IN OUTLINE. By Liddell Hart. New York: Random House, 1936, 285 p. $2.00.

Probably the best brief history of the war in both its political and military aspects. Well proportioned and well knit, Captain Liddell Hart's narrative never loses sight of the forest for the trees. One has the impression on finishing it that the war would have lasted indefinitely had the material resources of the belligerent nations been commensurate with the stupidity of some of their generals.

HISTOIRE DE LA GRANDE GUERRE. By Henry Bidou. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française, 1936, 694 p. Fr. 70.

A readable and impartial summary, with some fifty colored maps.

AIR POWER AND ARMIES. By J. C. Slessor. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 231 p. $4.00.

A detailed history of aviation in the Great War and a consideration of what lessons useful in the next great war may be drawn therefrom. The author is an officer in the British Air Service. A large map of the western front is pocketed on the rear cover.

THE WAR OF THE GUNS. By Aubrey Wade. New York: Scribner, 1936, 142 p. $3.00.

Neither the text nor the pictures in this tale of artillery warfare leave much to the imagination.

WAR MEMOIRS OF DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, Volume V, 1917–1918. Boston: Little, Brown, 1936, 464 p. $3.00.

This book is reviewed in an article by Colonel Conger in this issue.

HAIG. Volume II. By Duff Cooper. Toronto: Macmillan, 1936, 484 p. $7.50.

The second half of the authorized biography, by the present British Minister of War. A great deal of space is given to an account of the Passchendaele offensive.

HAIG: A BIOGRAPHY. By Duff Cooper. Garden City: Doubleday, 1936, 381 p. $4.00.

This is the abridged American edition. It is essentially a war story, for little attention is devoted either to Haig's prewar or postwar years, which is just as well since he seems to have been a singularly uninteresting person.

LE COMMANDEMENT DES GÉNÉRAUX NIVELLE ET PÉTAIN. By General Hellot. Paris: Payot, 1936, 320 p. Fr. 25.

This third volume in the "Histoire de la Guerre Mondiale" covers the year 1917.

ARMÉES FRANÇAISES DANS LA GRANDE GUERRE. Volume IV, part III. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1936, 4 v., Fr. 470.

A new addition to the official French history, consisting of three volumes and a carton of maps. It covers the end of the battle of the Somme and the first Verdun offensive (September–December 1916).

THE NATION AT WAR. By General Ludendorff. London: Hutchinson, 1936, 189 p. 8/6.

A rather illogical exposition of "totalitarian warfare," chiefly important because it reveals the military philosophy of the "brains" behind Hindenburg.

DAS UNBEKANNTE HEER. FRAUEN KÄMPFEN FÜR DEUTSCHLAND, 1914–1918. By Marie-Elisabeth Lüders. Berlin: Mittler, 1936, 236 p. M. 5.50.

A comprehensive history based on an examination of official sources.

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L'ESERCITO ITALIANO NELLA GRANDE GUERRA (1915–1918). Volume III. Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1936, 3 parts, L. 75.

This latest installment of the official history of Italy's part in the World War covers the operations of 1916 and consists of two books, one of text and one of documents, and a carton containing 58 maps, schedules and tables.

KONSERVATIVE POLITIK IM LETZTEN JAHRZEHNT DES KAISERREICHS. Volume II. VON 1914–1918. By Graf Kuno Westarp. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1936, 720 p. M. 12.

Valuable for its information concerning Germany's wartime economy.

Western Europe

ENVIRONMENT AND NATION. By Griffith Taylor. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936, 571 p. $4.00.

A leading human geographer has in this sequel to his "Environment and Race" written a monumental treatise on the cultural geography of Europe. After placing the problem in its general historical setting, he takes up the countries individually, illustrating his points with a wealth of maps, diagrams and tables.

EUROPE SINCE 1914. By F. Lee Benns. New York: Crofts, 1936, 851 p. $5.00.

A standard authority expanded and brought up to date.

AND FEAR CAME. By John T. Whitaker. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 273 p. $2.50.

A correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune* records his impressions of a Europe where in the last few years he has watched the illusion of peace fade.

INSIDE EUROPE. By John Gunther. New York: Harper, 1936, 468 p. $3.50.

A revised edition of a highly successful conspectus of European politics and politicians, including new sections on France that are especially good.

EUROPE IN CRISIS: THE POLITICAL DRAMA IN WESTERN EUROPE. By R. B. Mowat. London: Arrowsmith, 1936, 120 p. 3/6.

A diplomatic historian presents a frankly pro-German point of view.

MAJOR CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE SINCE 1930. By William Bennett Munro. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 68 p. 40 cents.

A convenient reference work with bibliographical notes.

LOCARNO. Edited by F. J. Berber. London: Hodge, 1936, 405 p. 12/6.

A handy collection of documents (treaties, correspondence, speeches, interviews, communiqués, etc.) for the period between 1919 and 1936, compiled by the director of the research department of the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik.

DER NEUE FRANKO-RUSSISCHE ZWEIBUND IM LICHTE FRANZÖSISCHER VORKRIEGSAKTEN. By Bernhard Schwertfeger. Potsdam: Athenaion, 1936, 70 p. M. 1.

The present alliance compared with its counterpart in the early nineties.

PAUL PAINLEVÉ: PAROLES ET ÉCRITS. Paris: Rieder, 1936, 627 p. Fr. 20.

Selected addresses, lectures, and articles by one of the outstanding statesmen of the Third Republic.

LA FRANCE NE SERA PAS UN PAYS D'ESCLAVES. By Jacques Doriot. Paris: Les Oeuvres Françaises, 1936, 154 p. Fr. 6.

The program of one of the leaders of French fascism, former communist mayor of St. Denis.

MISÈRE OU PROSPÉRITÉ PAYSANNE? By René Dumont. Paris: Fustier, 1936, 192 p. Fr. 8.

The author maintains that the way to remedy France's agricultural overproduction is not by crop destruction but by important social reforms.

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L'AGRICULTURE FRANÇAISE: SON TRAGIQUE DÉCLIN, SON AVENIR. By Marcel Braibant. Paris: Colin, 1936, 201 p. Fr. 10.

The writer believes French agriculture to be definitely on the downgrade in spite of occasional periods of euphoria. He offers no panacea; remedies must vary according to the product and the moment of their application.

BURGOMASTER MAX. By Oscar E. Millard. London: Hutchinson, 1936, 287 p. 18/.

A biography of Brussels' famous war-time burgomaster.

NEDERLAND IN DE WERELD POLITIEK. By A. S. De Leeuw. Zeist: Torenkrans, 1936, 247 p.

A thoroughly documented history of Dutch foreign policy since the Boer War.

DENMARK — THE COÖPERATIVE WAY. By Frederic C. Howe. New York: Coward-McCann, 1936, 277 p. $2.50.

Denmark's middle way is the coöperative way and Mr. Howe shows that it has been eminently successful in preserving the standard of living of the Danish people.

WOODEN TITAN. By John W. Wheeler-Bennett. New York: Morrow, 1936, 490 p. $5.00.

Mr. Wheeler-Bennett has done more than merely debunk the Hindenburg myth by showing how unjustified is the curiously important place assigned the general-president in history; he has given us a profoundly satisfying synthesis of the last twenty years of German history. This can unqualifiedly be classed as one of the best books of the year.

HISTORY OF THE GERMAN REPUBLIC. By Arthur Rosenberg. London: Methuen, 1936, 350 p. 15/.

The author of "The Birth of the German Republic" carries his story down to 1930. The present work deserves praise, though it is not up to the standard of its predecessor, perhaps due in part to the absence of adequate sources.

MEMOIRS OF COUNT BERNSTORFF. New York: Random House, 1936, 383 p. $3.50.

This honest book adds little to the author's previous account of his years in Washington, though there is new light on his relations with certain American personalities. Its most important contributions concern Bernstorff's ambassadorship at Constantinople during the last part of the war, and his activities in the political life of the German Republic, particularly on behalf of the League and disarmament. This volume should be read by all who wish to understand the tragedy of postwar German democracy.

DIE DUITSCHE HERBEWAPENING. By Baron van Voorst tot Voorst. The Hague: Moorman, 1936, 108 p.

It is unfortunate that this informative book by a Dutch major-general is not available to more readers, since it contains a strikingly concrete appraisal of Germany's new army, the efficiency of which the author judges to be greater now than in 1914. He faces the possibility that his own country may be drawn into the next (and probably undeclared) war.

FIRES UNDERGROUND. By Heinz Liepmann. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1936, 300 p. $2.00.

An anti-Nazi journalist draws a breathtaking picture of the secret struggle waged by illegal organizations against the dictatorship during its early months.

DAS NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE DEUTSCHLAND UND DIE WISSENSCHAFT. By Bernhard Rust and Ernst Krieck. Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1936, 35 p. M. 1.50.

Funeral orations pronounced at the Heidelberg festivities over the grave of German scholarship by two high Nazi functionaries, one of them Minister of Education, the other Professor of Philosophy at Heidelberg University.

ILLINOIS

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VOLKS- UND WEHRKRAFT, KRIEG UND RASSE. By Friedrich Burgdörfer. Berlin: Metzner, 1936, 138 p. M. 2.70.

Germany's population problem in relation to her military policy realistically examined.

ARBEITSBESCHAFFUNG UND FINANZORDNUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND. By Karl Schiller. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1936, 177 p. M. 8.

A somewhat technical study concerning one of Nazi Germany's major internal problems.

ÖSTERREICH. ERBE UND SENDUNG IM DEUTSCHEN RAUM. Edited by Josef Nadler and Heinrich von Srbik. Salzburg, Leipzig: Pustet, 1936, 404 p. M. 5.70.

Sixteen authors discuss Austria's historical mission.

L'INDIVIDU ET L'ÉTAT DANS L'ÉVOLUTION CONSTITUTIONELLE DE LA SUISSE. By William E. Rappard. Zürich: Éditions Polygraphiques, 1936, 566 p. Fr. 60.

A scholarly and documented interpretation of modern Switzerland and its political changes, by the rector of the University of Geneva.

SUISSE: ORGANISATION POLITIQUE, ADMINISTRATIVE ET JUDICIAIRE DE LA CONFÉDÉRATION HELVÉTIQUE ET DE CHAQUE CANTON. By Alfred Silbernagel-Caloyanni. Paris: Sirey, 1936, 176 p. Fr. 50.

The anatomy of one of the world's few successful democracies by a former judge in the canton of Basle.

HAIL CAESAR. By David Darrah. Boston: Hale, Cushman and Flint, 1936, 337 p. $2.50.

When he was expelled from Italy in 1934 the author had been Rome correspondent of an American paper for seven years. His experiences illustrate the difficulties under which journalists labor in a dictatorship.

L'EMPIRE FASCISTE. By Marcel Prélot. Paris: Sirey, 1936, 258 p. Fr. 24.

One of the most intelligible pictures of the new corporative institutions of Fascist Italy.

L'ALTRA GUERRA: LE MATERIE PRIME E L'ITALIA. By G. de Florentiis. Milan: Bompiani, 1936, 292 p. L. 15.

An engineer estimates Italy's supply of the necessary raw materials. A valuable contribution on a question made crucial by the League's sanctions.

THE SPANISH TRAGEDY. By E. Allison Peers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 247 p. $2.50.

A moderate and on the whole impartial recital of the facts of Spanish history from the fall of Primo de Rivera to the accession of the Caballero ministry, by the professor of Spanish literature at the University of Liverpool.

SPAIN IN REVOLT. By Harry Gannes and Theodore Repard. New York: Knopf, 1936, 235 p. $2.00.

A lucid account of the background of the present military revolt, with particular attention to the social and economic forces in operation, the whole interpreted from the leftist viewpoint.

THE CIVIL WAR IN SPAIN. By Felix Morrow. New York: Pioneer Publishers, 1936, 64 p. 15 cents.

An extreme leftist interpretation.

KATALONIEN GEGEN KASTILIEN. ZUR INNERPOLITISCHEN PROBLEMATIK SPANIENS. By Anton Sieberer. Vienna: Saturnia-Verlag, 1936, 309 p. M. 6.

Concerning a problem that will continue to be troublesome no matter who wins the civil war.

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Eastern Europe

THE GREAT RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By Victor Chernov. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936, 466 p. $5.00.

The author, one of the founders of the Social Revolutionary Party, was a member of the Kerensky Provisional Government. He gives here an authoritative inside story of the failure of that government. Blame for the Bolshevik triumph is assigned in large part to the tactics of the moderates, men like Miliukov and Kerensky, of whom Chernov is perhaps too critical. The book has been admirably abridged and translated by Philip Mosely.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CAUSE OF PEACE. New York: International Publishers, 1936, 191 p. $1.75.

Statements and articles by Lenin, Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Tukhachevsky, and Litvinov, with an appendix of selected documents.

L'EXPÉRIENCE KERENSKI. By Alexandre Kerenski. Paris: Payot, 1936, 183 p. Fr. 15.

Many having seen fit to compare the historical rôle of the Blum ministry with that of the Kerensky régime of 1917, the chief of the latter has decided to place his actions once again in what he regards as the proper setting. His interpretation of the part played by the Soviets at that time is by no means orthodox.

ALS POLITISCHER GENERAL IM OSTEN. By Graf von der Goltz. Leipzig: Koehler, 1936, 173 p. M. 2.85.

This is a completely revised edition of a book originally published in 1920, by the commander of the German army operating in the Baltic countries during 1918–19. In the new version Count von der Goltz makes interesting revelations concerning an obscure chapter of war history.

MOSCOW ADMITS A CRITIC. By Sir Bernard Pares. New York: Nelson, 1936, 94 p. $1.00.

The foremost British authority on the history of Russia returns to that country after an absence of twenty years, during which he had been outspoken in his criticism of the Soviet régime. Still very critical, he nevertheless finds much to admire in the new Russia.

EINSAM KÄMPFT DAS WOLGALAND. EIN BERICHT AUS 7 JAHREN KRIEG UND REVOLUTION. By Georg Löbsack. Leipzig: Voigtländer, 1936, 403 p. M. 3.

A dramatic story of the sufferings of the German communities along the Volga during and after the war.

LETTLAND. DAS WERDEN UND WESEN EINER NEUEN VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT. By Reinhold Brenneisen. Berlin: Volk und Reich, 1936, 429 p. M. 10.

A useful survey, though based on figures somewhat out of date.

DIE AGRARISCHE ÜBERBEVÖLKERUNG POLENS. By Theodor Oberländer. Berlin: Volk und Reich, 1936, 125 p. M. 9.

Causes, manifestations and proposed cures.

THE PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE GERMAN-POLISH BORDERLANDS. By Ian F. D. Morrow assisted by L. M. Sieveking. New York: Oxford University Press, 1936, 558 p. $10.00.

This thorough study, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, examines the historical antecedents and the present status of one of Euroye's knottiest problems — the Polish Corridor.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE CRISIS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY. By Kamil Krofta. Prague: Orbis, 1936, 61 p. 1/.

A timely statement by the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia.

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EDUARD BENEŠ. DER MENSCH UND DER STAATSMANN. By Arthur Werner. Prague: Roland Verlag Morawitz, 1936, 246 p. Kč. 36.

The president of Czechoslovakia portrayed both as human being and as statesman.

TSCHECHOSLOWAKISCHE AUSSENPOLITIK. By Emil Strauss. Prague: Orbis, 1936, 164 p.

A substantial work on the development of Czechoslovakia's foreign policy.

IDEA ČESKOSLOVENSKÉHO STÁTU. Edited by Jan Kapras, Bohumil Němec, František Soukup. Prague: L. Mázač for Národní Rada Československá, 1936, 614 p.

A remarkable collection of scholarly studies by 46 experts, who trace the idea of Czechoslovak unity and survey the economic, political, social and religious conditions of today. The best single volume of its kind.

KAMPF IN BÖHMEN. By Hans Krebs. Berlin: Volk und Reich, 1936, 228 p. M. 7.50.

The relations between the Czechs and Germans in Czechoslovakia viewed from the German angle.

DER ARBEITER UND SEIN RECHT. By Konrad Henlein. Karlsbad, Leipzig: Frank, 1936, 70 p. 35 Pfennigs.

A plea by the chief of the Sudeten Party for working-class support.

LA NATURE JURIDIQUE DES CLAUSES TERRITORIALES DU TRAITÉ DE TRIANON. By Antal Ullein-Reviczky. Paris: Pedone, 1936, 252 p.

A Hungarian view, by a professor at the University of Debrecen.

LA GRANDE INDUSTRIE HONGROISE. By Geza Lengyel. Budapest: Librairie Grill R. Gergely, 1936, 44 p. Fr. 5.

An informative brochure on the development of Hungarian industry and foreign trade during the last ten years, published by the Confédération des Grands Industriels de Hongrie.

LA PROBLÈME DE LA DETTE PUBLIQUE DES ÉTATS BALKANIQUES. By Panagiotis B. Dertilis. Athens: Flamman, 1936, 388 p.

A history of the public debts of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Turkey and Jugoslavia.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE BALKANIQUE 1935. Edited by Léon Savadjian. Paris: Société Générale d'Imprimerie, 1936, 109 p. Fr. 45.

A list of books (with brief summaries) and articles published in 1935.

REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES ÉTUDES BALKANIQUES. Year II. Belgrade: Imprimerie Minerva, 1936, 629 p.

Contributions by numerous authors and in several languages on Balkan culture, history, and economics.

LE ROI ALEXANDRE. By J. N. Faure-Biguet. Paris: Plon, 1936, 95 p. Fr. 2.50.

A sympathetic biography of the late monarch.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

GREAT BRITAIN, EMPIRE AND COMMONWEALTH, 1886–1935. By J. A. Spender. London: Cassell, 1936, 932 p. 10/6.

The former editor of the *Westminster Gazette* chronicles a half century of British history. The thread of the story is the decay of liberalism.

THE RECORD OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. By Ramsay Muir. London: Allen and Unwin, 1936, 204 p. 5/.

A telling indictment of the Baldwin administration, which the author believes "to be the worst, the weakest, the most timorous and the most incompetent Government that Britain has known since the days of Lord North."

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MEN, MOVEMENTS, AND MYSELF. By Lord Snell. London: Dent, 1936, 284 p. 18/.

An eventful life spent in the service of English labor.

THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. VOLUME VIII. SOUTH AFRICA, RHODESIA AND THE PROTECTORATES. Edited by Arthur Percival Newton and others. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 1030 p. $11.00.

A massive work of coöperative scholarship tracing the history of Africa south of the Zambezi River from prehistoric times to the present, with the emphasis naturally on the period since the Boer War. More attention and sympathy might have been given to the native problem.

GENERAL SMUTS, VOLUME II. By Sarah Gertrude Millin. Boston: Little, Brown, 1936, 460 p. $3.50.

The concluding volume of the authorized biography. Mrs. Millin had access to the public and private papers of the Boer statesman. The book opens with Smuts' admission into the British war cabinet in 1917 and closes with the recent party union under Hertzog.

SOUTH AFRICA TO-DAY AND TO-MORROW. By R. J. M. Goold-Adams. London: Murray, 1936, 260 p. 6/.

A thoughtful book that does not hesitate to face the unpleasant racial question. The Union and Southern Rhodesia are advised to develop secondary industries and the latter to increase its white population many-fold in the near future.

DIE BÜRGERLICHE GESELLSCHAFT IN AUSTRALIEN. By Karl Heinz Pfeffer. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1936, 479 p. M. 16.

A discerning description of Australian social ideals and realities.

CROSS CURRENTS OF AUSTRALIAN FINANCE. By D. B. Copland and C. V. Janes. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1936, 496 p. 10/6.

Source material on the Commonwealth's money problems.

UNEMPLOYMENT POLICY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AUSTRALIA. By E. Ronald Walker. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1936, 258 p. 5/.

The Australian problem in its larger setting.

NORTH AUSTRALIA. By C. Price Conigrave. London: Cape, 1936, 319 p. 10/6.

The author, who spent fifteen years in northern Australia, emphasizes that in view of the resources and population of that region the Commonwealth cannot afford to ignore it or leave it unprotected against an expansionist foreign power.

NEW ZEALAND: A SHORT HISTORY. By J. C. Beaglehole. London: Allen and Unwin, 1936, 164 p. 3/6.

A reliable survey demonstrating how little politics has had to do with shaping the conditions of life in New Zealand.

Near East

SPRING UP, O WELL. By Dorothy Ruth Kahn. New York: Holt, 1936, 276 p. $2.75.

An American's very human reaction to the transformations being wrought in Palestine by the Jewish immigrants.

WAS GEHT IN PALAESTRINA VOR. By Elieser Pray. Tel-Aviv: Hashomer Hazair, 1936, 64 p.

A Marxian approach to the Arab problem in Palestine.

THE ARAB MOVEMENT IN PALESTINE AND ITS ORIGINS. By Michael Assaf. Tel-Aviv: Davar, 1936, 85 p.

Five lectures on the growth and character of Arab Nationalism.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GÉOGRAPHIE HUMAINE DE LA SYRIE CENTRALE. By Richard Thoumin. Paris: Leroux, 1936, 364 p. Fr. 80.

A scientific study of man's relation to his environment.

LA POLITIQUE DE L'IRAN DANS LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By Mostafa Mesbah Zadeh. Paris: Pedone, 1936, 176 p. Fr. 40.

Iran's attitude toward the organization of peace, explained primarily from a legalistic point of view.

DIE WIRTSCHAFTSVERFASSUNG IRANS. By Abdollah Malekpur. Berlin: Frickert, 1936, 111 p.

Iran's industry, financial structure and foreign trade, described with the aid of copious statistics.

THE SOUTHERN GATES OF ARABIA: A JOURNEY IN THE HADRAMAUT. By Freya Stark. New York: Dutton, 1936, 328 p. $3.75.

A profusely illustrated record of a journey in a region which has been visited by very few Europeans.

Africa

THE EFFECTS OF CENTRALIZATION ON EDUCATION IN MODERN EGYPT. By Russell Galt. Cairo: American University at Cairo, 1936, 134 p.

Interesting sidelights on the results of trying to harmonize European with Islamic educational ideals and practices.

L'AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE FRANÇAISE. PAR L'ATLANTIQUE OU PAR LE SAHARA? By Georges Tuaillon. Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1936, 462 p. Fr. 30.

A volume which contains more than the name implies, as it is a general treatment of the resources, history, and future possibilities of French West Africa.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE CRITIQUE DE L'AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE FRANÇAISE. By J.-L. Georges Tuaillon. Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1936, 49 p.

Most of the titles are of books published in the last few years.

DIE WEISSEN UND DIE SCHWARZEN: ERLEBNISSE IN FRANZÖSISCH-WESTAFRIKA. By Georg Gizycki. Essen: Essener Verlagsanstalt, 1936, 416 p. M. 5.80.

An unfavorable picture of French methods and officialdom in West Africa by one who served there for five years.

L'EMPIRE D'ÉTHIOPIE. LE MIRROIR DE L'ÉTHIOPIE MODERNE 1906–1935. By Adrien Zervos. Paris: Geuthner, 1936, 503 p. Fr. 120.

This valuable work is accompanied by over three hundred illustrations and forty maps. The author lived in Ethiopia for thirty years.

LA CONQUÊTE DE L'ÉTHIOPIE, By Paul Gentizon. Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1936, 294 p. Fr. 15.

An eye-witness account, by the correspondent of the Paris *Temps*, of the campaign in northern Ethiopia, concluding with the capture of Addis Ababa.

THE ABYSSINIA I KNEW. By General Virgin. London: Macmillan, 1936, 184 p. 8/6.

This descriptive work on Ethiopia by the Swedish general who at one time was military and political adviser to Haile Selassie gives a good account of the outbreak and early stages of the war.

TRE ANNI A GONDAR. By Raffaele Di Lauro. Milan: Mondadori, 1936, 218 p. L. 8.

Italy's last consul in Gondar recounts the events of the three years he passed there before the outbreak of the recent war. Richly illustrated.

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GRAZIANI A NEGHELLI. By S. Volta. Florence: Vallecchi, 1936, 205 p. L. 15.
The illustrated record of Graziani's difficult march from Somalia northwestward to the Ethiopian plateau, by an Italian journalist who accompanied him.

L'AVION NOIR. By Henry de Monfreid. Paris: Grasset, 1936, 212 p. Fr. 12.

LE MASQUE D'OR OU LE DERNIER NÉGUS. By Henry de Monfreid. Paris: Grasset, 1936, 256 p. Fr. 15.
Two racy effusions from the pen of a man well-acquainted with Ethiopia. Unfortunately his books are colored by an intense animosity against the Ethiopian government and a corresponding admiration for the Italians. Numerous illustrations.

DIE KÄMPFE IN KAMERUN 1914–1918. By Heinrich Mentzel. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1936, 102 p. M. 4.20.
This brief account is based on personal information and on the Reichsarchiv.

REISEN UND FORSCHUNGEN IN ANGOLA. By Otto Jessen. Berlin: Reimer, 1936, 397 p. M. 38.
A monumental and profusely illustrated work, the fruit of eleven different trips into Portugal's largest colony. The economic condition of the country, its government and kindred problems are competently handled.

Far East

COVERING THE FAR EAST. By Miles W. Vaughn. New York: Covici-Friede, 1936, 408 p. $3.00.
An American correspondent in the Orient from 1924 to 1933 records his experiences with a maximum of shrewd reporting and a minimum of philosophy.

JAPAN IN DER WELT. DIE JAPANISCHE EXPANSION SEIT 1854. By Anton Zischa. Bern and Leipzig: Goldmann, 1936, 388 p. M. 6.80.
A popular summary.

JAPANESE TRADE AND INDUSTRY PRESENT AND FUTURE. Compiled by Mitsubishi Economic Research Bureau. New York: Macmillan, 1936, 663 p. $7.50.
An indispensable fund of information for anyone interested in Japan's economic expansion. The subject matter is organized according to industries and is supported by some 500 tables of statistics.

MILITARISM IN JAPAN. By Kenneth W. Colegrove. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1936, 77 p. 75 cents.
The military tradition and how it has Japan in its grip today.

CHINA AT THE CROSSROADS: THE CHINESE SITUATION IN PERSPECTIVE. By Peng-Chun Chang. London: Evans, 1936, 179 p. 3/6.
The Chinese problem in its historical perspective, by a professor of philosophy at Nankai University in Tientsin.

CAN CHINA SURVIVE? By Hallett Abend and Anthony J. Billingham. New York: Ives Washburn, 1936, 317 p. $3.00.
Two American correspondents state that China can hope to preserve her independence against Japanese encroachments only with outside help.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK UND DIE REGIERUNG DER KUOMINTANG IN CHINA. By Gustav Amman. Berlin: Vowinkel, 1936, 240 p. M. 7.50.
A sequel to "The Legacy of Sun Yat Sen" (1929), covering the period 1927–1933. The author finds that the Japanese and Russian pressures on China have caused Chiang Kai-shek to adopt as his goal a Far East version of National Socialism.

LE DROIT CHINOIS. By Jean Escarra. Peiping: Vetch, 1936, 559 p. Ch. $18; Paris: Sirey, Fr. 95.

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ILLINOIS

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A learned treatise on the conception and evolution of China's legislative and judicial institutions, by a professor of law at the University of Paris who has been adviser to the Chinese government.

NEWS FROM TARTARY: A JOURNEY FROM PEKING TO KASHMIR. By Peter Fleming. New York: Scribner, 1936, 384 p. $3.00.

A brilliantly written account of a trip from Peiping through China's hinterland to Sinkiang, the Soviet penetration of which the author highly deplores.

FRENCH POLICY AND DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA. By Thomas E. Ennis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936, 230 p. $3.00.

This admirable study throws into strong relief the aims and methods peculiar to French colonial policy.

Latin America

LES RELATIONS DES ÉTATS DE L'AMÉRIQUE LATINE AVEC LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS. By Manuel Perez-Guerrero. Paris: Pedone, 1936, 220 p. Fr. 30.

A much needed legal and historical synthesis by a Venezuelan expert.

HANDBOOK OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES. Edited by Lewis Hanke. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936, 250 p. $3.00.

A topically arranged and annotated bibliography of 2,343 books and articles published in 1935.

MEXICO: A REVOLUTION BY EDUCATION. By George I. Sánchez. New York: Viking, 1936, 211 p. $2.75.

An educator from New Mexico gives an absorbing picture of the rapid changes being wrought in the culture of old Mexico.

SOCIAL ASPECTS OF THE BANANA INDUSTRY. By Charles David Kepner, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936, 230 p. $3.00.

Some results of the activities of American fruit companies in the Caribbean area.

HAITI AND HER PROBLEMS. By Dantes Bellegarde. Rio Piedras: University of Puerto Rico, 1936, 55 p.

Lectures by a Haitian diplomat.

GÓMEZ: TYRANT OF THE ANDES. By Thomas Rourke. New York: Morrow, 1936, 320 p. $3.50.

The colorful career of Venezuela's late dictator entertainingly disclosed. The author gives credit to Gomez for the material benefits he bestowed on his country, but insists that they were not at all sufficient to compensate for the moral and intellectual degradation of a whole generation.

DIE DIPLOMATISCHE VORGESCHICHTE DES CHACOKONFLIKTS. By Hans Sandelmann. Leiden: Sijthoff, 1936, 300 p. M. 10.50.

A thorough study of the period up to the middle of 1932.

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ARMAMENT

ARMAMENTS YEAR-BOOK, General and Statistical Information. Afghanistan — Albania — Sa'udi Arabia — Argentine — Australia — Austria — Belgium — Bolivia — Brazil — United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (including British Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories and Newfoundland) — Bulgaria — Canada — Chile — China — Colombia — Costa Rica — Cuba — Czechoslovakia — Denmark — Dominican Republic — Ecuador — Egypt — Estonia — Finland — France — Germany — Greece — Guatemala — Haiti — Honduras — Hungary — India — Iran — Iraq — Irish Free State — Italy — Japan — Latvia — Liberia — Lithuania — Luxemburg — Mexico — Netherlands — New Zealand — Nicaragua — Norway — Panama — Paraguay — Peru — Poland — Portugal — Roumania — Salvador — Siam — Spain — Sweden — Switzerland — Turkey — Union of South Africa — Union of Soviet Socialist Republics — United States of America — Uruguay — Venezuela — Yugoslavia (Kingdom of). Geneva, 1936. 1129 p. 24 cm. (League of Nations, C.186.M.119.1936.IX.5.)

COLLECTIVE SECURITY, A record of the Seventh and Eighth International Studies Conferences Paris 1934–London 1935, edited by Maurice Bourquin. Paris, International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, 1936. xi, 514 p. 22½ cm.

CONFERENCE for Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Conference Documents. Volume III (pages 737–938). Geneva, 1936. 33 cm. (League of Nations, 1936. IX. 4.)

CONFERENCE for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. PRELIMINARY REPORT on the Work of the Conference. Prepared by the President, Mr. Arthur Henderson. Geneva, 1936. 206 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, Conf. D.171(1).1936.IX.3.)

RECORDS of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. Series B. Minutes of the General Commission. Volume III, October 16, 1933–June 11, 1934 (Pages xxi–xxiv and 645–694). Geneva, 1936. 33 cm. (League of Nations, 1936. IX. 1.)

——— Series C. Minutes of the Bureau. Volume II, October 9, 1933–November 20, 1934 (Pages ix–xii and 179–256). Geneva, 1936. 33 cm. (League of Nations, 1936. IX. 2.)

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COPYRIGHT protection throughout the world: pt. 1, International régime, by Leo G. Koepfle. May 20, 1936. Washington, 1936. [1], iii, 70 p. (Foreign and Domestic Commerce Bureau, Industrial property bulletin, patents, trade marks, copyrights, and unfair competition under foreign laws, C. L. no. 582; PTM 83; Commercial Laws Division.) Paper, 10c. single copy (70c. per set. 7 pts.), $1.00 a year.

——— Same: pt. 2, British Empire; by Leo G. Koepfle. June 20, 1936. Washington, 1936. [3], 175 p. (Industrial property bulletin, . . . C. L. no. 587; PTM 84; Commercial Laws Division.)

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

TWELFTH Annual Report of the Permanent Court of International Justice (June 15, 1935–June 15, 1936). Leyden, 1936. 427 p. 24½ cm. (Series E, No. 12.)

THIRD GENERAL INDEX of the Publications of the Court (Series A./B. and C). Twentieth–Thirty-Fifth Sessions (1931–1935). Leyden, 1936. 129, 129 p. 24½ cm. (Series F, No. 3.)

COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

APPLICATION of the Principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations. STUDY of the Proposals Submitted by Members of the League. Geneva, 1936. 32 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.376.M.247.1936.VII.8.)

——— COMMUNICATIONS from Governments received up to September 12, 1936, in reply to the Secretary-General's Circular Letter 124, of July 7, 1936. Geneva, 1936. 25 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A.31.1936.VII.9.)

——— COMMUNICATION from the Chinese Government. Memorandum of the Chinese Government making Certain Suggestions to improve the Application of the Principles of the Covenant. Geneva, 1936. 2 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A.32.1936.VII.10.)

——— COMMUNICATION from the Polish Government. Geneva, 1936. 1 double p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A.35.1936.VII.11.) In French and English.

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——— COMMUNICATION from the Iranian Government. Geneva, 1936. 1 double p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A.40.1936.VII.12.)

——— REPORT submitted by the General Commission to the Assembly. Geneva, 1936. 3 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, A.83.1936.VII.13.)

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

EQUALITY of Treatment in the Present State of International Commercial Relations. The Most-Favoured-Nation Clause. Geneva, 1936. 26 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, C.379.M.250. 1936.II.B.9.)

REMARKS on the Present Phase of International Economic Relations. Reconstruction of the Machinery of International Exchange as a Factor in Recovery and Appeasement. Together with Observations by the Financial Committee. Geneva, 1936. 10 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, C.378. M.249.1936.II.B.7.)

REPORT on the Work of the League 1935/36. Annex: Note by the Secretary-General on the Economic Situation. Geneva, 1936. 16 p. incl. tables, graphs. 24 cm. (League of Nations, A.6(a). 1936. Annex II. 1936. Gen. 7.)

REVIEW of World Trade 1935. Geneva, 1936. 85 p. 27 cm. (League of Nations, 1936. II.A.14.)

WORLD ECONOMIC Survey, Fifth Year 1935/36. Geneva, 1936. 338 p. incl. tables, graphs. 24 cm. (League of Nations, 1936. II.A.15.)

WORLD Production and Prices 1935/36. Geneva, 1936. 156 p. incl. tables, graphs. 27 cm. (League of Nations, 1936. II.A.16.)

EGYPT — UNITED KINGDOM

TREATY of Alliance between His Majesty, in respect of the United Kingdom, and His Majesty the King of Egypt . . . and a Convention concerning the Immunities and Privileges to be enjoyed by the British Forces in Egypt, London, August 26, 1936. London, 1936. 29 p. 24½ cm. (Egypt No. 1 (1936) Cmd. 5270.) 6d.

FAUNA AND FLORA

International Convention for the Protection of Fauna and Flora (with protocol), London, November 8, 1933. London, 1936. 45 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 27 (1936) Cmd. 5280.) 9d.

LABOR CONFERENCE, INTERNATIONAL

REDUCTION OF HOURS of Work in the Textile Industry. International Labour Conference, Twenty-Third Session, Geneva, 1937. Second Item on the Agenda. Questionnaire II. Geneva, 1936. 47 p. 24 cm.

SAFETY PROVISIONS for Workers in the Building Industry with reference to Scaffolding and Hoisting Machinery. International Labour Conference, Twenty-Third Session, Geneva, 1937. First Item on the Agenda. Questionnaire I. Geneva, 1936. 47 p. 24 cm.

LABOR QUESTIONS

The I.L.O. Year-Book 1935–36. Geneva, 1936. vii, 571 p. charts. 24 cm. At head of title: International Labour Office.

INDUSTRIAL Environment and Health, Practical methods of investigation. Geneva, 1936. v, 336 p. incl. illus., tables, graphs. 17 cm. (International Labour Office.)

INTERSTATE COMPACTS on Labour Legislation in the United States by Ethel M. Johnson. Geneva, 1936. 28 p. 24 cm. (Reprinted from the *International Labour Review*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 6, June 1936.)

YEAR-BOOK of Labour Statistics 1935–36, first year of issue. Geneva, 1936. viii, 227 p. incl. tables. 24 cm.

TWENTIETH Session of the International Labour Conference. Geneva, 1936. 52 p. 24 cm. (Reprinted from the *International Labour Review*, Vol. XXXIV, No. 3, September 1936.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS

LEAGUE OF NATIONS. JOURNAL of the Seventeenth Session of the Assembly. No. 1. [– 19]. — Geneva, Sunday, September 20 [– Sunday, October 11], 1936. Geneva, 1936. 19 numbers. 33 cm.

VERBATIM RECORD of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations. First [– Seventeenth] Plenary Meeting, Monday, September 21 [– Saturday, October 10], 1936. Geneva, 1936. 17 numbers. 33 cm.

MANCHURIA

A BRIEF Survey of the Manchoukuo State Railways. 2d ed. Mukden, General Direction, 1936. 7 p. of photos. 2, 51 p. map. 22 cm.

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FIFTH REPORT on Progress in Manchuria to 1936. Dairen, South Manchuria Railway Company, 1936. vii, 253 p. maps. charts. photos. 28½ cm.

MANDATED TERRITORIES

MANDATED Territory of WESTERN SAMOA. (Sixteenth Report of the Government of New Zealand on the Administration of, for the Year ended March 31, 1936.) Wellington, G. H. Loney, 1936. 28 p., map. 33 cm. 1 s. (At head of title: A. — 4. 1936. New Zealand.)

PERMANENT MANDATES Commission. Minutes of the Twenty-Ninth Session. Held at Geneva from May 27 to June 12, 1936, including the Report of the Commission to the Council. Geneva, 1936. 234 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C.259.M.153.1936.VI.A.1.)

RAPPORT à la Société des Nations sur la situation de la SYRIE et du LIBAN (année 1935). Paris, Imprimerie Nationale, 1936. xvii, 233 p. incl. tables. 31 cm. At head of title: République Française. Ministère des Affaires Étrangères.

REPORT by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of the CAMEROONS under British Mandate for the Year 1935. London, 1936. 136 p. incl. charts. map. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 118.) 3s.

REPORT by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of TOGOLAND under British Mandate for the year 1935. London, 1936. 103 p. maps. 24½ cm. (Colonial No. 117.) 2s. 6d.

REPORT to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of NAURU during the year 1935. Canberra, L. F. Johnston, 1936. 38 p. incl. tables, graphs. 33½ cm. At head of title: Commonwealth of Australia.

REPORT to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of the Territory of NEW GUINEA from July 1, 1934, to June 30, 1935. Canberra, L. F. Johnston, 1936. 126 p. incl. tables. 33½ cm. At head of title: Commonwealth of Australia.

MARITIME LABOR

BRIEF REPORT on the Work of the Organisation, 1919–1936. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1936. 46 p. 24 cm. (At head of title: International Labour Conference. Twenty-First (Maritime) Session, Geneva, October 1936.)

HOURS of Work on Board Ship and Manning. International Labour Conference, Twenty-First (Maritime) Session, Geneva, October 1936. Item I (A and B) on the Agenda. Report I (A and B). Geneva, 1936. 179 p. 24 cm.

HOLIDAYS With Pay for Seamen. International Labour Conference, Twenty-First (Maritime) Session, Geneva, October 1936. Fifth Item on the Agenda. Report V. Geneva, 1936. 69 p. 24 cm.

PARTIAL REVISION of the Minimum Age (Sea) Convention 1920 (No. 7). International Labour Conference, Twenty-Second Session, Geneva, 1936. Geneva, 1936. 23 p. 24 cm.

MUNITIONS INDUSTRY

MUNITIONS INDUSTRY, Special Senate Committee, Munitions Industry, [reports] pursuant to S. Res. 206 (73d Congress), to make certain investigations concerning manufacture and sale of arms and other war munitions. Washington, 1936. [pts. 3–7] (Senate Report 944, pts. 3–7, 74th Cong. 2d sess.)

Pt. 3. [Report on activities and sales of munitions companies; submitted by Mr. Nye.] v, 282 p. il., 2 p. of maps. Paper, 25c.

Pt. 4. Report on War Department bills S. 1716–S. 1722, relating to industrial mobilization in wartime; [submitted by Mr. Clark]. iii, 76 p. Paper, 10c.

Pt. 5. Report on existing legislation; [submitted by Mr. Clark]. vi, 232 p. Paper, 15c.

Pt. 6. Supplemental report on adequacy of existing legislation; [submitted by Mr. Nye]. iii, 184 p. il. 2 pl. Paper, 15c.

Pt. 7. Report on Government manufacture of munitions; [submitted by Mr. Nye]. iii, 123 p. Paper, 10c.

——— MINUTES of Council of National Defense. Washington, 1936. vii, 318 p. (Senate committee print, no. 7, 74th Cong., 2d sess.) Paper, 35c.

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